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Latin American and Caribbean countries have substantially transformed 
their economies over the past decades by adopting policies that foster a 
greater outward orientation of their economies and by setting aside 
import substitution development strategies. While the intensity of the 
transformations varies across countries, the region has definitely shifted 
development models. Macroeconomic and trade policy reforms are at 
the center of the changes that have taken place.
One of the foundations of the development strategy adopted by 
Latin American countries is the high priority assigned to increasing 
exports. Exports have certainly increased from US$104 billion in 1987 
to US$279 billion in 1997. Nevertheless, that expansion is partly due to 
the growth of exports from one country, Mexico. In fact, the region’s 
share in world merchandise trade declined from 5.8% in 1983 to 5.3% 
in 1997: Latin America’s share, excluding Mexico, was only 3.2% for 
that last year, which is practically the same as in 1990 (3.1%), accord­
ing to the World Trade Organization (WTO 1998a). Therefore, Latin 
American countries are not taking full advantage of the opportunities 
that result from the increase of global trade.
Moreover, according to the Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean, primary commodities still make up an 
important share of the countries’ exports for most countries, excluding 
Barbados, Brazil, and Mexico (ECLAC 1999a). In consequence, Latin 
American and Caribbean economies are highly vulnerable to the fluctu­
ations of the global economy. This export specialization is also undesir­
able in the long run because the prices of commodities relative to those 
of manufactured goods will continue to decline during the coming 
decades (World Bank 1999).
1
2 Introduction
The counterpart to Latin America’s enduring specialization in 
exporting primary commodities is the region’s inability to have manu­
factured exports grow at high rates. For the vast majority of Latin 
American countries, exports of goods with higher levels of value added 
tend to decrease as the domestic demand recovers and the exchange rate 
appreciates. The region’s poor performance regarding manufactured 
exports is one of the explanations for its inability to benefit from the 
expansion of global trade, since trade of manufactured exports grows at 
a much higher rate than other exports. For instance, manufactured 
exports grew at 7% per year from 1990 to 1997, while agricultural and 
mining exports grew at a rate of 4.5% for the same period (WTO 
1998b).
Mexico— which has had a spectacular export performance during 
recent years— is the most notable exception to the specialization in 
exporting commodities. The share of Mexico’s exports in merchandise 
exports from Latin America has risen during the past several years to 
43% in 1998. The main explanations for Mexico’s outstanding export 
performance are the close links to the U.S. market that were strength­
ened by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and spe­
cialization in exporting manufactured goods.
The differences in export specialization have significant conse­
quences for trade performance: Latin America’s merchandise exports, 
excluding those of Mexico, dropped by 7% in 1998, but Mexico’s have 
increased by 6.5%. That country’s exports have systematically grown at 
higher rates than exports from the rest of the region over the past few 
years (WTO 1999).
Additionally, Latin America’s being weak in manufactured exports 
has momentous consequences by insulating it from the dynamic 
growth-stimulating effects of manufacturing for export, such as the 
“learning effects, the realization of scale economies and the creation of 
positive externalities associated with manufacturing for export” 
(Helleiner 1995).
Therefore, the question at issue is which policies have the potential 
of encouraging a higher export growth rate, particularly for manufac­
tured exports. Achieving this goal would allow Latin American and 
Caribbean countries to take greater advantage of the opportunities aris­
ing from the increase of global trade. At the same time, these countries 
could benefit from the positive spillover effects of manufacturing for 
export.
Latin American governments have started to assign a greater priori­
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ty to export growth policies during recent years. There is a growing 
recognition that while macroeconomic and trade policy reforms are 
essential for improving export growth, they are not sufficient for 
encouraging a sustainable increase of manufactured exports.
The export promotion policies that have customarily been used by 
the countries in the region have, for the most part, become insufficient 
for addressing the challenges faced by export firms nowadays. More 
needs to be done if the region wishes to reap the benefits of the surge of 
global trade.
Together with that, the updated export promotion policies need to 
be compatible with the Uruguay Round Agreements. These agreements 
have benefited developing countries by increasing trade opportunities 
and strengthening the dispute settlement procedures, and have estab­
lished new rules for nonagricultural export subsidies, which will be pro­
gressively cut. The new rules— to be enforced by the W T O — will lead 
to important changes in policy, many of them beneficial to developing 
countries in the present circumstances.
One of the consequences of the W T O  rules is that the new export 
promotion policies will have to emphasize addressing the source of the 
inefficiencies that originally justified setting up export subsidies. The 
new rules governing multilateral trade allow governments to resist the 
pressures of lobbies and to move toward policies that address ineffi­
ciencies at the source and seek to increase firms’ ability to export on a 
sustainable basis. Similarly, many of the policies traditionally used to 
set up export-processing zones will have to be modified. Therefore, 
export promotion policies will become more relevant than in the past, 
as other instruments are eliminated.
Hence, most countries in the region will have to revise their export 
promotion policies to ensure that the policies will be fully compatible 
with the new multilateral trade rules by the year 2003. The new set of 
export promotion policies needs to be effective— in tune with the new 
policy environment and consistent with the new multilateral trade rules.
This book seeks to contribute to the discussions of policymakers 
regarding which policies would be most appropriate for encouraging 
export growth in Latin America. The approach used here is to combine 
an examination of a country’s export promotion policies with microeco­
nomic research. The case studies were carried out in firms that export 
manufactured goods with relatively high levels of value added, at least 
when compared to the region’s exports. The purpose was to learn from 
the companies that are successful exporters and to assess the effective­
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ness of export promotion policies from the viewpoint of the final users, 
that is export firms themselves. This procedure is rarely used to evalu­
ate the effectiveness of policy instruments.
At the same time, carrying out company-based studies has the addi­
tional benefit of improving the knowledge of firms’ behavior in the con­
text of the present macroeconomic and trade policies. The abundance of 
macroeconomic studies over the past years stands in contrast to the 
scarcity of the research on how Latin American firms have changed 
their behavior in response to the macroeconomic and trade policy 
changes.
One of the first microeconomic studies examined how Chilean 
firms had adapted to the macroeconomic and trade policy changes dur­
ing the 1970s and early 1980s (Corbo and Sánchez 1984). In recent 
years, there has been a growing interest in conducting research into the 
changes in manufacturing companies’ behavior and the way they are 
adapting to the new economic environment.1 Nevertheless, the evidence 
about the microeconomic changes in Latin America following the 
changes in macroeconomic and trade policy is still lacking. This vol­
ume seeks to provide information that helps to fill that gap, and should 
be useful for academics and analysts interested in the behavior of Latin 
American manufacturing companies.
All the same, it is important to point out that the approach used for 
the country studies has the disadvantage of working with a sample that 
is not statistically representative, thus producing weaker conclusions 
than those based on econometric analysis. Moreover, there is an evident 
selection bias, because most of the studies focused on companies that 
were successful at exporting.
Despite these limitations, the procedure used here has the advan­
tage of providing an abundance of information at the microeconomic 
level that is very useful for designing export promotion instruments. 
These instruments are designed to be used by individual companies. If 
the knowledge of how export companies behave is inadequate, the poli­
cy instruments may be off target and therefore ineffective.
This book presents country studies of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and 
Mexico. It was essential to include Brazil and Mexico because they are 
the two leading exporters in Latin America. Mexico is also the only 
country in the region that exports significant amounts of manufactured 
goods, in spite of having been essentially a primary goods exporter as 
recently as the early 1980s. For an investigation of policies that suc­
cessfully encourage manufactured exports, Mexico is clearly the first 
choice among Latin American and Caribbean countries.2
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Chile was one of the first countries in the region to adopt an out­
ward-oriented strategy. It was also a forerunner in export promotion 
policies. Both Chile and Mexico have export promotion policies that are 
effective and, for the most part, compatible with the new rules that will 
be enforced by the WTO. Colombia is included in the country studies 
because it was one of the first nations in Latin America to have effective 
export promotion policies. Study of these four countries allows a good 
geographical sample of the medium and large economies of the region.
The remainder of Chapter 1 highlights certain points of the debate 
about economies of scale and learning by exporting, from the perspec­
tive of thinking about policies for export growth. It briefly reviews 
some of the findings of the country studies regarding the main questions 
addressed by the project, and is but a concise summary aimed at 
prompting a first discussion of these issues. It is not intended as an 
exhaustive presentation; each chapter discusses additional topics direct­
ly relevant to the specific country.
Chapters 2 to 5 examine the policies that are determinants for 
export performance in the four named Latin American countries. The 
chapters describe the macroeconomic environment and trade policy and 
detail export promotion instruments in these countries. They also dis­
cuss the influence of these policies on the behavior of export firms so as 
to derive conclusions relevant for formulating policy recommendations 
aimed at enhancing export performance. Chapter 6 sets forth policy rec­
ommendations aimed at increasing exports based on the results of the 
country studies.
Economies of Scale and Learning by Exporting: 
A  Review of the Literature
For many years, the fundamental principles of trade theory were the 
models presented by David Ricardo and by Eli Heckscher and Bertil 
Ohlin. Ricardo’s model demonstrated that trade among countries was 
driven by the differences between relative prices. Heckscher and 
Ohlin’s model established that countries would specialize in exporting 
goods relatively intensive in the production factors they were most 
abundant in prior to trade and that— in the long run— trade tends to 
equalize factor returns (Caves and Jones 1985). Along with these two 
models, there are many others in traditional trade theory that have made 
key contributions to the understanding of the main features of trade 
flows in the world, particularly interindustry trade.
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Nevertheless, traditional trade theory cannot provide an explanation 
for the discrepancy between the Heckscher-Ohlin-based models ’ predic­
tion about factor return equalization and what can be observed in the 
real world. It cannot predict the growing importance of intraindustry 
trade between industrialized nations or of intrafirm trade by multina­
tional corporations. Furthermore, there is a confusion between positive 
and normative issues when the Heckscher and Ohlin model’s prediction 
that countries with abundant labor will specialize in exporting labor- 
intensive goods gets turned into a policy recommendation suggesting 
that developing countries should specialize in exporting this kind of 
merchandise (Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1983).
The inconsistency between traditional trade theory’s predictions 
and the stylized facts characterizing trade flows today became more 
acute in light of the remarkable growth of manufactured exports from 
the newly industrializing countries in Southeast Asia. Far from special­
izing permanently in exporting goods for which they had an initial com­
parative advantage, these countries decided to build the capability to 
progressively modify their comparative advantage. Traditional trade 
theory— based on the assumptions of perfect competition, perfect infor­
mation, homogeneous products, and constant returns to scale— was not 
very useful when analyzing the changes that were taking place and was 
even less so when it came to thinking about the policy implications.
In response to these lacunae, efforts were made during the 1970s 
and the 1980s to develop international trade models that no longer sys­
tematically included the restrictive assumptions mentioned above. The 
models introduced concepts from the theory of industrial organization, 
thus allowing for imperfect competition, increasing returns to scale, 
product differentiation, and asymmetric information (Ethier 1979; 
Brander and Spencer 1985; Horstmann and Markusen 1992; Brainard 
1993; Neary 1994). The models’ purpose is to show that trade is not 
always driven by comparative advantage but can also result from 
increasing returns to scale within the firm, from external economies, 
and/or from imperfect competition. The models’ significant contribu­
tion to economic theory is that trade models presently have a greater 
consistency with some of the stylized facts currently observed, such as 
intraindustry trade.
Paul Krugman’s pioneer work played a particularly important role 
in this improvement by developing techniques that allowed a formal 
introduction of economies of scale in trade models. He demonstrated, 
for example, that an early start in producing a good can allow a country 
to acquire an advantage in that industry through dynamic increasing
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returns— external economies that are obtained throughout time— as the 
industry accumulates knowledge (Krugman 1987; Krugman and 
Obstfeld 1994). When the industry spends more time producing the 
good, it can decrease average cost due to past experience (learning by 
doing) and specialize in the production of that good. History may mat­
ter more than initial comparative advantage.
Hence, it may be that specialization results not only from an initial 
static comparative advantage but also from economies of scale within 
the firm or the industry, from an early start in producing a good, or from 
a temporary shock that promotes (or destroys) a given industry. Thus 
temporary shocks can have permanent effects on trade.
Alwyn Young (1991) discusses the dynamic effects of international 
trade with an endogenous growth model in which learning by doing, 
while being bounded for each good, has positive spillovers across 
goods. This model is useful for analyzing the learning that takes place 
over time as firms learn how to export, which allows them to acquire 
permanent comparative advantages as long as the learning cannot be 
totally captured across borders or internationalized. The greater the link 
between the dynamic economies of scale and country-specific charac­
teristics that cannot be easily transferred, such as human capital or an 
efficient institutional support system, the greater the comparative 
advantage that the industry can acquire. Inversely, if the knowledge can 
easily be copied, such as what variety of asparagus is the best for 
exports or which are the countries that are the best purchasers, the coun­
try will have difficulty in maintaining its comparative advantage. Other 
nations will benefit from its pioneer export activities.
Many of the new trade theory models presented by economists in 
industrialized countries appear to be a mere formalized version of 
issues that have been discussed for years by economists interested in 
development economics, such as industrialization by import substitu­
tion and infant industries. Dani Rodrik (1988) points out that “this new 
literature is a frustrating reminder to the south that too often ideas 
become intellectually respectable only when they become congruent 
with the interest of major northern countries.”
Yet, the new models do present the outstanding advantage of 
attempting to set up in a formal way issues that had up to now not been 
presented in such a form. They also contribute to bringing back to the 
center of the discussion of economic analysis topics that, while being 
relevant for developing countries, had been excluded from the main­
stream of the economic theory due to the lack of rigorous economic 
models.
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From a different perspective, Jorge Katz (1987) carried out research 
on the economics of technology generation in the largest Latin 
American countries. His investigation in individual firms yields an evo­
lutionary path for “in-house” technological search efforts, as companies 
try to adapt technologies designed for firms in industrialized nations. 
Once this learning path is followed, the companies have a technology 
that is functional for domestic conditions. Therefore, they are then able 
to export the adapted technologies to neighboring countries, given that 
these technologies will also tend to be more appropriate for firms in 
those nations. From that perspective, “technological learning in the 
domestic industrial sector could give rise to a sequence of exports of 
increasing technical sophistication” (Ablin and Katz 1987). Although 
these studies are not carried out in the framework of the new trade theo­
ry, but rather in that of evolutionary economics, they also depart from 
standard neoclassical theory by proceeding to lift assumptions.
At the outset, the new trade theory was thought out from a positive 
perspective, which is to provide models with predictions that are more 
consistent with the observed stylized facts. The goal was not a norma­
tive one. However, the policy implications of these new models have 
been at the center of intense discussions. This is particularly the case of 
the strategic trade policy.
The general idea behind the strategic trade policy is that a home 
country that is initially less competitive than a foreign country in a 
given industry could shift its comparative advantage by temporarily 
closing down its economy. This would enable it to protect the domestic 
industry, thus allowing it to become more productive until it reaches the 
productivity level of the foreign country. Krugman has pointed out that 
he believes that the strategic trade policy argument should not be con­
sidered a major contribution of the new trade theory since it cannot be 
proven that deviating from free trade provides countries with substan­
tial gains (Krugman 1993; Helpman 1989).
What are the implications of the new trade theory models for devel­
oping countries today? Without discussing whether strategic trade poli­
cy is beneficial to large industrialized nations, it clearly is not appropri­
ate for the Latin American economies given that they have relatively 
small domestic markets. The limited size of the domestic market would 
hinder firms from attaining a level of output where they could have sub­
stantial economies of scale if they were temporarily protected from 
import competition. That is precisely one of the stumbling blocks to the 
import substitution development strategy.
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In addition, the welfare loss to consumers because of protection, 
even temporary, would be significant. Moreover, an increase of protec­
tion would be incompatible with the macroeconomic and trade policy 
reforms in Latin American countries during the past decades. Finally, 
the difficulty of designing appropriate policies within the framework of 
strategic trade policy and of avoiding its benefits from being captured 
by special-interest groups is certainly not negligible. Therefore, the 
costs of protection would be clearly higher than the benefits.
However, the fact that strategic trade policy is not relevant for 
developing countries does not imply that the same conclusion can be 
reached for economies of scale. While increasing returns to scale have 
mainly been used to explain intraindustry trade between industrialized 
nations, the fact that intraindustry trade is not as significant for devel­
oping countries does not imply that economies of scale are irrelevant 
for developing nations. In these countries increasing returns explain 
some flows of interindustry trade: for smaller economies, an efficient 
plant size may produce a level of output that is bigger than the size of 
the domestic market. Since the degree of specialization is not as high as 
in industrialized countries, interindustry trade may be relatively more 
important than intraindustry trade. On the other hand, as preferential 
trade agreements expand the size of regional markets, intraindustry 
trade may become more important between the members of the agree­
ments.
Economies of scale have figured prominently in the discussion 
regarding the improvement of resource allocation in developing coun­
tries. Anne Krueger (1985) indicates that the possibility of exploiting 
economies of scale is one of the reasons why export-oriented develop­
ment strategies have enabled Asian exporters to achieve higher growth 
rates than countries following import substitution strategies.
José Antonio Ocampo (1993) points out that the new trade theory 
has implications for trade policy in developing countries: liberalizing 
trade between developing nations allows them to take advantage of the 
different economies of scale discussed by these models. Regional pref­
erential trade agreements also allow firms to have access to larger mar­
kets and therefore to benefit from economies of scale (Devlin and 
Ffrench-Davis 1999).
It must be pointed out that the initial impact of trade liberalization 
on economies of scale is not straightforward. Although it is true that 
domestic firms in industries with increasing returns may potentially 
achieve economies of scale when countries open up their economies,
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the impact may be ambiguous. Trade liberalization may destroy indus­
tries that had previously had access to economies of scale as long as the 
domestic market was protected (Rodrik 1992).
Yet, when the discussion turns away from the topic of whether trade 
liberalization will always result in resource allocation gains— or if these 
gains are also the product of the sound macroeconomic policies that 
accompanied trade liberalization— to that of analyzing the case of firms 
that not only survived the opening up of the economy but effectively are 
exporting, and of comparing them to firms that do not sell abroad once 
trade has been liberalized for several years already, the ambiguity 
decreases. One could expect export firms to have a decrease in their 
unit cost as their output increases due to increased exports, if the tech­
nology used in the industry allows for increasing returns.
Therefore, the perspective provided by the new trade theory models 
is particularly useful for developing countries when analyzing those 
economies of scale that arise while exporting. These can be the most 
frequently mentioned economies of scale— static economies of scale 
ensuing, for example, from a greater production capability due to larger 
plants— together with dynamic economies of scale resulting from 
investment over time and from knowledge accumulation through learn­
ing by doing.
Hence, while one policy conclusion that could be derived from the 
new trade theory models in industrialized nations is to suggest that in 
some industries it is advisable to temporarily protect domestic firms to 
ensure them economies of scale that allow an increase in productivity, 
these same models lead to radically different policy recommendations 
for developing countries with smaller domestic markets.
In fact, the policy recommendation in developing countries for 
industries that have the potential to benefit from economies of scale is 
exactly the opposite. The firms that should receive temporary assistance 
should not be those producing mainly for the domestic market. On the 
contrary, support should be available for export firms that have access 
to a larger market when exporting: selling abroad allows such compa­
nies to attain greater economies of scale. It also enables firms to get on 
a steeper learning curve because they are exposed to highly demanding 
clients, the most advanced technologies, and updated product specifica­
tions and marketing strategies. Inasmuch as there are potential benefits 
that can be obtained by putting firms on steeper learning curves and 
having access to a larger market, it is export firms that should receive 
assistance.
Moreover, upgrading technology in manufacturing often implies
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larger scales of plants and of companies (Alcorta 1994). Furthermore, 
economies of scale can also play a role as a firm increases its interna­
tional marketing capability (Keesing and Lall 1992). There are specific 
economies of scale directly related to exporting, for example, resulting 
from a fixed cost such as having an export division. At the same time, 
there are external economies as more companies get information on 
how to export and on new markets.
The externalities resulting from pioneer export firms’ activities are 
an additional justification for providing assistance for these companies. 
Marketing abroad is an expensive and demanding activity for pioneer 
firms that benefits latecomers as they enter markets where the first suc­
cessful firms have already shown the way and borne most of the initial 
costs and risks. This is particularly true for information costs. The fact 
that pioneer firms cannot capture all the benefits of their initial incur­
sion into world markets results in a level of exports that is suboptimal.
The role of knowledge accumulation and learning by doing in 
growth and trade models has become more relevant in the recent years 
(Lucas 1993; Krugman 1987; Krugman and Obstfeld 1994).3 At the 
same time, certain econometric studies have concluded that there is no 
evidence that firms learn from exporting (Clerides, Lach, and Tybout 
1998; Roberts and Tybout 1997 discussed by Westphal [1998]).
Larry Westphal questions the results from these aggregate data 
investigations by pointing out that they contradict the evidence from an 
abundance of findings from case studies. He believes that the link 
between high exports and remarkable development performance results 
from the “unrivaled benefits in the form of accelerated and efficacious 
technological development that can be derived through aggressive 
export activity” (Westphal 2225).
An empirical confirmation of the importance that purposefully ori­
ented learning has for developing countries is provided by the experi­
ence of the East Asian countries: “What the whole East Asian experi­
ence has been about is learning, entering global markets at the low end, 
moving up and taking advantages of the learning which comes with 
playing in the global market” (Barry 1989).
Concurrently, Michael Hobday (1995) provides a thorough descrip­
tion of the exceptional learning process undertaken by electronic firms 
in East Asia. Exporting pushed these companies to upgrade their tech­
nological and marketing skills to be able to satisfy requirements more 
demanding than those in the domestic markets.
The additional exposure to learning opportunities when selling 
abroad appears to be particularly significant for exports of products
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with relatively high value added. Exporting these products often 
demands a greater technological knowledge that can in turn have posi­
tive spillovers for the rest of the economy. This is now an important 
issue for Latin American countries.
In sum, economies of scale and learning by doing are at the center 
of some of the issues discussed by mainstream economic theory. The 
investigation in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico was designed to 
establish whether these topics are relevant for successful Latin 
American export companies. It also examined other subjects that are 
critical for firms’ export performance and for effective export promo­
tion policies.
Issues Covered in This Book
The rest of this chapter summarizes some of the points addressed by the 
country studies. It does not intend, however, to cover all the topics dis­
cussed in the following chapters. The questions asked here are the fol­
lowing: Do firms that export regularly have access to greater economies 
of scale than companies focused mainly on the domestic market? Do 
export companies have— over time— greater learning opportunities than 
nonexport firms, thus exhibiting dynamic economies of scale through 
knowledge accumulation? What export promotion policies are most 
effective for assisting export firms? What are the chief obstacles faced 
by exporters? This section also discusses the importance of the 
exchange rate for export performance.
Economies of Scale
The link between economies of scale and exporting is strong in Chile 
and Colombia. Selling abroad allows export firms in these countries to 
have access to greater economies of scale than the companies that focus 
mainly on the domestic market. Hence there is a connection between 
exporting and economies of scale, at least in these smaller economies.
The causality link goes in both directions. Export firms have access 
to greater economies of scale than the companies that sell mainly in the 
domestic market precisely because they export. Concurrently, 
economies of scale at the plant level push firms to export.
Along the same line, the introduction of updated technologies often 
implies a larger scale. Manufacturing companies need to improve the 
quality of the goods they manufacture. If they fail to do so, they face
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the prospect of losing market share to imported goods and of eventually 
having to close their plants. However, manufacturing higher quality 
goods requires the use of updated technologies. This in turn often 
implies a substantial increase in the scale of the plant. Hence, for the 
Latin American countries with relatively small domestic markets, man­
ufacturing will increasingly require exporting.
By contrast, the connection between selling abroad and economies 
of scale was weak in Brazil and Mexico, where economies of scale were 
not a significant factor for export decisions for the industries included 
in the project. The larger size of these two economies implies that for 
many industries, the domestic market is large enough to permit 
economies of scale. This conclusion is obviously strongly dependent on 
the industry, car manufacturing, for example, requires a market size 
much larger than the domestic one in both these nations.
Rather than economies of scale, the determining factor that trig­
gered exports by the Mexican firms covered by the study was the 
decrease of demand in the domestic market. Economic recessions are 
the single most important factor that initially pushed Mexican firms to 
start exporting, irrespective of what industry they engage in. Most of 
the companies covered by the project (which excluded transnational 
corporations) had not initially needed to invest large sums in expanding 
manufacturing capacity to begin to export. In fact, the companies start­
ed exporting to use excess capacity after domestic demand plummeted 
in the country’s successive recessions.4 This is clearly a case of 
“switching” of sales from the domestic market to external markets in 
response to depressed domestic demand (Helleiner 1995).
In any event, for the smaller economies in Latin America the con­
nection between exporting and economies of scale matters. 
Manufacturing firms in these countries will increasingly have to consid­
er exporting if they want to remain in the manufacturing business as 
their countries progressively open their markets to trade and invest­
ment.
Learning by Exporting
Exporting— by exposing firms to international competition and to 
greater information— provides companies with considerable learning 
opportunities. This learning takes place in export-related activities, as 
could have been expected, and in other areas that are not directly con­
nected to exporting. Therefore, export firms can get on a steeper learn­
ing curve than firms that sell mainly in the domestic market. Exporting
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encourages companies to upgrade and at the same time provides them 
with greater information about the changes needed to accomplish that 
goal. The evidence presented in the country studies strongly corrobo­
rates Westphal’s conviction and Hobday’s findings concerning the 
importance of exporting for providing firms with learning opportuni­
ties. This was particularly clear in Chile, demonstrated by a comparison 
of export firms with companies that focused mainly on the domestic 
market.
Selling abroad enables companies’ access to information on the 
main trends in global markets, updated product specifications and quali­
ty control procedures, input procurement sources, and leading produc­
tion, management, and marketing practices. Thus these companies have 
more information than nonexport firms.
In addition to enhanced information opportunities, exporting 
requires firms to change their practices and learn to do things different­
ly. This is particularly true for firms that sell to large companies with 
supplier certification programs, which provide assistance for upgrading 
production and management practices. Exporting has a strong impact 
on firms, pushing them to upgrade and providing them with better 
information on the steps to take in that direction.
The single most significant point is that clients in export markets 
are generally much more demanding than those in the domestic market. 
Quality control is a critical issue: exporting forces companies to signifi­
cantly upgrade the quality of their merchandise and to put in place strin­
gent quality control systems.
In sum, the learning process that takes place in exporting firms 
allows them to have access to dynamic economies of scale that enables 
them to gain market share in export markets as well as the domestic 
market. Moreover, the learning process stimulated by exporting has 
positive spillovers in the domestic market, allowing the companies to 
introduce updated products and practices.
Nevertheless, although export companies in Colombia had greater 
learning opportunities than firms selling exclusively in the domestic 
market, entrepreneurs could not take full advantage of these opportuni­
ties. This was because Colombian executives had to spend a consider­
able amount of time and energy overcoming the obstacles faced by their 
companies. Another factor that curtailed the learning opportunities pro­
vided by exporting was the difficulty firms had when importing inputs. 
Finally, the fact that import competition in Colombia is at this time 
moderate also contributes to the lower degree of learning.
This last point can be linked to another conclusion, one that was not
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initially expected, but which ex post makes sense. Even if exporting 
provides firms with greater learning opportunities than selling only on 
the domestic market, it is also true that there are other enhanced learn­
ing opportunities. These are opportunities that result from selling in a 
domestic market with an intense degree of competition or from being 
suppliers to industries that are striving in export markets.
For instance, the study in Chile showed that as the economy has 
progressively become more open to competition because of trade liber­
alization, the appreciation of the exchange rate, the strong increase in 
per capita income, and an influx of new distribution networks, there has 
been a blurring of the difference between the behavior of export firms 
and that of the companies that sell mainly on the domestic market. The 
growing degree of competition in the domestic market is pushing a 
greater proportion of manufacturing firm managers to operate more like 
export company managers. These managers are looking for the best 
input sources and hiring consultants with the goal of changing product 
specifications and production and management practices. Moreover, 
firm executives are now frequently going to trade fairs and traveling 
abroad to visit other companies in the same industry. For instance, the 
intense degree of competition in the printing market in Chile has 
allowed companies that managed to be successful in the domestic mar­
ket to then export without having to substantially change the specifica­
tions of their products. Therefore, a greater degree of competition in the 
domestic market is effectively a good way of encouraging firms to have 
a more active approach toward upgrading.
At the same time, the research in Brazil and in Mexico showed that 
while direct exporters had greater learning opportunities than firms 
catering mainly to the domestic market, there were also significant 
learning opportunities arising from supplying world-class exporting 
companies. For example, the firms that have managed to successfully 
supply companies manufacturing automobiles in the two countries were 
then capable of exporting without having to substantially modify their 
products. The upgrading opportunities were directly proportional to the 
strength of the links between the firms manufacturing auto parts and the 
large automobile assembly companies. In that sense, the point that man­
ufacturing for export is the best way to encourage learning and enable 
upgrading remains valid. However, the exporting need not be direct but 
may be indirect too.
Nevertheless, these enhanced learning opportunities are for the 
most part confined to a few industries in the region, mainly in Brazil 
and Mexico. Most other countries have yet to develop industries that
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manufacture products capable of meeting international standards. On 
the other hand, this strongly confirms the idea that attracting investment 
in high-technology industries can have positive externalities.
Hence, learning is stimulated by competition and the exposure to 
demanding product standards. This learning can result from intense 
domestic competition or from the possibility of supplying world-class 
exporters. Increasing competition in the domestic market and attracting 
companies that are among the top players in manufactured goods export 
markets is a good way of encouraging firms to learn and upgrade.
Exporting provides companies with the foremost learning and 
upgrading opportunities. Therefore, encouraging firms to export and 
supplying them with assistance to do so is a way of inducing companies 
to upgrade and facilitating the process.
Export Promotion Policies5
Export promotion assistance is most effective for companies that are 
beginning to export when information is readily available and export 
formalities are transparent, streamlined, and expeditious, as in Chile 
and Mexico. Trade promotion organizations’ assistance for going to 
trade fairs and marketing abroad is highly beneficial for small and 
medium companies.
Adequate export financing, such as provided by BANCOLDEX in 
Colombia and BANCOMEXT in Mexico, is critical for firms’ export 
capability. Moreover, export credit availability acquires greater signifi­
cance as export subsidies are phased out to comply with the Uruguay 
Round Agreements. Therefore, the decision of the government of Brazil 
to emphasize the development of export financing will allow more 
firms in that country to break into export markets, as long as the finan­
cial assistance procedures are clearly established and access is facilitat­
ed for a wide range of companies.
At the same time, systematic and recurrent efforts to further 
decrease the antiexport bias encourage a greater number of firms to 
export. Therefore, Latin American countries should continue their 
progress in that direction. They should also have a policy environment 
that encourages widespread productivity increases in the economy, thus 
allowing an upgrade of the country’s export supply capability.
Last, the importance of having a strategy for increasing export 
growth that has a high priority in a government’s agenda and that is 
coherent with the other key policies in the country cannot be overem­
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phasized. Export promotion policies by themselves are not sufficient for 
triggering export growth. An increase of the rate of growth of manufac­
tured exports that persists over time— even when domestic demand 
recovers and when the exchange rate appreciates— requires a compre­
hensive strategy.
Export Obstacles
Several Latin American countries have made significant progress in 
reducing the disincentives to exporting by decreasing the obstacles that 
entrepreneurs face when they sell abroad. Yet, the numerous difficulties 
met by exporters remain an important stumbling block that curtails 
export growth in the majority of the countries of the region.
To address this issue Brazil and Costa Rica, for example, have 
given a high priority to measures aimed at cutting the costo país, that is, 
the additional cost firms bear when exporting from that country. 
Mexico, with its impressive reduction of export red tape, has a commis­
sion— the Comisión Mixta para la Promoción de Exportaciones (COM- 
PEX)— set up to reduce the bottlenecks faced by exporters.
Brazilian firms face a maze of regulations administered by different 
agencies. Furthermore, the excessive bureaucracy encountered by 
export firms has increased during the past years due to the intricacy of 
the requirements for issuing certificates of origin for Mercosur. In 
Colombia, the complexity of the red tape required to get goods through 
customs has curtailed the impact of trade liberalization. Mexican and 
Chilean firms do not have to go through much paperwork when selling 
abroad, but they face substantial red tape when exporting to other coun­
tries in Latin America because of the regulations in the importing 
nations. Exporting to the United States, in contrast, is often less cum­
bersome.
Excessive paperwork is an obstacle to exporting that can be sub­
stantially reduced at very little cost. It does require, however, that gov­
ernments have the political will to eliminate the paperwork and over­
come the resistance from agencies trying to preserve their discretionary 
powers.
Infrastructure deficiencies strongly contribute to increasing the 
costs faced by export firms. The high costs of and the delays to getting 
goods through the port of Santos in Brazil have long had the reputation 
of being the best barrier against import competition. Chilean firms 
exporting manufactured goods to neighboring countries sometimes have
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to delay shipments due to roads that are not open all year long. There 
are many similar examples in most Latin American countries. Such 
inefficiencies are a significant obstacle to increasing export growth.
Governments wanting to increase export growth should consider 
investing in improving the infrastructure needed by export firms. These 
investments could be financed by a reallocation of the funds that will be 
available as export subsidies are phased out. After all, this is precisely 
the kind of obstacle to exports that justified setting up the subsidies in 
the first place. Eliminating the source of the inefficiency would be the 
best use for these funds, and doing so will contribute to a widespread 
cost reduction in the economy.
The Influence of the Exchange Rate
The evolution of the exchange rate is critical for export performance. It 
affects companies’ ability to get export orders for the goods that they 
are manufacturing at present. Moreover, it has long-term consequences 
because of its influence on the decisions of whether or not to invest in 
export-oriented industries. An exchange rate policy that provides incen­
tives leading to exporting and investing in export industries is essential 
for increasing manufactured exports (Helleiner 1995). All the same, 
several countries in Latin America have allowed the exchange rate to 
appreciate in order to achieve goals other than promoting export 
growth. Moreover, the influx of foreign capital during certain periods 
has been an additional factor that further contributes to the appreciation 
of the exchange rate, thus creating an adverse effect on export perform­
ance.
Exchange rate appreciation was an obstacle to export growth in 
Mexico before December 1994 and in Brazil up to early 1999. It also 
explains the decrease in the growth rate of nontraditional exports from 
Chile. At the same time, Michael Bleany (1999) showed that although 
trade reform in Latin American countries has been successful in 
improving the transmission of the prices in world markets to exporters, 
some of the effects of the reforms have been masked by the apprecia­
tion of the exchange rate. This has depressed the profitability of 
exports, thus dampening export performance. In sum, the exchange rate 
policy in most Latin American countries in recent years has not encour­
aged export growth.
This does not imply, however, that appreciation is a harmful thing 
and that a sharp currency devaluation is desirable. In fact, a certain 
degree of appreciation of the exchange rate is to be expected as produc­
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tivity increases and export performance improves. Furthermore, the 
appreciation of the exchange rate induces productivity gains by forcing 
companies to upgrade to better face import competition. It also allows 
firms to buy relatively cheaper imported equipment and inputs. 
Moreover, in certain circumstances it may encourage exporters to pro­
gressively move toward exporting goods with higher value added.
The tendency to a significant exchange rate appreciation in the 
majority of the Latin American countries may change as the region 
undergoes the repercussions of the financial turbulence in Asia. A cer­
tain degree of devaluation would be useful for encouraging export 
growth. Sharp devaluations, however, would not contribute to improv­
ing the region’s capability for exporting manufactured goods.6
In fact, if a country’s currency undergoes a significant devaluation, 
it may be that this will only help boost exports in the short run. In the 
long run, a strongly devaluated exchange rate may have a negative 
effect on manufactured exports because the rate would raise the price of 
imported inputs and equipment and isolate domestic producers from 
import competition. Besides, such a rate would increase the difficulties 
for obtaining export credit, and could foster turmoil in the domestic 
market— the complement of the export market for many export compa­
nies— and curtail the availability of credit for the private sector in gen­
eral. Sharp devaluations generate uncertainty, thus cutting investment in 
productive activities. All these reasons imply that sharp devaluations 
are not desirable. The bursts of export growth that have been observed 
after sharp devaluations are usually made up of goods manufactured for 
the domestic market that must be exported due to the plummeting of 
domestic demand.
The opposite of a policy aimed at appreciating the exchange rate is 
not to sharply devaluate the national currency. On the contrary, it is a 
set of policies that allows the exchange rate to be stable in the long run, 
while appreciating slightly as productivity increases and the country 
improves its export performance. What exporters need is an exchange 
rate that is predictable in the long run and that at the same time encour­
ages investment in industries manufacturing tradables.
* * *
The country studies and the policy presented in the following chapters 
do not cover all the issues that are essential for analyzing policies to 
encourage export growth. Appropriate policies for attracting foreign 
investment in leading manufacturing industries, for example, play an
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important role in promoting export growth. Likewise, the differences 
among rules regarding export-processing zones explain why some 
countries have successfully increased exports while others have lagged 
(Willmore 1996). At the same time, some countries have been able to 
attract high-technology industries to these zones (Buitelaar, Padilla, and 
Urrutia 1999). Economic geography explains why export companies 
prefer to invest in certain locations. Although these issues are critical 
for export performance, they are beyond the scope of this volume.
Notes
1. Baumann (1994); Bielschowsky (1994); Castillo, Dini, and Maggi (1994); 
Katz and Burachik (1997).
2. Policies regarding foreign direct investment and in-bond processing plants 
or maquilas are not addressed here because they are beyond the scope of the book. 
Nevertheless, the importance of these policies for export growth must be acknowl­
edged, particularly in the case of Mexico.
3. The foundation for the learning by doing models of the 1980s and the 1990s 
is from the early 1960s: Kenneth Arrow’s seminal paper (1962) has a model in 
which knowledge is endogenous to the production function. His model emphasizes 
the importance of learning, “the product of experience.”
4. Further research is required to establish whether these companies did invest 
significant sums for expanding export capacity at a later date.
5. See Chapter 6 for a presentation of policy recommendations for increasing 
exports.
6. See Manuel Agosin (1993a) for a discussion of the negative impact that 
sharp fluctuations of the exchange rate have on export performance.
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Mexico: 
Export Promotion Policies 
on the Cutting Edge
Adriaan ten Kate, Carla Macario, and Gunnar Niels
Mexico has been very successful at increasing exports. However, the 
country’s greatest accomplishment has been the remarkable increase of 
manufactured goods exported. This performance is to a great extent the 
product of the decisions by transnational corporations (TNCs) to locate 
plants in Mexico and the effects of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). Nevertheless, it is also the result of the country’s 
efficient export promotion policies. This chapter sets forth Mexico’s 
trade policies, emphasizing the government’s export promotion instru­
ments. It also presents the main features of firms’ export behavior, 
based on a study of successful export-manufacturing companies that 
was carried out with the goal of deriving policy implications.
The Macroeconomic Environment
Mexico’s gross domestic product (GDP) was US$428 billion in 1998, 
(at 1995 prices), the second highest of the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries, after Brazil. GDP growth rate was 4.9% for 1998, 
after the record growth of 6.8% for 1997 (see Table 2.1 for indicators 
that describe the economy’s performance during the 1990s).1
Manufacturing’s share of GDP was 20.6% in 1997, a slight increase 
from 18.6% in 1980 and 19.0% in 1990. Manufacturing GDP’s growth 
rate was 10.9% in 1996 and 9.8% in 1997, after a drop of 4.9% the pre­
vious year.
Mexico has transformed its economy over the past decade by open­
ing it up to trade and investment flows. Imports of goods and services 
were 33.7% of GDP in 1998, up from 17.3% in 1980. Import ratios had
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Table 2.1 Mexico: Economic Indicators
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 19986
GDPa 336,713 350,792 363,680 370,020 387,144 363,234 382,074 408,140 428,077
GDP growth rates*5 5.1 4.2 3.7 1.7 4.6 -6 .2 5.2 6.8 4.9
Imports3*0 60,666 71,603 82,852 86,796 100,681 82,168 102,218 125,957 144,419
Exports3’0 49,885 56,462 59,808 66,554 76,260 89,322 107,024 125,013 137,823
Import ratiod 18.0 20.4 22.8 23.5 26.0 22.6 26.8 30.9 33.7
Export ratio (all goods)d 14.8 16.1 16.4 18.0 19.7 24.6 28.0 30.6 32.2
Export ratio (manufactures)0 43.3 50.8 71.1 74.6 77.3 77.5 78.1 80.7 85.1
Exchange rate* 2.81 3.02 3.10 3.12 3.38 6.42 7.60 7.92 9.14
Source: ECLAC, on the basis o f official figures.
a. Millions o f  U.S. dollars at 1995 prices.
b. Average annual rates at 1995 prices.
c. Goods and services including goods for processing (m aquila).
d. Percentages o f GDP at 1995 prices. Includes goods and services.
e. Percentages o f total value o f FOB exports of goods. Includes goods for processing (m aquila).
f. Nominal exchange rate in pesos per dollar.
g. Preliminary figures.









been growing steadily, particularly since import liberalization in the 
mid-1980s (see below). Exports of goods in 1998 were US$138 billion 
(at constant 1995 prices), up from US$11 billion in 1980 and US$23 
billion in 1985. Exports of goods and services were 32.2% of GDP in 
1998, up from 10.3% in 1980. Mexico was by far the largest exporter in 
Latin America in 1998, while Brazil, with total exports amounting to 
US$62 billion was a distant second.
Consequently, Mexico’s degree of openness, expressed as the sum 
of exports and imports of goods and services over GDP, has had a sig­
nificant increase from 27.6% in 1980 and 32.8% in 1990 to 65.9% in
1998. As a point of comparison, Latin America’s degree of openness for 
this last year is 39.6%.
However, an even more significant change has been Mexico’s 
increased specialization in export manufactured goods, including those 
of the maquiladora industry (the in-bond processing manufacturing 
process). These manufacturing exports amount to 85.1% of the FOB 
value of total exports of goods in 1998. These numbers would certainly 
not be as high if the maquila exports were excluded, but the increased 
importance of manufactured products in Mexico’s exports is an impres­
sive transformation of the country’s export behavior. It is also a contrast 
with the other countries of the region, most of which are still mainly 
primary goods exporters.
Hence, Mexico’s export structure today is strikingly different from 
that of 1980, when crude oil accounted for 60.9% of exports and most 
other leading export products were primary agricultural or mining 
goods. While the main export product in 1997, including maquila, still 
is crude oil (9.4% of total exports), the next nine leading export items 
are all manufactured goods, such as passenger motor vehicles (8.8%), 
insulated wire and cable (4.5%), vans and trucks (3.6%), television sets 
(3.5%) and other products with high technological content such as elec­
tronic machinery or motor vehicle parts.
The surge of manufactured exports is partly due to the transforma­
tions that have taken place in the Mexican economy after import protec­
tion was substantially cut during the mid-1980s (Kate 1998). However, 
trade liberalization is not the only explanation, since many other coun­
tries in the region have liberalized trade in the same period without 
reaching similar results. Ros (1994) points out that Mexico’s current 
industrial structure is the result of the successful import substitution 
development strategies of earlier decades that allowed the country to 
modify its comparative advantage pattern in favor of manufacturing.
The expansion of the manufacturing industries that arose from
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import substitution policies, together with Mexico’s location advan­
tages, attracted many TNCs, which decided to set up plants in Mexico. 
This in turn contributed to the increase of manufactured exports, partic­
ularly for the automotive industry. Import liberalization since 1985, and 
especially the enactment of NAFTA in 1994, also played a major role in 
TNCs’ decisions to localize their production in Mexico.
Another contributing factor to Mexico’s export success is that the 
country’s firms deliberately decided to increase their exports, given the 
incentives provided by import liberalization and export promotion poli­
cies as well as investment in human capital and infrastructure (Máttar 
1996).
At the same time, the shock to the Mexican economy as a result of 
the strong devaluation in December 1994 (see Table 2.1) and the ensu­
ing plummeting of domestic demand also was a key factor in increasing 
the level of exports during the past years.
However, even though export performance has been impressive, it 
is nonetheless true that exports are highly limited to a few products, a 
small number of firms, and a few markets. (The most important export 
products are listed above.) As for the limit to firms, it should be noted 
that in 1995 there were slightly over 1,900 Mexican firms that exported 
more than US$1 million, but only about 300 of these realized more than 
80% of all exports.2 At the same time, around 85% of Mexican exports 
go to the United States (see Table 2.2 on page 26).
The challenge now facing the country’s manufacturing industry is 
to attain higher output and export growth rates (Máttar and Peres 1997). 
Learning more about the strategies of successful Mexican exporters of 
manufactured goods and about the effectiveness of export promotion 
policies will therefore provide a useful basis from which to draw policy 
conclusions. These findings should prove relevant not only for Mexico 
but to other Latin American countries as well, since Mexico is the coun­
try in the region with the best export performance in terms of manufac­
tured goods.
Trade Policy
Mexico followed an import substitution industrialization model since 
the late 1940s. Its main components were high tariffs and benchmark 
prices used as references by customs. There were also import licenses 
that varied over the years but that in some periods covered most items 
produced domestically.
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During the 1980s, there was a radical change in the trade policy as 
the Mexican government proceeded to liberalize imports. This shift in 
focus began with the debt crisis of 1982 and was followed up by more 
significant changes from 1985 to 1987. During this same period, the 
country decided to apply for membership in the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), becoming a member of GATT in 1986.
As a result of these changes in trade policy, import license require­
ments that covered almost 100% of the domestic production in 1982 
went down to 25.4% of production by December 1987, and then contin­
ued dropping, at a slower rate, to 16.5% in 1993. Tariffs were also 
dropped in different stages, reaching the range of 0 to 20% ad valorem 
by 1987, whereas before the maximum tariff had been 100% (Kate
1998). The weighted average tariff is presently below 10% ad valorem 
(Máttar 1998).
The country has also expanded trade by negotiating preferential 
trade agreements (PTAs). The most important one is NAFTA with the 
United States and Canada, which took effect in January 1994. NAFTA 
provides for a complete elimination of all tariff barriers to trade in 
goods in the region within 15 years, as well as for the partial elimina­
tion of many barriers to trade in services and to cross-border invest­
ment. Other trade agreements have been signed with Chile (1992), 
Bolivia (1995), Costa Rica (1995), the Group of Three (i.e., Colombia 
and Venezuela [1995]), and Nicaragua (1998). Negotiations with other 
Latin American countries, Israel, and the European Union are on their 
way. The agreement with Chile eliminated all bilateral import tariffs as 
of the beginning of 1998. Bolivia agreed to liberate 97% of Mexican 
exports from tariffs immediately. Under the agreements with Costa Rica 
and the Group of Three, all import tariffs will be abolished by the year 
2004 (for Costa Rica trade in agriculture is not included). Nicaragua 
will liberate all Mexican industrial exports by 2008.
Overall, Mexico’s trade balance with the countries with which it 
has signed trade agreements has gone from a deficit of US$2.7 billion 
in 1993 to a surplus of US$13.4 billion in 1997.3 It should be noted, 
however, that this change in the trade balance probably has more to do 
with the strong devaluation of the peso in December 1994 (see Table 
2.1) than with the agreements proper. A quick look at data of Mexican 
exports to its trade partners in Table 2.2 gives an idea about the impor­
tance of each of the trade agreements individually. As can be seen, 
exports to the United States, by far the largest trading partner, have 
increased 21.8% per year since NAFTA. Trade with Canada has grown 
more slowly, and the country’s share in total Mexican exports has curi-
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Table 2.2 Mexico's Exports (and Share of Total) to Partner Countries in Preferential Trade Agreements, Millions of U.S. Dollars at 
Current Prices




Chile 124 153 200 261 492 688 842 1992 37.6%
0.30% 0.33% 0.39% 0.43% 0.63% 0.72% 0.76%
United States 32,818 37,514 42,851 50,998 66,617 80,344 94,185 1994 21.8%
79.62% 81.08% 82.67 % 84.22% 85.32% 83.86% 85.44%
Canada 568 801 1,569 1,534 1,983 2,170 2,156 1994 8.3%
1.38% 1.73% 3.03% 2.53% 2.54% 2.27% 1.96%
Costa Rica 81 110 100 99 140 188 221 1995 30.7%
0.20 % 0.24% 0.19% 0.16% 0.18% 0.20% 0.20%
Colombia 152 218 239 319 459 438 513 1995 17.1%
0.37% 0.47% 0.46% 0.53% 0.59% 0.46% 0.47%
Venezuela 121 197 228 229 382 424 675 1995 43.4%
0.29% 0.43% 0.44% 0.38% 0.49% 0.44% 0.61%
Bolivia 12 8 17 11 25 30 32 1995 43.3%
0.03% 0.02% 0.03% 0.02% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03%
Nicaragua 17 18 21 22 32 53 64 1998 —
0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.05% 0.06%
Total exports 41,219 46,267 51,832 60,554 78,077 95,801 110,237 — —
S ource: ECLAC (1998a).









ously decreased with respect to the last year before NAFTA (from 
3.03% in 1993 to 1.96% in 1997). Overall tariff levels in these countries 
were already relatively low before 1994, however, and NAFTA has 
arguably been more important for reducing certain nontariff barriers to 
trade and investment.
Tariff barriers in Latin American countries tend to be much higher 
than those in the United States, and the agreements on tariff reductions 
with these countries are therefore more likely to produce significant 
effects on trade. This has proved especially true for the agreements with 
Chile, Venezuela, and Bolivia. As can be observed from Table 2.2, 
Mexican exports to Chile have increased almost sevenfold from 
US$124 million in 1991 to US$842 million in 1997. Exports to 
Venezuela and Bolivia increased over 43% on average per year in the 
first three years of the agreement. For Costa Rica, this was slightly 
more then 30%. Exports to Colombia have grown as well but at a slow­
er rate. Evidence from the investigation presented below suggests that 
this may be due to remaining nontariff barriers to trade in this country.
Export Promotion Policies
This section describes Mexico’s most important export promotion 
instruments. It also presents BANCOMEXT, the country’s export pro­
motion bank.4
Programs to Provide Access to Competitive Inputs
Mexico has several policy instruments to allow export firms to have 
access to a wide range of raw materials and intermediate inputs, 
markedly imported ones. These programs have been an important factor 
in the country’s export growth. Although many nations have similar 
schemes, Mexico has been particularly successful at using them effec­
tively and at allowing them to evolve over the years with a remarkable 
degree of administrative flexibility, particularly when compared with 
other Latin American countries. Most of these programs are run by the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, while the Ministry of Finance is respon­
sible for refunding the tax credits provided under these schemes. This 
section presents the main programs the country has for allowing compa­
nies to have access to competitive inputs.
The first of these schemes is the one that has encouraged the open­
ing up of plants along the border inside in-bond processing zones, better
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known as the maquiladora regime. The maquila program originally 
allowed firms located inside in-bond processing zones to have free 
access to imported raw materials and, more important, components to 
be assembled in the plants and then shipped back to the United States. 
The program has existed for several decades and is mainly used by 
firms located in the north of the country near the border with the United 
States.
However, since 1989 the program is no longer restricted to a specif­
ic geographic area, and there are now plants operating under the 
maquila regime in other regions of the country as well. Still, plants do 
tend to prefer locations in the states of northern Mexico where they are 
closer to the border. Firms operating under this scheme can also sell a 
portion of their output on the domestic market. It may be stated that the 
maquila program has been very successful. At present, there are more 
than 3,100 maquiladora plants. Maquila exports increased by 20% per 
year between 1982 and 1995. In that last year, 39.2% of Mexico’s total 
exports came from these processing zones, compared with only 12.0% 
in 1982 (ECLAC 1998a).s
Another instrument used by firms that are not operating under the 
maquila regime is the drawback. Through this instrument companies 
can recover the amount spent on tariffs on imported inputs used to man­
ufacture exports. This is a typical kind of scheme used in many coun­
tries to offset an antiexport bias. In Mexico it is used mainly by firms 
that are occasional exporters. Firms that are regular exporters tend to 
prefer the Programa de Importación Temporal para Producir Artículos 
de Exportación (PITEX) scheme described below. Exports under the 
drawback scheme were US$517 million in 1995, 0.6% of the country’s 
exports.6
PITEX allows exporters to import inputs on a temporary basis with­
out paying taxes on them. The advantage of PITEX over the drawback 
is that it allows firms exemption not only from tariffs, but also from the 
value-added tax and any antidumping duties that might apply. 
Furthermore, there is a substantial reduction in the cost incurred by 
firms since there is an ex ante exemption rather than an ex post recover­
ing of taxes— the latter being the case with drawbacks— and because 
fewer administrative formalities are required.
To be accepted in the PITEX, a firm must export at least 
US$500,000 a year or a certain percentage of its output (between 10% 
and 30%, according to whether the imported goods are raw materials or 
capital goods). The importance of the PITEX program is almost compa-
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rabie to that of the maquila program. There are currently about 3,200 
firms in PITEX, whose exports in 1995 were 29.3% of the country’s 
overall exports.7
The program of Empresas Altamente Exportadoras (ALTEX) is a 
program that enables firms recognized as regularly exporting significant 
amounts to carry out only simplified import and export formalities, as 
well as quickly recover the ad valorem tax on domestic inputs used for 
manufacturing exports. The program has been in place since 1990. To 
qualify as ALTEX companies, firms must export over US$2 million or 
between 40% and 50% of their sales. Exports by firms included in the 
ALTEX scheme have amounted to approximately 7% of total exports in 
1995.8
These export promotion programs have been very useful for export 
firms. They do, however, have the disadvantage of failing to provide 
incentives for domestic companies to become suppliers to exporters, 
since the programs’ benefits go directly to firms that are themselves 
exporters. To compensate for this, changes were introduced in July 
1995 with the goal of fostering linkages between export firms and the 
rest of the economy by providing incentives for indirect exporters.
The new rules allow firms included in programs such as ALTEX, 
PITEX, or the maquila system to issue “export vouchers” (constancias 
de exportación) to domestic input suppliers when the inputs are used for 
manufacturing exports. These vouchers enable suppliers to export com­
panies to be exempted from paying the value-added tax on the inputs 
they sell to exporters, as if they were exporters themselves.
This incentive, an interesting policy innovation in the region, 
makes it possible to offset what was formerly an antiexport bias: export 
firms did not have to pay the ad valorem tax when importing inputs 
(since they qualified as PITEX firms, for example), but did pay it when 
purchasing inputs domestically. It was possible for these export firms to 
recover the value-added tax, but the present system is simpler and faster 
because it turns a tax refund into a tax exemption. Another interesting 
feature present in the innovation is that the private firm in the PITEX, 
ALTEX, or maquila program is the one issuing the voucher, so that 
bureaucratic formalities are reduced.
BANCOMEXT
The main goal of the Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior (BAN­
COMEXT), Mexico’s foreign trade bank, is to provide export financ­
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ing. The bank also provides exporters with information about foreign 
markets, such as on tariffs and nontariff barriers, as well as about rules 
of origin and the specific terms of trade agreements signed by the coun­
try. In addition, BANCOMEXT administers financial and logistical sup­
port programs for firms participating in trade fairs.
BANCOMEXT’s representatives in the bank’s offices abroad write 
reports on export opportunities in specific markets. These trade com­
missioners also provide information for individual companies and for 
trade missions.
With respect to export financing, the bank operated essentially as a 
“second-floor” financial institution up to the mid-1990s. This means 
that it provided funds to the commercial banks that dealt directly with 
firms requiring export credit.
Nevertheless, BANCOMEXT has started operating also as a first- 
floor financial institution in recent years. It allocates some of its funds 
directly to companies with the purpose of being more active in placing 
export-financing funds and as a way of providing export credit to firms 
that have difficulties in getting access to financing through commercial 
banks. For instance, when the bank granted loans for US$6,316 million 
dollars in 1996, 22% of those funds were given directly to firms 
through first-floor operations (BANCOMEXT 1996).
The institution has recently had difficulties in placing all the funds 
it has programmed. This is because its lending rates rose after the reces­
sion that began in December 1994, as international lenders increased 
the country’s risk premium. A small number of large export companies 
can often obtain lower rates abroad, but most firms in Mexico do not 
have access to foreign capital markets and must rely upon B A N ­
C O M E X T  or domestic commercial banks. As of mid-1998, B A N ­
COMEXT was offering export firms loans at an average rate of Libor 
plus 1 to 4 percentage points for loans in national currency and Libor 
plus 2 to 6 percentage points for loans in foreign currency.9 These rates 
are much lower than those being offered by other banks in the 
country.
In 1996, 86.5% of all firms that received financial assistance were 
small and medium-sized firms (BANCOMEXT 1996). During 1997, 
BANCOMEXT provided financial and nonfinancial assistance to 8,289 
firms. Of the 4,506 firms that received financing, 813 got it directly 
from the bank and 2,692 through a commercial bank. The other firms 
that benefited from financial assistance used programs to grant collater­
al that enabled them to obtain loans.10
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Changes After NAFTA and the Uruguay Round
Since NAFTA provides for substantial cuts in most tariffs between 
Mexico and its main trade partner, the United States, some of the pro­
grams will become less relevant as the different stages of the trade 
agreement are enacted. For example, by 2001, the maquila firms will be 
able to sell as much as they want on the domestic market after, of 
course, paying the corresponding tariffs, if any.
Similarly, some of the other programs mentioned above will be 
phased out for exports to Canada and the United States. They will still 
be available for exports to non-NAFTA countries but will undoubtedly 
be of much less economic significance, given the importance of the 
United States and Canada in terms of the country’s exports.
This will entail a change in the relative importance of the various 
export promotion policies. Providing firms with assistance in obtaining 
export information and carrying out market studies abroad, support for 
trade fair participation and assistance with financing and insurance will 
become increasingly important. Therefore, the role of BANCOMEXT 
will be even more significant than it is today.
Finally, it must be pointed out that Mexico will not have to modify 
its export promotion policies in order for them to be compatible with 
the Uruguay Round Agreements. It is one of the few countries in Uatin 
America and the Caribbean that already has an export promotion system 
that is fully compatible with the multilateral trade rules. The country’s 
export promotion system was designed from the outset to be compatible 
with the multilateral trade negotiations.
Firms' Export Behavior
This section presents the main findings of a research project focusing 
on successful exporters of manufactures in Mexico. The twelve compa­
nies included in the study are large domestic firms that export high- 
value-added goods. They belong to the food-processing, chemical, and 
automobile parts industries. TNCs and maquiladora firms were exclud­
ed, partly to ensure comparability with the research carried out for the 
other country studies.11
The main issues addressed by the research are the following: What 
are the principal factors that push a firm to start exporting? Is there a 
learning process involved in exporting activity? Which export promo­
tion instruments do companies use and how do they evaluate them?
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What are the main export obstacles? How do preferential trade agree­
ments (PTAs) influence firms’ export opportunities?
Main Factors Affecting Firms' Export Decisions
The single most significant factor that initially triggered the Mexican 
firms’ export efforts was trying to find new markets to compensate for a 
drop of demand in the domestic market. Most of the companies took the 
decision to export during a year in which the Mexican economy was 
either entering or was in the middle of a recession. Hence, recessions in 
the domestic economy played a significant role in encouraging firms to 
export.
Therefore, the need to find markets for the companies’ excess 
capacity is what pushes these Mexican firms to export. In contrast, in 
the industries included in the investigation long-run economies of scale 
(as opposed to short-run economies obtained by full utilization of exist­
ing capacity) were not a significant export factor.12 In Mexico, there are 
a number of industries for which the domestic market— if not in reces­
sion— is large enough to allow for production at minimally efficient 
scales.13
Nonetheless, the interviews also showed that over time there is a 
growing persistence of the decision to export. Even if the firms includ­
ed in the research tended to begin deploying export efforts during reces­
sions, once they entered the foreign markets they maintained their pres­
ence abroad. This is because exporting provides firms with a 
predictable source of hard currency, decreases their vulnerability to 
fluctuations in the domestic market, and allows them to have greater 
learning and upgrading opportunities (see below).
This may not be representative of the export behavior of all compa­
nies, since many firms still consider exporting as a temporary option to 
dispose of excess capacity.14 Notwithstanding, it shows a change in atti­
tude of the managers of Mexico’s larger companies, in the sense that 
their export activity will not, as before, disappear completely once 
domestic demand recovers.
Maintaining a presence in export markets was facilitated for the 
firms included in the investigation because they tend to be large compa­
nies. This allows them to have the financial capacity to maintain a pres­
ence in both the domestic and export markets, once the fixed cost of the 
activities required to enter foreign markets— such as trips abroad for 
initial contacts and trade fair participation, financing market studies,
Mexico 33
and hiring representatives— is covered. This is a significant change in 
the behavior of most Mexican firms.
Learning by Exporting
The project was designed to identify two different kinds of learning 
processes. The first type of learning process is directly related to how 
firms export, which includes finding out how and where to get the 
information needed to export the company’s products. It also covers the 
learning process by which the firm acquires the skills it needs to carry 
out the steps to enable exporting. The second type of learning process is 
export related in the sense that it takes place when the firm is either 
manufacturing for export markets, including establishing contacts with 
clients abroad, but goes beyond the export process itself. This is a kind 
of learning accessible to firms because they are exporting, but that takes 
place in areas beyond export activity itself.
Learning to export. Most of the export managers who were inter­
viewed began to export by traveling abroad, trying to contact clients 
and going to trade fairs, first as observers and later on with their own 
booths. The first step was to gather information about potential markets 
abroad and about the tariff and nontariff barriers to be overcome in 
order to gain access to those markets. The next step was to find out 
which were the most important trade fairs for their industry, as well as 
the more appropriate ones for the specific product the firm wished to 
export.
For example, while there are many trade fairs for the footwear 
industry, some of them are more suitable for relatively smaller firms 
because they mainly attract retailers who sell directly to consumers. 
Meanwhile, others are more appropriate for a company manufacturing a 
very high volume of output, since they are aimed at large firms that sell 
to department stores in the United States. There are also industries for 
which trade fairs are not important for the business transactions actually 
carried out, but simply because the fairs provide information about the 
state of the art in that particular industry and about the main competi­
tors.
Therefore, the first issue that must be addressed when exporting is 
that of information, not only on trade issues, such as tariff and nontariff 
barriers, but also on industry-specific topics. The second one is financ­
ing market research abroad. This involves traveling to trade fairs, some­
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times setting up a stand, sending samples, and, more generally, gather­
ing information about foreign markets and making contacts.
Setting up a network in the United States is often relatively easy for 
Mexican entrepreneurs due to their close links with the Hispanic com­
munity of Mexican descent, as well as their own familiarity with that 
country. For example, in the 1960s one food-processing company start­
ed exporting in response to strong demand for its products by Mexican 
consumers living in the United States. The firm’s managers realized that 
one of the reasons for their high sales in the north of Mexico was that 
their goods were being bought by Mexicans living in the United States, 
who frequently resold them on the other side of the border. This 
prompted them to try to export themselves.
In contrast, it was more difficult for firms trying to export for the 
first time to other countries, such as those in Latin America. In these 
countries, establishing contacts was often a trial-and-error process, 
which required a greater investment in trips abroad and finding out 
about the different commercial practices in each country, such as the 
credit terms and procedures that clients expect.
Hence, the first two main stages in acquiring export capabilities are 
obtaining information and establishing a network abroad. These stages 
demand that firm managers have the willingness and capability of 
investing in trying to build an export market. Beginning to export is 
expensive and hard and can be very frustrating in the short run. It 
requires a substantial investment of time and money, as well as persis­
tence and flexibility. This condition is a sine qua non and must not be 
underestimated. It is probably what ultimately determines why one 
company becomes a successful exporter, but a similar one is unable to 
do so.
Although an executive’s determination to export is a necessary con­
dition, it is important to point out that the investment required to pio­
neer a new export market is suboptimal because the company will not 
be able to capture all the benefits of its investment. Once the company 
has gone to the expense of obtaining the information, traveling to trade 
fairs, contacting potential buyers, and exporting, it will be much easier 
for another firm in the same industry to target, from the outset, the same 
market that the pioneering company targeted after several costly steps. 
This is an area where there are externalities, in the sense that the first 
firm investing in opening up markets abroad will not be able to capture 
all the benefits of doing so. Other companies will also benefit from this 
pioneer activity.
In fact, several of the export managers interviewed in the course of
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the study mentioned that their firm had taken into account other compa­
nies ’ export success when evaluating the possibility of launching their 
own export efforts. They also said that it had been easier for them to 
choose a destination for their exports after finding out about other 
firms’ success in a given export market. Similarly, several of the food- 
processing firms included in the survey were encouraged to export to 
European countries by the success that U.S. firms, such as Fiesta and El 
Paso, had in exporting “Tex-Mex” food products.
It must be pointed out that there are differences between industries 
with respect to the importance of marketing efforts abroad. While there 
are some industries in which they are crucial, such as the food-process­
ing industry, there are others in which the important point is to establish 
contact with brokers dealing with their products. Once that is done sat­
isfactorily, the export manager’s primary concern no longer is to main­
tain a visible presence at trade fairs but rather to set up an export’s 
logistics. There was a striking contrast between the export managers 
interviewed in consumer products manufacturing industries, who were 
actively looking for new markets and were in close touch with changes 
occurring in those markets, and those in charge of exporting commodi­
ties, such as intermediate petrochemicals, who in fact would more 
appropriately be “export logistics” managers.
For example, the export manager of one of the food-processing 
firms had spent a considerable amount of time not only going to the 
related trade fairs in the United States, but also getting information 
about the new products that were coming out in the “ethnic foods mar­
ket.” The firm’s initial strategy for increasing exports to the United 
States had been to target communities with a high percentage of con­
sumers of Mexican descent. However, the following step was to target a 
higher income level group, particularly the baby-boom generation that 
had shown its willingness to try out new food products. In this market, 
the Mexican firm was competing for market share with Jamaican firms 
that had introduced a wide variety of new products in the U.S. market. 
These products had many of the packaging features that are in high 
demand with consumers in the U.S. market, such as good-quality glass 
containers and colorful labels. Therefore, to preserve market share the 
export manager had to systematically monitor the innovations intro­
duced by these rival firms.
By contrast, an export manager of a chemical firm was not con­
cerned with getting new clients or losing market share to innovating 
rivals. His firm had long-standing contracts with a handful of U.S. com­
panies. The product exported by his firm was an intermediate good with
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clearly specified and unvarying standards. Therefore, his responsibility 
was making sure that the transportation arrangements from the Mexican 
plant to destinations in the United States were adequate and timely, so 
that deliveries were made by deadline. This implied ensuring that the 
trucks got to the border at a time when the customs officers were pres­
ent on both sides of the frontier and making arrangements for trucks 
based north of the border to transport the goods inside the United 
States. He had no need to be continuously informed about changes in 
the export market.
These differences are not irrelevant for policy purposes. They 
should be known to civil servants working in this area, in the sense that 
the support needed by different types of firms is not the same. Export 
promotion institutions must be aware that the kind of export assistance 
provided for export firms has to be adapted to the industries considered.
In sum, beginning to export involves a significant learning process: 
export managers, particularly those exporting goods other than com­
modities, have to do an in-depth search for potential markets, find out 
which products are in demand, manage to get into distribution channels 
(sometimes a very difficult feat), participate in trade fairs, and persuade 
clients that they have supply capabilities. Then, when they finally get an 
order, they hope that the client will make new orders and not jump to a 
cheaper supplier at the smallest variation of the exchange rate.
Therefore, government provision of export information is very use­
ful for companies beginning to export. There are two additional reasons 
that stress the importance of support in this area: first, the firm cannot 
always completely appropriate the information it has obtained, since the 
mere fact that it is shipping goods abroad provides a signal to other 
companies; second, this kind of information— for example, about tariff 
and nontariff barriers in a given country— can be useful to many firms 
simultaneously. These are additional justifications for providing export 
information.
Learning from exporting. The study demonstrated that exporting also 
provides companies with learning opportunities in such areas as product 
characteristics, quality assurance, and marketing. Moreover, it enables 
firms to stand up to import competition in the domestic market more 
successfully. Over half of the managers interviewed in Mexico men­
tioned areas in which exporting had prompted them to upgrade the qual­
ity of their products and allowed them to know what the standards were, 
as well as how to meet them.
For example, one of the food-processing firms had to change the
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jars and the labels it used for its products. It also modified some steps of 
the production process, particularly those related to quality control 
requirements, to meet the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) 
standards for imported products. These changes were initially intro­
duced only for products manufactured for export markets, but before 
long they were applied to all the firm’s output, hence upgrading quality 
for the domestic market too. Other companies in the food-processing 
industry had similar stories of modifying their production process to 
enable export and then introducing the changes in all production lines.
The reasons for extending the changes to cover all output, not only 
that for export markets, are twofold: (a) it has become too costly to 
have different standards for export products than for domestic market 
products; (b) many firms realized that introducing these changes 
allowed them to recover part of their domestic market share, which had 
been lost to import competition.
Selling to countries with stringent requirements, such as the United 
States and Japan, is particularly useful for learning while exporting. In 
the case of the food-processing firms, the FDA played an important role 
in allowing firms to upgrade the quality of their products. The fact that 
the FDA standards are clearly defined is very helpful. This is an impor­
tant contrast to many Latin American countries’ sanitary requirements 
that are perceived in fact as nontariff barriers.
Export-based learning also takes place in companies in industries 
other than food processing and in countries other than the United States. 
One of the chemical companies included in the study started exporting 
in the early 1980s, when Mexico put forth its first big manufactured- 
products export drive by setting up export-oriented industrial complex­
es. The firm’s export manager believed that even though Japanese 
clients were difficult and demanding, they provided a valuable learning 
opportunity.
Similarly, a company that manufactures after-market radiator hoses 
improved the quality of all its output after entering export markets. The 
firm’s chief executive officer (CEO) went through considerable efforts 
to try to export to Central America. In so doing, he realized that the 
quality of his products did not satisfy international standards. He hired a 
chemist to assist him in progressively adapting the quality of his inputs 
to meet those requirements, and today all his output conforms to inter­
national standards. This in turn has allowed his products to gain market 
share in Mexico itself. Meanwhile, the demands of the export process 
have forced him to perfect his distribution system, a learning that also 
has had positive spillovers in his domestic distribution system.
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It can therefore be concluded that exporting does provide signifi­
cant learning opportunities for the firms involved in the process, and 
not just in areas directly related to the export process.
While direct exporting appears to provide important learning 
opportunities for manufacturing firms, the same can be said for indirect 
exporters, that is, the suppliers to export companies that are at the cut­
ting edge in their industry.
For instance, one firm that manufactures engine bearings and bush­
ings for automotive assembly plants in Mexico has received several 
quality awards, such as Q-l from Ford and similar ones from Nissan. 
Being recognized as a top-quality supplier to these world-level compa­
nies has made it easier for the firm to enter export markets. The compa­
ny’s managers had had to go to considerable lengths to establish their 
presence in foreign markets and to obtain information about how busi­
ness was conducted in, for example, South American countries, but they 
did not have to upgrade their product’s quality, since it was already rec­
ognized as outstanding. From that perspective, the link between having 
a presence in international markets and learning for upgrading remains. 
However, it does not necessarily have to be by exporting directly: being 
an indirect exporter to an industry that is recognized as being among the 
best is sufficient.
It must be pointed out, however, that “learning while being an indi­
rect exporter” will generally be restricted to those industries and coun­
tries that have top-quality products. It will probably occur more fre­
quently in Mexico and, for some industries, in Brazil than in other Latin 
American countries, most of which are not manufacturing exports that 
satisfy international standards.
The learning process that takes place while exporting and the posi­
tive impact it has on firms’ productivity is an additional factor that pro­
motes a more permanent presence in the export markets: several CEOs 
mentioned that although they began to export because of the need to use 
excess capacity, the learning they gained while exporting is such that it 
encouraged them to continue to export, even when domestic demand 
had recovered. The economic importance of this learning process is dif­
ficult to assess with greater precision, but there is evidence that it con­
tributes significantly to upgrading companies’ presence in both export 
and domestic markets.
The learning process that occurs in the domestic market itself when 
the firm is a supplier of a world-level industry, such as the automobile 
industry in Mexico, allows one to take the point further: what pushes
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most firms to learn when exporting is the increased competition they 
face when they try to market abroad and the exposure to international 
standards. Hence, learning is stimulated by competition and exposure to 
the standards of top-quality products. However, in most countries in 
Latin America— with the exception of some industries in Mexico and 
Brazil— it is exporting that provides the greatest challenge. Hence, it 
also provides firms with greater learning and upgrading opportunities.
Export Promotion Policies: Usefulness for Export Firms
Mexico’s export promotion policies provide significant support for 
export firms. Assistance provided by BANCOMEXT, and sometimes by 
SECOFI, in supplying information on foreign markets, publishing 
export directories with companies’ references, and financing trade fair 
participation has been important in the initial stages for most compa­
nies. These are precisely the areas that are the most crucial for a firm 
just beginning to export.
For example, one of the companies in the study that began export­
ing with the help of BANCOMEXT started by listing its products in the 
institution’s export roster. This allowed it to get its first export orders. 
Meanwhile, contacts with several of BANCOMEXT’s representatives 
abroad led to specific export opportunities. The institution provided 
financing for the firm’s participation in a trade fair in Cologne, 
Germany, and the export manager was also able to learn more about 
exporting in a workshop organized by BANCOMEXT.
Other corporate executives stated that B A N C O M E X T ’s support 
had been very helpful in providing export financing for the working 
capital they needed before reaching the point of actually shipping the 
goods, as well as in extending credit to the purchasing firms for the first 
export orders. BANCOMEXT also financed companies’ participation in 
trade fairs abroad. In some cases, the firms no longer make use of the 
export bank’s financial support because their own export experience 
allows them to get export financing elsewhere. Nevertheless, the com­
pany executives believed that the institutional support had played a key 
role in enabling their firms to begin exporting.
Nonetheless, while providing assistance for companies that are 
beginning to export is important, there are significant differences 
between firms with respect to the relevance of export-related informa­
tion and trade fair backing. These differences are industry related.
Sustained government support is particularly important for indus-
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tries aimed at markets where there are frequent changes, for example, in 
consumers’ tastes. In these industries, trade fair participation and updat­
ed market information is vital.
In contrast, for industries exporting commodities the important step 
is to manage to insert the firm into a network of brokers. After that, the 
exporting process mainly consists of setting up the export logistics. 
Besides, companies exporting commodities tend to be very large firms 
that have less need for government assistance in export matters.
B A N C O M E X T ’s support for export financing was critical in the 
early 1990s when it was very difficult for Mexican firms to get credit. 
At that time, exporting allowed companies to get loans that they could 
not have obtained otherwise. For example, interviews in Mexican gar­
ment firms in 1993 showed that at that time, when credit was scarce due 
to a tight monetary policy, export financing was often the only source of 
financing available to the medium-sized firms included in the survey 
(Macario 1995). In that sense, providing export financing allows partial 
compensation for failures of financial markets in Latin American coun­
tries.
Providing financing for export is still important today, although a 
number of firms— mainly the larger ones— find that they can presently 
get financing at better rates from other financial institutions, particular­
ly abroad, than from BANCOMEXT. This is due to the sharp increase 
in rates at which B A N C O M E X T  has been able to get funds abroad 
since December 1994. This rate increase was transferred to the loans the 
export bank makes in Mexico, since it does not subsidize interest rates. 
On the other hand, rates for export financing are still very attractive for 
many small and medium-sized firms.
In respect to export promotion instruments for companies already 
exporting, such as the drawback, ALTEX, and PITEX programs dis­
cussed earlier, these are widely used by Mexican firms.15 The few firms 
not using one of these programs were either barely beginning to export 
or did not use enough imported inputs to make it worthwhile.
In sum, Mexico’s export promotion policies are efficient and sup­
portive of firms’ export efforts.
Main Obstacles to Export
The firms’ executives found that there are no significant export obsta­
cles in Mexico for exporting to the United States and Canada. While 
some entrepreneurs still criticize export red tape in Mexico, which 
obviously discriminates against smaller firms, there is a consensus
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about the fact that it has been considerably reduced and does not repre­
sent an important obstacle. Transportation to the United States also 
appears to be operating quite well. There are complaints about how 
ports operate and regarding railroad transportation, but there is a belief 
that there have been improvements.
Exporting to countries outside NAFTA does present more obstacles. 
These export obstacles include red tape requirements in importing 
countries, inadequate infrastructure, irregular shipment schedules, and 
difficulty in consolidating shipments. These obstacles appear to be more 
acute in the case of Central America: in some cases, it is cheaper and 
faster to ship goods from Mexico to Chile.
Bureaucratic constraints in the countries that buy Mexican exports, 
particularly those in Latin America, can turn into nontariff trade barri­
ers. Venezuela, for example, requires that a government agency must 
issue a quality certification for every shipment of after-market automo­
bile parts, even when the export firm is certified as a supplier to large 
automotive companies in Mexico and the United States. This occurs in 
spite of the preferential trade agreement signed by that country with 
Mexico and Colombia. Certificates of origin often appear to function as 
a similar sort of administrative nontariff trade barrier in several Latin 
American countries.16
Transporting export goods to countries outside North America also 
seems to be quite difficult. Mexico’s roads and, in general all the coun­
try’s transportation systems, are set up for exporting to the United 
States. This is reasonable since it is Mexico’s main trading partner. 
However, it complicates matters for firms trying to export to other 
regions, as many have tried to do since the December 1994 devaluation 
and the subsequent recession.
Export managers also complained about the insufficient shipment 
frequency and the difficulties for consolidating loads. It is quite possi­
ble that these obstacles will decrease as the export of goods to other 
countries, such as those in Latin America, continues growing. Still, they 
do represent a stumbling block for companies trying to export at pres­
ent.
The Influence of Preferential Trade Agreements 
on Firms' Export Opportunities
The aggregate data presented earlier shows that the PTAs signed by 
Mexico since 1992 have had a positive effect on exports. This was cor­
roborated by the experience of the firms included in the survey. Of the
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twelve firms included in the research, ten said they have benefited from 
these PTAs. One of the two companies that had not benefited from the 
trade negotiations was a firm that already was exporting auto parts to 
the United States before NAFTA was signed and still faced a tariff that 
did not change much. The other firm’s main export market was Central 
America, where it continued to face many barriers.
The impact of the preferential trade agreements on the firms includ­
ed in the study can be summarized as follows. In the first place, several 
companies have benefited from having access to cheaper inputs because 
tariffs for U.S. products in Mexico have dropped. For instance, one of 
the companies (an orange juice manufacturer) saw the tariff on several 
inputs not produced domestically drop to 0%. Meanwhile, its market in 
Chile grew substantially because the tariff imposed upon its product 
was also abolished.
Another example is a polyester manufacturer that benefited from 
NAFTA: production was located in Mexico, precisely due to that PTA. 
Meanwhile, the company’s market share in Chile also increased consid­
erably because it replaced other input sources in that country. Similarly, 
one auto parts firm was able to continue selling in Venezuela, in spite of 
the recession in that country, due to the preferences negotiated in the 
Group of Three (G-3) PTA among Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela.17
Of these trade negotiations, the one that has had the strongest 
impact is of course NAFTA with the United States and Canada. This 
agreement has not only expanded the companies’ export opportunities 
but also allowed them to have access to less expensive or higher quality 
inputs, thus contributing to the enhancement of the firms’ productivity.
Nevertheless, as discussed above, other PTAs signed by Mexico in 
the early 1990s also have had beneficial effects, particularly because 
tariff levels in Latin America tend to be (before trade negotiations) quite 
high, much higher than those of the United States. Therefore, the mar­
ginal effect of these agreements on the decrease of tariffs can be quite 
significant.
In spite of the overall increase in exports to the G-3, the firms 
included in the research complained that Colombia and Venezuela, even 
after signing the trade agreement, have a series of nontariff trade barri­
ers that were not included in the negotiations but that remain important 
obstacles to increases in trade. An example of these barriers is the need 
to prove compliance with sanitary conditions or carrying out long and 
cumbersome formalities for each shipment.
In the longer run, in addition to increased trade, the entrepreneurs 
interviewed believe that the PTAs will have another positive effect
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through their impact on firms’ investment decisions, most particularly, 
locational ones. For example, they are clearly aware that NAFTA has 
played an important role in the decisions .of several transnational com­
panies to set up or revamp their plants in Mexico. Similarly, the invest­
ments by Mexican firms in Chile in such industries as food processing, 
where Bimbo bought Ideal, and in the infrastructure, where Bufete 
Industrial bought Ovalle Moore, were strongly influenced by the PTA 
between the two countries.
The fact that PTAs have had a significant impact on companies’ 
export opportunities suggests that a great deal of care has to be taken 
when negotiating them so as to ensure consideration of such aspects as 
the importance of trade diversion and of strategic decisions about which 
countries will be the major trade partners. It appears that these points 
were expressly taken into account when negotiating the trade agree­
ments Mexico signed in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, another feature 
that should be taken into account in the course of the negotiations is that 
the agreement really does increase trade opportunities and that trade 
will not be hindered by nontariff barriers.
Conclusions
The project found that the main motivation for companies to begin 
exporting was the need to offset the fall of demand in the domestic mar­
ket. Thus, it was the need to find markets for output that could no 
longer be sold in the domestic market that drove these firms to export. 
In contrast, economies of scale have not been a factor that stimulated 
export activity for the companies included in the survey.
These firms’ presence in export markets is also, however, taking on 
a more permanent nature. This new trend takes hold as corporate execu­
tives (once they have started to export) cease viewing export markets as 
a temporary outlet for excess capacity, but instead come to regard them 
as a permanent complement to the firms’ domestic market share. 
Exporting allows firms a reliable source of hard currency and decreases 
vulnerability to the fluctuations of the domestic market. It also provides 
companies with learning and upgrading opportunities.
To begin exporting, companies have to obtain information and 
establish a network abroad. It was easier for Mexican entrepreneurs to 
start exporting to the United States than to other markets, such as those 
of Latin American countries.
Several of the executives in the study made the decision to begin
44 Export Promotion Policies on the Cutting Edge
exporting after witnessing the success of another export firm in the 
same industry. This shows that a firm’s success in selling to a new mar­
ket abroad rapidly provides a signal to other companies in the same 
industry. Furthermore, the information on tariff and nontariff barriers 
obtained by one firm can be useful for another company in the same 
industry. A firm that is a successful pioneer exporter bears greater costs 
than the companies that follow in its path. Hence, private investment in 
obtaining export information is suboptimal because the pioneer export 
company cannot appropriate all the benefits of this investment, but 
instead generates positive externalities that benefit latecomers. This 
confirms the fact that the cost of providing export information should 
not be borne exclusively by individual firms.
There is also evidence that support for export firms needs to be tai­
lored to the specific industries involved. Exporting manufactured con­
sumer goods is much more demanding than exporting commodities. 
Export promotion institutions should consider this when designing sup­
port programs.
Exporting— by exposing firms to competition and to demanding 
international standards— provides companies with considerable learn­
ing opportunities about the prevailing standards in export markets and 
how they should go about upgrading to satisfy these standards. There is 
a significant learning process that takes place within firms as they adapt 
their production and distribution processes to satisfy export market 
requirements. This process allows the acquisition of a substantial 
amount of knowledge that permits an outward shift of the production 
function. In sum, when companies start exporting they get on a steeper 
learning curve. The greater learning and upgrading opportunities that 
export activity provides to firms were found in companies that exported 
indirectly as well as those engaged in direct export activity. In other 
words, the opportunities exist for both suppliers to exporters and for 
exporters themselves.
This learning capability requirement, which is at the same time an 
obstacle for firms trying to export and an advantage for those that are 
successful at doing so, is crucial at a time when the pace of change in 
demand has accelerated. Enabling and encouraging more companies to 
get on such a learning curve could have significant positive effects in 
terms of firms ’ productivity. Exposing companies to competition and 
world-level standards in a given industry and allowing them access to 
the upgrading tools required to compete in such markets is probably one 
of the most efficient and significant kinds of support that public policy 
could provide, in both small and in large economies.
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Mexico’s export promotion programs are very useful for export 
firms. Companies make extensive use of the export promotion instru­
ments available to them, such as the PITEX and ALTEX programs, as 
well as of the assistance provided by BANCOMEXT in the forms of 
export information and financing. The government’s ability to set up 
programs that allow companies to have ready access to a wide range of 
inputs and to streamline bureaucratic export formalities is outstanding 
and sets it apart from its counterparts within the region. Moreover, these 
export promotion programs have the additional advantage of being fully 
compatible with the Uruguay Round Agreements.
B A N C O M E X T  provides export firms with substantial support, 
although it has had more difficulty since December 1994. This financial 
institution will become even more relevant in the coming years as some 
of the government’s export promotion programs are partially phased 
out. The export hank is an exemplary institution, but it will have to 
adapt if it is to have the flexibility and ability to provide the kind of 
support firms will need to cope with the new challenges in export mar­
kets. This is important if BANCOMEXT wants to ensure its ability to 
continue contributing to an increase in the number of export companies.
Therefore, even though there is still room for improvement— such 
as a further reduction in export formalities in some programs and a 
greater adaptation of BANCOMEXT’s programs to the evolving needs 
of export firms— Mexico’s export promotion policies appear to be very 
effective. They play a particularly crucial role in the initial stages of 
export activity, when companies need information about how to access 
foreign markets and obtain financing for participation in trade fairs. 
They are also among the best in Latin America in terms of enabling 
firms to gain access to competitive inputs.
Hence, while Mexico’s export success is mainly the result of a wide 
range of economic policies, of the size of the country’s manufacturing 
sector, and of its proximity to the United States, the country’s export 
promotion system also makes a valuable contribution to this export suc­
cess. Complaints about the red tape required for exporting notwith­
standing, export promotion programs such as PITEX and ALTEX and 
the support provided by BANCOMEXT help firms to export and are an 
important factor in the country’s export success.
This policy advantage is a result of the government’s determination 
to increase exports. It is also the product of the administrative capability 
Mexican export promotion institutions possess thanks to their highly 
qualified professionals and their flexibility in adapting programs to 
firms’ needs. Mexican entrepreneurs often complain that the govern-
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ment is rigid and takes too long to change its policies. But when one 
compares the institutional capability of Mexican export promotion insti­
tutions with that of other such agencies in Latin American and 
Caribbean countries, Mexico has a clear advantage. The new incentives 
for indirect exporters are a good example of this. Moreover, the public 
sector has the capability needed to administer a number of different 
export facilitation schemes, such as the ALTEX and PITEX programs. 
By contrast, there are several Latin American and Caribbean countries 
that lack the administrative capability even to administer standard pro­
grams, such as a drawback scheme.
Companies do not face any significant obstacle in Mexico when 
exporting to the United States or Canada. Yes, some aspects of the 
country’s infrastructure still appear to be deficient, such as its railroads 
and port facilities, but entrepreneurs believe that quite a bit of progress 
has been made in recent years and that more will be made in the near 
future.
On the other hand, firms face major obstacles when trying to export 
to Latin American countries. The main obstacles include inadequate 
infrastructure, irregular and costly shipment options, and red tape in the 
importing countries. A lack of transparency with respect to commercial 
practices and to national commercial legislation in these countries also 
hinders export opportunities. Some of these obstacles will become less 
of a constraint as trade expands, since this can be expected to permit an 
increase of shipment frequencies and to provide more opportunities for 
cargo consolidation. Others will have to be addressed by government- 
level negotiations, such as the nontariff barriers resulting from bureau­
cratic and procedural requirements.
Regional PTAs provide export firms with greater access not only to 
markets abroad, but also to a wider range of imported inputs. NAFTA, 
for example, has allowed the companies included in the study to 
increase their exports and also to obtain imported inputs at a lower cost 
than before the agreement went into effect. The agreements negotiated 
by Mexico with Latin American countries have also led to an increase 
in export opportunities, particularly in the case of Chile. The positive 
long-term locational effects of these agreements in terms of companies’ 
decisions to set up plants in a country to benefit from these larger mar­
kets was also stressed by the entrepreneurs who were interviewed. Last, 
the opportunities provided by these agreements, which have opened up 
new markets for Mexican firms, have contributed to the country’s eco­




1. The information included in this section, unless otherwise specified, is 
from ECLAC (1999b) and (1999c).
2. Information provided by SECOFI.
3. Information provided by Mexico’s Trade Commissioner in Chile.
4. This section is based on Kate and Niels (1996).
5. The research presented in this chapter did not cover maquila firms, since 
one of the criteria used was to include comparable companies in the different coun­
tries covered by the study. However, a description of this scheme is given in this 
section to provide a point of reference for comparing the impact of the different 
export promotion instruments.
6. Information provided by SECOFI.
7. Information provided by SECOFI.
8. Information provided by SECOFI.
9. Information provided by BANCOMEXT.
10. Information provided by Mexico’s trade commissioner in Chile.
11. For a detailed description of the firms included in the project, the criteria 
for selecting them, and the main findings of the study, see Macario (1998a).
12. This outcome is different from the one obtained in the studies in Chile and 
Colombia. The reason for these contrasting findings is the difference in size of the 
countries’ domestic markets. See the corresponding chapters.
13. However, there are industries in which operating at a world-level scale 
entails having plants whose level of output is larger than most domestic markets, 
including M exico’s. This is the case, for example, of some products of the petro­
chemical industries.
14. One of the goals of the present Mexican administration is to make that 
nation’s firms’ presence in export markets more permanent. This objective is based 
on the perception that many companies remain in export markets for only a short 
period (interview with SECOFI officials).
15. No results are given on the maquila scheme because no maquila firm was 
included in the study.
16. Note that although Mexican manufacturers mentioned on several occa­
sions that obtaining certificates of origin was a cumbersome procedure, Chilean 
entrepreneurs claim that they are facing unfair competition from Mexican firms 
exporting after-market parts that are in fact not manufactured in Mexico, but in 
Asia. The main reason for getting away with this practice, according to the Chilean 
manufacturers, is the laxity of the Mexican authorities in delivering certificates of 
origin. Whatever the real reason for the loss of market share by the Chilean firms in 
question, this event shows that streamlining administrative procedures is not always 
that simple, and that complex negotiations may be involved.
17. These results have a strong selection bias, since this is a sample of suc­
cessful exporters. The conclusions drawn here for a small number of firms do not 
allow one to conclude that the majority of Mexican firms have benefited from 
NAFTA and the other PTAs signed by Mexico in recent years. It is still too early to 
assess the impact of these PTAs on the Mexican manufacturing industry, and inter­
viewing a small number of firms is in any event not the correct way to do so. 
However, the interviews were a good opportunity to get some preliminary informa­




In Search of a New Export Drive
Carla Macario
Chile was a pioneer of trade reform in Latin America, particularly dur­
ing the late 1970s and the early 1980s. The country was also a forerun­
ner with respect to export promotion policies. The outcome of these 
reforms was that the nation successfully increased exports over the 
course of many years.
Yet, recent years have shown that the country needs new policies if 
it wants to regain the ability to have exports growing at high rates. The 
recent fall in exports can be partially explained by the economic turbu­
lence that began in Asia and then spread to Latin America. Neverthe­
less, the fall is also due to a specialization in exporting a few natural- 
resource-intensive commodities that made the country vulnerable to 
fluctuations of the business cycle in export markets. This specialization 
is the result of inappropriate macroeconomic policies— from the stand­
point of promoting export growth— combined with a dwindling of the 
efforts to introduce policy innovations leading to sustained export 
growth. This chapter examines Chile’s policies from the perspective of 
promoting exports.
The Macroeconomic Environment
Chile’s GDP was US$77 billion in 1998 (Table 3.1). GDP growth rate 
was 7.0% in 1997 and 3.1% in 1998. After more than a decade during 
which the country went through several recessions (in the 1970s and in 
the early 1980s)— and performed poorly in terms of growth rate (GDP 
dropped by a yearly average of 0.2% between 1980 and 1985) the econ­




Table 3.1 Chile: Economic Indicators
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 19988
GDPa 44,787 48,072 53,347 56,857 59,775 65,200 69,694 74,581 76,882
GDP growth ratesb 3.3 7.3 11.0 6.6 5.1 9.1 6.9 7.0 3.1
Importsa’c 9,314 9,794 12,379 13,716 14,760 18,214 20,173 22,950 23,166
Exportsa-c 11,897 12,974 14,972 15,409 17,092 19,234 21,922 24,285 25,776
Import ratiod 20.8 20.4 23.2 24.1 24.7 27.9 28.9 30.8 30.1
Export ratio (all goods)d 26.6 27.0 28.1 27.1 28.6 29.5 31.5 32.6 33.5
Export ratio (manufactures)6 10.9 12.7 13.2 16.1 16.4 13.2 14.3 15.2 16.9
Exchange rate* 305 349 363 404 420 397 412 419 460
S o u rce : ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
a. Millions o f U.S. dollars at 1995 prices.
b. Average annual rates at 1995 prices.
c. Goods and services.
d. Percentages o f GDP at 1995 prices. Includes goods and services.
e. Percentages of total value o f FOB exports of goods.
f. Nominal exchange rate in pesos per U.S. dollars.
g. Preliminary figures.









average yearly rate of 8.3% during the period 1991-1997 (Rosales
1999). This performance stands out in Latin America where most coun­
tries have at best been growing at rates of between 2 and 4% per year.1
The country’s ability to grow at relatively high rates was due to the 
combination of several determinants, such as stable macroeconomic 
policies, the setting up of private pension funds that encouraged saving 
and investment, a reduction of the government’s intervention in the 
economy, and a countrywide consensus of what economic policy should 
be. Still, one of the major factors credited with allowing this perfor­
mance was the transformation of the Chilean economy from one of 
import substitution to one that has opened up and in which exports play 
a major role. Chile’s degree of openness, expressed as the sum of 
imports and exports over GDP, was 63.6% in 1998, up from 32.2% in 
1970.
The country’s exports of goods and services reached US$24.3 bil­
lion in 1997 and US$25.8 billion in 1998, measured at constant 1995 
prices. Exports’ share of GDP has grown steadily from 12.6% in 1970 
and 25.9% in 1985 to 33.5% in 1998. Export growth has been determi­
nant for the growth of the Chilean economy (Agosin 1997; Garcia, 
Meller, and Reppetto 1996). Hence, Chile has been very successful in 
transforming its economy from a closed one to one that has opened up 
substantially and in which exports play a major role (Table 3.2).
Yet, this export performance is somewhat mitigated by the fact that 
most of the country’s exports are still primary goods. In 1997 Chile’s 
leading ten export products were refined copper (27.9%), copper ores 
(12.1%), fish (5.1%), wood pulp (3.6%), meat and fish meal (3.3%), 
wine (2.5%), grapes (2.5%), gold (2.3%), unrefined copper (2.2%), and 
lumber (1.7%). Therefore, the ten main products accounted for over 
63% of the country’s exports, demonstrating a significant concentration 
of exports in a few products, of which 42% are copper based.
T ab le  3.2 C h ile : G D P  a n d  E x p o rt G ro w th  1980-1997 (P e rc e n ta g e , a v e ra g e  a n n u a l  






S ource: ECLAC, on the basis o f official figures.
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The share of copper products has decreased considerably since 
1970, when it accounted for 78.8% of the country’s exports (ECLAC 
1998b). Copper is less important than in the past, but it is still very 
important for the trade balance and even more so for the public sector’s 
budget. The weight of copper in the country’s exports implies that the 
economy is very sensitive to the fluctuations of the price of copper on 
world markets. The same can be said of meals and wood pulp, although 
to a lesser extent.
For instance, the fall of the prices of the country’s main export 
products led to a decrease in the export of goods from US$16.9 billion 
in 1997 to US$14.9 billion in 1998, measured at current market prices. 
While exports of goods measured in volume increased by 6.8% during 
this period, a fall of 17.6% of the prices of the goods exported explains 
the decrease of 12.0% of the value of exports of goods.
This shows that concentration in the export of a few natural- 
resource-intensive commodities makes the Chilean economy highly vul­
nerable to fluctuations in international markets. And most of the decrease 
is the consequence of reduced mineral exports, essentially due to the 
plummeting of the price of copper. Nevertheless, revenue from other 
export products also fell. For example, the price of wood pulp— one of 
the country’s main exports— went down for the third year in a row.
Most of the leading exports had very low processing levels: in 
1998, only 16.9% of the country’s exports were manufactured products, 
one of the lowest percentages in the region. This hinders the incorpora­
tion of the latest technological innovations with the potential of leading 
to positive spillovers in the rest of the economy.
Moreover, there is a strong concentration in the number of export 
firms. Ten principal firms exported 40% of exports during the first 
semester of 1997, while 59% of the companies exported less than 
US$100,000 per year (ProChile 1997). This is combined with a high 
rate of turnover among exporters (the number of companies that export 
one year and do not the following year)— which reaches 35%. This 
means that there are many firms that export sporadically instead of on a 
regular basis.
There is also a significant limit to export destinations: they go to a 
small number of countries. In 1997 the main exports markets were the 
United States (15.9%), Japan (15.7%), Great Britain (6.2%), South 
Korea (5.8%), Brazil (5.6%), and Taiwan and Argentina (4.6% each). 
Therefore, almost half the country’s main export markets are in only 
five countries.
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At the same time, there has been a decrease in the annual rate of 
growth of nontraditional exports from 21.8% in 1995 to 6.9% in 1997 
to 3.6% for 1998 (Banco Central de Chile 1999). This is clear evi­
dence that the export diversification push has weakened over the last 
years.
The country’s specialization in exporting a few natural-resource­
intensive commodities has been reinforced by the appreciation of the 
exchange rate. The Chilean peso has had a sustained appreciation since 
the early 1990s, which was brought about by several factors. One of 
them was the sizable flow of capital to Latin American economies dur­
ing most of the 1990s, particularly before the 1994 Tequila shock. At 
the same time, the significant investments in large mining projects and 
in forestry, paper, and pulp enterprises also contributed to the apprecia­
tion of the peso.
For example, despite the depreciation of the peso during a few 
months of 1997, the real exchange rate of the peso appreciated by 8.4% 
during that year. In fact, the rate of appreciation up to October 1997—  
just before the country started experiencing the effects of the economic 
turbulence in Asia— was 10.4% (Banco Central de Chile 1999). This 
compounded a sustained appreciation over several years, far higher than 
what could be explained by increases in productivity. The appreciation 
of the peso for several years contributed to a decrease in the inflation 
rate to 4.7% for 1998, the lowest in several decades. But such apprecia­
tion has curtailed export growth.
Exchange rate appreciation has been particularly high in relation to 
countries outside Latin America, since appreciation with respect to the 
region was somewhat mitigated by the significant appreciation of 
currencies in some countries, such as Brazil, up to the beginning of
1999.
Moreover, this appreciation happened at the same time as an 
account deficit that was already higher than 5% of GDP even before 
the onset of the economic troubles in Asia and the ensuing fall in the 
price of copper (Rosales 1999). There was a change in the trend during 
the second semester of 1998 that led to a 3.6% depreciation of the peso 
for that year (Banco Central de Chile 1999), and the same trend contin­
ued during the first months of 1999. Nonetheless, the magnitude of the 
depreciation certainly was not an accurate reflection of an economy 
that has seen the price of its main export products fall and the current 
account deficit continue growing to about 7% of GDP (ECLAC 
1999d).
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Trade Policy
Chile started transforming its economy after the military coup that over­
threw Allende’s government in September 1973. An import substitution 
development strategy that had been in place for several decades was 
replaced by one based on opening up the economy and emphasizing 
outward-oriented growth. At the same time, the government’s interven­
tion in the economy was slashed. The banks, manufacturing firms, and 
land that had been put under government control under Allende were 
privatized. The same was done with other state-owned firms in the fol­
lowing years. Concurrent with these changes, new policies were 
designed to foster the establishment of a domestic capital market 
(Ramos 1986).
Trade policy was radically transformed. At the end of Allende’s 
government tariffs varied widely, from 0 to 750%, the average tariff 
being 94%. In addition to these high tariffs, there were various nontariff 
barriers, such as the prohibition on importing certain goods and the 
requirement to make large deposits to import other merchandise 
(Ffrench-Davis 1980).
The trade policy changes introduced after September 1973 were the 
following: nontariff barriers were almost completely eliminated, while 
all tariffs above 200% were cut to that level. Tariffs were then progres­
sively reduced and the dispersion decreased, so that by 1979 a flat tariff 
of 10% applied to most goods. In 1980 the average tariff was 10.1% 
(Ffrench-Davis 1989). During that period Chile was a forerunner of 
trade reform in Latin America.
Nevertheless, the export push that could have been expected from 
trade liberalization was dampened by the appreciation of the peso, as 
the government started using the nominal exchange rate to control infla­
tion. This decision— combined with the laxity of regulations in the 
financial system and an abundance of financial flows from the industri­
alized countries— contributed to making the import of goods much 
more profitable than manufacturing them in the country: while exports 
grew at annual rates of 14.4% between 1974 and 1981, imports grew at 
a rate of 22.5%. As a result, in 1981 Chile’s current account deficit was 
18% of GDP (Ffrench-Davis, Leiva, and Madrid 1992). It is not trade 
liberalization as such that explains these events, but rather the incom­
patibility between the trade policy and the exchange rate policy due to 
their having different goals.
In the early 1980s, there was a substantial decrease in financial 
flows to developing countries. In the case of Chile this was compound-
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ed by a drop in the price of copper, the country’s main export good and 
also a significant source of revenue for the public sector. The economy 
went into a severe recession as GDP dropped by 15.7% in 1982. There 
was a devaluation, and unemployment rates increased sharply. Tariffs 
were raised again so that the average tariff went up gradually from 
10.1% in 1982 to 25.8% in 1985.
As the economy recovered, tariff levels were again progressively 
reduced. The policy mix during the period 1990-1996 was successful, 
allowing the country to continue increasing exports and to maintain the 
trade deficit at a moderate level (Agosin and Ffrench-Davis 1998). 
Chile has consolidated tariffs with the W T O  at a maximum rate of 25%, 
bringing it down from 35%. This relatively low rate was chosen pre­
cisely to show the country’s determination to have low tariffs. The only 
exceptions are sugar, wheat, and oil for human consumption and oil 
seeds (GATT 1991; DIRECONBI 1994).
At present, one of the key elements of Chile’s trade policy is a flat 
tariff of 10%. It was 11% for several years until January 1999, when a 
1% reduction was applied. There will be a further cut of 1% per year for 
the next four years, reaching 6% by 2003. This is the tariff applied to 
imports from countries with which Chile has not negotiated PTAs, the 
goal of this further reduction being a decrease in the trade diversion 
effect of the PTAs.
The other key element of the country’s trade policy is the negotia­
tion of PTAs that have been actively pursued since the early 1990s. 
Chile has such agreements with Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Peru, and Venezuela. The country has a special trade agreement with 
Bolivia. Chile is an associate member of MERCOSUR, the customs 
union set up by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. The country 
is not a full member of MERCOSUR so as to avoid the high common 
external tariff applied by that customs union. Chile belongs to the Asia 
Pacific Economic (APEC) Forum, an organization that promotes trade 
among countries of the Pacific Rim. As a result of the numerous prefer­
ential trade agreements, the average tariff on imports to Chile is in fact 
around 8% and not flat.
Export Promotion Policies
Among Chile’s export promotion policies are those that are aimed at 
compensating the antiexport bias, the schemes that seek to encourage 
exports and the institutional support for export activities.2 Information
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on the amount of funds used to finance the instruments or the share of 
exports using them is provided whenever available.
Policies to Compensate the Antiexport Bias
Drawback. This scheme, set up in 1988, allows firms to recover the 
tariffs paid when importing inputs used to manufacture exports. It is the 
standard instrument that most countries use to enable companies to 
compensate the antiexport bias that results from tariffs. It also lets firms 
have access to a wide range of inputs, particularly imported ones. It 
does not confer the recovery of countervailing duties nor of antidump­
ing penalties.
The petrochemical industry has been the one to benefit the most 
from the drawback— 43.0% of the funds spent from 1988 to 1993—  
along with the mining sector (26.37%) (Servicio Nacional de Aduanas 
1994). Approximately US$30 million were used to finance this instru­
ment in 1997.
That this instrument is operative in Chile provides domestic firms 
with an advantage over the companies in the majority of Latin 
American countries. Most nations in the region do not have drawback 
systems that function in practice even if they do theoretically exist in 
the legislation.
Nevertheless, even in Chile this scheme involves complex paper­
work requirements, and large companies have a greater ability to com­
ply with the requirements. By contrast, medium and small-sized firms 
find it more difficult to gather all the information necessary for the 
drawback. Up to now they have tended to prefer using the Reintegro 
Simplificado, an export subsidy described below.
Value-added tax refund. This system, set up in 1974, allows firms to 
get a refund of the value-added tax paid when buying products for 
export or inputs for manufacturing exports. It is a usual arrangement 
aimed at avoiding double taxation.
Export warehouses. The export warehouses, Almacenes Particulares 
de Exportación, allow firms manufacturing exports to store imported 
inputs or parts that will be used to make export products. Firms using 
these warehouses can bring the imports into the country without paying 
tariffs or the value-added tax. This scheme allows companies to avoid 
taxes for imports when storing or manufacturing exports. Hence, it dif-
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fers from the two instruments described above that allow firms to 




Simplified drawback scheme for nontraditional exports. This export 
V ./'' promotion instrument, the Reintegro Simplificado, was set up in 1985. 
Its goal is to allow firms to obtain a subsidy roughly equal to the refund 
of tariffs on imported inputs used to manufacture nontraditional export 
goods. It allows exporters of nontraditional goods to get a refund of 3, 
5, or 10% of the FOB value of the exports. To qualify for this refund, 
the firm must be exporting a product that has a maximum of 50% of 
imported inputs and, most important, of which total exports of that 
product by all companies in the country in a given period were below a 
specified threshold.
For example, to have the right to a refund of 10%, the total exports 
of a given good must have been in the previous year under US$11.6 
million. For a refund of 5% the maximum threshold is set at US$17.4 
million, and for 3% at US$20.9 million. Hence, as the exports of a 
given product (defined by its tariff item) increase and pass the thresh­
olds, they drop to the lower refund levels— say from 5 to 3%— until 
they are excluded, precisely because of the export success.
This policy, innovative in Latin America, seeks to encourage the 
entry into markets abroad of products that had not previously been 
exported and to bolster export diversification. The policy has con­
tributed to increasing the number of export firms, particularly small and 
medium-sized companies.
The amount spent on this instrument was US$210 million in 1996, 
an average of 8.7% of the value of the exports that can use it (Banco 
Central de Chile 1998). In 1992, 78% of the funds used for reimbursing 
exporters were paid under this drawback scheme (DIRECONBI 1994), 
and approximately 2,200 firms use it.
Firms in the food and beverage industry, and wood-processing, 
paper, printing, and chemical companies are the main users of this 
arrangement. It is an effective scheme for encouraging export diversifi­
cation because it has promoted the entry of new products into export 
markets at a low fiscal cost. It also self-destroys in the sense that once 
the policy is successful— that is, once a certain export threshold has 
been reached for a given product— there are no longer any export subsi-
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dies for that good. It could also be used as a scheme to promote export­
ing to new markets, if it were slightly modified by changing the rule of 
total exports of a given good to one that specifies exports to a given 
market (Macario 1995).
Nevertheless, although it is supposed to be a tariff refund, this 
instrument is in fact (at least in part) an export subsidy. Even if tariffs 
were effectively paid on imported inputs, nothing guarantees that they 
were in the percentage being refunded. Therefore this scheme is not 
compatible with the Uruguay Round Agreements, which established 
that most nonagricultural export subsidies should be eliminated by the 
year 2003. The only exceptions allowed are export subsidies in coun­
tries belonging to the group of nations with the lowest incomes, which 
does not include Chile. Moreover, products benefiting from this 
arrangement may also be subject to countervailing measures in import­
ing countries.
The scheme for importing capital goods. This subsidy, based on a 1987 
law, allows companies to delay for up to seven years the payment of tar­
iffs due for importing capital goods, which is then scheduled in three 
payments. If equipment is bought in the country instead of being 
imported, it allows the buyer to have a tax credit for 73.0% of the tariff 
that would have been applied had the good been imported, hence 7.3% 
for a tariff of 10.0%.
This scheme assists firms manufacturing for the domestic market, 
as well as exporters. Hence it is not only an export subsidy, but also a 
subsidy for buying equipment for manufacturing for the domestic mar­
ket. The amount currently being spent on this incentive is about US$30 
million per year.
However, if the capital goods imported under this policy are used to 
manufacture exports, then it is possible for the company to avoid pay­
ing the tariffs. To be able to do so, the firm must have exported at least 
10%  of its total sales in the previous two years— for the first payment—  
and this is to increase to 60% for the next two payments. In that sense, 
it favors exporters above manufacturers for the domestic market. So this 
subsidy is not compatible with the Uruguay Round Agreements, and it 
will have to be eliminated by the year 2003.
Export Financing
In addition to the main export credit programs described below, export 
firms have access to loans from commercial banks and to financing
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from the Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (CORFO), the 
country’s development agency.
Financing for collateral for nontraditional exports. The Fondo de 
Garantía para Exportaciones No-Tradicionales, set up in 1987, provides 
export firms with up to 50% of what banks require as collateral when 
granting loans to finance exports. To qualify for this support, firms must 
be exporting a nontraditional product. The maximum is around 
US$200,000 per year for each exporter. This is not a direct export- 
financing mechanism, but rather one that allows companies to have col­
lateral, thus facilitating access to the export financing offered by the 
commercial banks. Firms rarely use it. Three collateral arrangements 
were approved in 1995 and two in 1996 (OMC 1997a).
Financing for purchase of Chilean exports. CORFO provides borrow­
ing facilities for foreign firms buying Chilean capital goods, consumer 
durables, and engineering and consulting services. This allows a com­
pany importing the goods and services credit for up to ten years, while 
the Chilean exporter is paid immediately.
The development agency has this sort of export line of credit with 
the Corporación Andina de Fomento (the development bank of the 
Comunidad Andina), with the Central American Integration Bank, and 
with banks in Argentina, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Peru. Such long-term 
export financing is very helpful in putting Chilean exporters on the 
same footing as firms from other countries that are able to offer credit 
to purchasers. This is typically the case of U.S. and European capital 
goods firms, and also of Brazilian and Mexican companies.
Export investment financing. CORFO has a long-term borrowing facil­
ity to finance export investment for Chilean export firms. This instru­
ment is available to companies with annual sales under US$30 million. 
It allows firms to finance the purchase of inputs and other items used in 
the production process. It also covers the expenses of marketing abroad, 
such as setting up offices, warehouses, or retail stores outside the coun­
try. Firms can obtain loans of up to US$3 million for these purposes and 
repay them within eight years.
Export insurance. CORFO provides companies with assistance for 
export insurance through the instrument known as Cubos Exportación 
that subsidizes 50% of the cost of export insurance for firms with yearly 
sales under US$10 million. Export insurance availability has also
60 In Search o f a New Export Drive
increased somewhat thanks to programs offered by the Asociación de 
Exportadores de Manufacturas (ASEXMA), the exporters’ trade associ­
ation.
Institutional Support for Export Activities
ProChile. ProChile, the country’s trade promotion organization (TPO), 
belongs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was created in 1975 with 
the goal of promoting nontraditional exports, diversifying exports, and 
breaking into new markets abroad. It has twelve offices in Chile and 
thirty-eight abroad.
The TPO’s activities are presently aimed at increasing exports from 
the companies that are already exporting and at adding to the number of 
export firms. The agency has also set the goal of encouraging compa­
nies that are large exporters to be more involved in export markets 
through strategic alliances with foreign firms.
ProChile provides information on the formalities required for 
exporting, export promotion instruments, requirements for exporting to 
given markets, tariffs, and trade fairs abroad. It publishes several maga­
zines with export information and an export directory. The TPO’s web 
site has information on the country’s export products and the companies 
manufacturing them, thus facilitating the flow of information for poten­
tial clients abroad.
The agency works closely with the private sector through small 
associations that organize export firms in 180 industry-based entrepre­
neurial groups, such as one for the wine exporters. Through these 
groups ProChile provides companies with assistance for marketing 
abroad, including designing strategies for different markets. The firms 
benefiting from this assistance must finance half of the expenses.
ProChile has a yearly budget of US$22 million, of which US$10 
million are earmarked for agricultural products. The 2,000 export firms 
working with the agency, of a total of 5,000 for the country, sell around 
a third of Chile’s exports.
In addition to its activities of the past several years, the TPO is now 
providing firms with financial assistance for establishing offices 
abroad. This new activity is to enable tighter links between export firms 
and their clients abroad, and to encourage companies to export on a reg­
ular basis.
The agency has played an important role in making it easier for 
small and medium-sized companies to try to export, hence allowing an
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increasing number of firms to export and a greater export diversifica­
tion. It has also enabled participation in trade fairs to become a custom­
ary practice. The TPO has fostered a spirit of collaboration between 
government institutions and trade associations, such as ASEXMA, that 
is beneficial for policy success.
The effective support provided by ProChile, the streamlined export 
formalities, and the export subsidy for minor or emerging exports— the 
Reintegro Simplificado— contributed to the country’s exporting prod­
ucts across a wide range of tariff items, particularly during the late 
1980s and the early 1990s. It also explains why medium-sized firms can 
be exporters, in contrast to what happens in other countries in Latin 
America, where exporting is an activity most often carried out only by 
the largest companies.
Nevertheless, the demands of export firms in terms of export assis­
tance are much more complex today than they were a decade ago. The 
current organizational structure of ProChile— that of a standard govern­
ment agency— precludes it from having the flexibility, autonomy, and 
financial resources it needs to be able to respond to these demands.
Therefore, the TPO will change its legal status, if Chile’s congress 
approves the new legislation, to that of an independent corporation. 
While remaining under the control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the TPO’s new board of directors will include delegates from the pri- 
vate-sector trade associations. The goal of this change is to give the 
institution greater flexibility and autonomy, thus allowing it to respond 
more quickly to the needs of export firms.
In the meantime, the agency has gradually been transferring the 
responsibility for some export promotion activities to the private sector, 
by channeling funds to trade associations, such as ASEXMA, and other 
organizations with which it has signed agreements.
The asociación de exportadores de manufacturas. ASEXMA is the 
trade association of firms exporting manufactured goods. It provides 
companies with information on export formalities, export promotion 
schemes, and markets abroad. This trade association provides informa­
tion directly and through a web page, assists firms in participating in 
trade fairs, organizes trade missions, and organizes workshops to dis­
cuss policy issues that are critical for exporters.
The association has worked closely with ProChile in setting up 
groups of exporters for specific industries. These groups carry out such 
activities as marketing abroad, participating in trade fairs, and opening 
offices in countries picked as target markets.
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ASEXMA and the German Agency for Technical Assistance man­
age a project aimed at improving the export supply capability of small 
and medium-sized firms. The project provides around forty export firms 
with technical assistance in matters related to quality, technology, entry 
into markets abroad, trade fair participation, and design of marketing 
strategies.
Firms' Export Behavior
The main features of the behavior of export manufacturing firms in 
Chile presented here are based on the findings of a research project, car­
ried out in footwear and printing firms, that compared export and non­
export companies. The ultimate goal of the investigation was to estab­
lish which policies would be most effective for increasing manufactured 
exports.3
The main issues addressed were the following: What are the chief 
determinants that push a firm to export? How do companies learn to 
export? Do export firms have access to greater learning opportunities 
that allow them to get on steeper learning curves than companies selling 
only in the domestic market? How useful are export promotion policies 
for export companies? Are there significant export obstacles in the 
country? What is the influence of preferential trade agreements on the 
firms’ export opportunities?
Main Determinants of Firms' Export Decisions
Understanding why companies begin to export is useful for a better 
comprehension of firms’ export behavior. The main factor in footwear 
companies’ export activity was demand by foreign clients. Some of 
these were clients from neighboring countries, such as Bolivia or 
Paraguay. United States-based traders also played an important role in 
encouraging exports in this industry: they were looking for manufactur­
ers to replace Brazilian suppliers. These traders also contributed to a 
significant upgrading of the footwear companies by enabling them to 
learn to export and by forcing firms to progressively upgrade their pro­
duction capabilities. After this first stage, managers started trying to get 
new clients abroad by traveling to other countries in the region or by 
going to trade fairs. In this respect, footwear firms that export have fol­
lowed the sequence detailed by Donald Keesing and Sanjaya Lall 
(1992).
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By way of contrast, the main determinant that triggered exporting 
by Chilean printing firms was the intense competition in the domestic 
printing industry. The largest printing firms responded to that increased 
competition by buying new equipment that allowed them better quality 
products. At the same time, the technological changes of the two past 
decades increased the optimal production scale in the printing industry. 
Therefore, the purchase of new equipment implies an increase of scale. 
This, in turn, given the limited size of the domestic market, has driven 
the largest printing firms to have a growing presence in export markets.
Exporting relatively large shares of their output allows companies 
to invest in equipment and management changes required for consis­
tently higher quality levels, which in turn makes it easier for firms to 
continue exporting. Exporting makes it easier for them to negotiate 
input prices and get larger export orders, thus enabling them to have 
access to pecuniary economies of scale.4
Meanwhile, for other printing companies, particularly those with a 
smaller share of the domestic market, exporting is the only way to try to 
maintain their profits, as their share of the domestic market decreases, 
also due to the competition that characterizes the industry.
Exporting without the need to upgrade was possible for Chilean 
printing firms because the intense competition in the domestic market 
had already pushed them to upgrade. (Chile was the first country in the 
region to be exposed to strong import competition, and therefore, many 
firms there had to start upgrading earlier than in other countries.) 
Indeed, demanding clients in the domestic market forced those compa­
nies that wanted to preserve their market share to invest in improving 
product quality.
Another factor that facilitated exporting was that several Chilean 
companies were major indirect exporters already. Indeed, some printing 
firms had already become indirect exporters, even before exporting 
became an important activity, through the products they supplied to 
exporters. A typical case is that of the packaging used by Chilean food- 
processing manufacturers that have become successful exporters of 
such products as tomato paste.
The intense competition in the Chilean printing market turned the 
strongest printing firms into companies capable of going out to look for 
export opportunities in the region. They were helped in this by contacts 
provided by clients in Chile. For example, when the managers of the 
printing companies decided to try to export regularly, instead of just 
selling to occasional foreign clients, they contacted their clients in the 
domestic market and asked them for recommendations to related com­
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panies abroad. Once a company was able to start selling to a subsidiary 
of a transnational corporation in another Latin American country, it 
became much easier to get other clients in that new market.
Therefore, the factor that set off exports by the Chilean printing 
industry is different from the one that was determinant for the footwear 
firms included in the survey: it is a supply-push process, much more 
than a demand-pull one. In other words, there was not one single main 
factor behind the export push in these Chilean firms: footwear firms 
started exporting due to demand from foreign clients; printing firms did 
so for reasons related to the technology required by a demanding 
domestic market.
Learning When Exporting
The study of export and nonexport firms showed that export companies 
have greater learning opportunities than nonexport ones due to contacts 
with traders and foreign clients and to exposure to international compe­
tition. This learning takes place in matters directly related to exporting. 
Nevertheless, it also takes place in matters not as directly related to sell­
ing abroad, such as production guidelines, quality control procedures, 
product specifications, and management practices. These enhanced 
learning opportunities allow companies to get on a steeper learning 
curve, accumulate greater knowledge, and thus have access to dynamic 
economies of scale. Exporting simultaneously encourages firms to 
upgrade while, at the same time, providing them with greater opportuni­
ties to do so. This allows companies to preserve and increase their mar­
ket share both at home and abroad.
The first step firm managers must take when they are planning to 
begin exporting is to gather information. When Chilean footwear entre­
preneurs started exporting, they needed to learn how to get clients 
abroad, set up the logistics required to export, and find out which were 
the customary financial arrangements. They also needed information 
about access to the export promotion instruments and relevant trade 
fairs for their market segment. ProChile and ASEXMA assisted the 
firms in obtaining information, and, at the same time, traders helped 
them to start getting their plants organized for export.
Printing firms had an easier time gathering the information needed 
to begin exporting because selling abroad had become an established 
practice by the time this industry began to export regularly. Another 
factor that contributed to the industry’s relative ease in beginning to 
export was that the largest firms already had updated products as a
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result of intense competition in the domestic market and of upgrading 
strategies they followed to survive this competition. Moreover, several 
printing firms were already indirectly exporting significant shares of 
their output through their sales to Chilean exporters, such as those with 
wrapping and packaging products.
In addition to getting information on how to break into export mar­
kets and fulfill export formalities, for example, Chilean companies also 
had to learn how to improve the quality of their products and make 
them appropriate for international markets. Footwear firms benefited 
from the support provided by traders, participation in trade fairs and the 
contact with clients, and exposure to international competition. Printing 
firms benefited mainly from exposure to international competition and 
from learning how to provide better services to demanding clients.
The greater learning opportunities provided by exporting are, in the 
long run, one of the strongest advantages export firms have over nonex­
port companies. The contact with foreign markets encourages company 
managers to get information on the latest product specifications, pro­
duction guidelines, and quality control systems required to meet those 
specifications. Exporting also puts managers in closer touch with the 
updated inputs used in the industry and allows the managers to find out 
which are the best suppliers.
Other areas less directly related to the quality of the product— such 
as administrative and logistics guidelines— also showed evidence of 
substantial transformations due to exporting. Hence, exporting has 
resulted not only in significant changes in the way firms manufactured 
the goods, but also in how the companies were organized.
The learning process set off by exporting was much stronger in the 
footwear than in the printing firms, since the latter were already using 
updated practices before beginning to export. Yet, even printing firms 
managers stated that exporting had provided their companies with sig­
nificant learning opportunities that had a positive impact on services 
supplied to clients, quality of product, and management practices.
Nevertheless, as the Chilean economy has progressively become 
more open to foreign competition as a result of the combination of trade 
liberalization and exchange rate appreciation, nonexport firms are 
changing their practices and behaving increasingly like exporting ones. 
Their managers now frequently go to trade fairs, travel abroad to visit 
other companies, and hire consultants so as to change product specifica­
tions and production and administrative procedures.
Anyhow, exporting provides firms with significant learning oppor­
tunities that allow them to upgrade and to gain market share. Export
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companies have greater learning opportunities than nonexport firms. 
Moreover, the learning process stimulated by exporting has positive 
spillovers in the domestic market, allowing companies there to intro­
duce updated products and practices.
Although the challenge faced by firms in the Chilean industries that 
confront strong import competition has also stimulated learning in non­
export firms, the strongest learning takes place in companies in close 
contact with markets abroad. Exporting is, without a doubt, one of the 
best ways to encourage a dynamic learning process because it encour­
ages faster learning for upgrading, while simultaneously providing 
firms with greater opportunities to find out what they need to do for that 
purpose.
Export Promotion Policies
Effective export promotion policies play an important role in encourag­
ing a greater number of firms to export. Yet, these policies are rarely 
evaluated by firm managers, who are well placed to assess the policies 
from the standpoint of the users. Interviews with company executives 
showed that Chile’s export promotion system is effective in providing 
support for companies’ export efforts: information is readily available 
and export formalities are transparent, streamlined, and expeditious.
The instrument most often used by the export firms included in the 
investigation was the Reintegro Simplificado (a few entrepreneurs had 
also used the scheme for paying lower tariffs on capital goods). Most of 
the firms have received assistance from ProChile, particularly when tak­
ing the first steps to export. For the most part, company executives felt 
that Chile’s export promotion policies and institutions were effective.
Nevertheless, the firm managers were not as optimistic about the 
effectiveness of export promotion policies in the future. They were con­
cerned that the elimination of the Reintegro Simplificado and of the 
scheme allowing them to cut tariffs on equipment would make it more 
difficult for them to export. Moreover, they felt that although ProChile 
was very supportive, it needed to improve the quality and the diversity 
of the services supplied to exporters.
Export Obstacles
Firms’ exporting success is a function of their own production and mar­
keting capability, of the effectiveness of export promotion instruments, 
and of the general economic environment that promotes exporting or,
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on the contrary, discourages companies from selling abroad. A range of 
factors, from the state of the country’s infrastructure to how customs 
operates, influences companies’ decisions to sells goods abroad. When 
these factors have a negative influence on companies’ abilities to 
export, the aggregate impact is the costo país, that is, the additional cost 
firms bear simply by exporting from a given country.
The first obstacle to exporting named by corporate managers was 
the appreciation of the exchange rate discussed above. The second main 
obstacle to exporting faced by firms in Chile is the poor state of the 
infrastructure, particularly outside the capital, Santiago. For instance, 
the companies that export manufactured goods to the Mercosur coun­
tries by land have problems in winter, since access to the main tunnel 
that allows trucks to cross the Andes Mountains is often blocked by 
snow.
Port facilities will also require substantial investment. The facilities 
at Valparaiso and San Antonio practically collapse during the harvest 
season, when shipping fresh fruit in a short period is critical. The coun­
try has invested in infrastructure over the past years, yet infrastructure 
upgrading has lagged behind export growth and has produced bottle­
necks.
All the same, export firms in Chile face significantly fewer obsta­
cles than the companies in most other Latin American countries. 
Chilean exporters do have an advantage over their competitors in the 
region. Nevertheless, the government should give priority to investment 
in infrastructure if it wants to promote sustained export growth.
Preferential Trade Agreements
Chile has signed a number of PTAs with several Latin American coun­
tries and with Canada during the past years. A rigorous assessment of 
the impact of the PTAs on Chilean companies would require a longer 
time and more specific studies. Still, it is possible to draw some general 
preliminary conclusions from the information obtained during the inter­
views. The interviews provide a good opportunity for a rough estimate 
of export firms corporate managers’ overall view of the PTAs’ influence 
on export opportunities.
Executives of Chilean companies interviewed saw the PTAs as pro­
viding their companies with more opportunities than threats, at least in 
the long run. There will be a direct positive effect as the PTAs provide 
Chilean firms with greater export opportunities that allow them to offset 
the small size of the domestic market.
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Moreover, Chilean firms stand to gain more from the PTAs than 
their counterparts in other countries. The marginal benefit from the 
decrease in tariffs will be greater for Chilean companies that will then 
face substantially lower tariffs in other Latin American countries and 
fewer nontariff barriers. By contrast, competing firms in other countries 
of the region had already faced low tariffs when selling their products in 
Chile. Chilean companies will gain from the PTAs not only through the 
increase of the size of the potential markets for their final products, but 
also from access to cheaper inputs, as has been, for example, the case 
with Mexican imports.
Companies exporting manufactured goods stand to benefit most 
from the PTAs with other countries in South America, where their prod­
ucts can compete with domestic manufacturers. This has been con­
firmed by studies carried out on this topic (Agosin 1993b).
Conclusions
Chile had high export growth rates during the late 1980s and the early 
1990s thanks to sound macroeconomic policies and a trade policy that 
gave emphasis to opening up the economy. The nation was a pioneer in 
trade liberalization in Latin America and a model for many other medi­
um and small-sized economies in the region. Furthermore, the unilateral 
trade liberalization had been complemented with numerous PTAs since 
the early 1990s, allowing Chilean manufacturing firms to offset the 
effects of the small domestic market.
At the same time, the country had an effective trade promotion 
organization, innovative export promotion instruments, streamlined 
export formalities, and fewer export obstacles than the other countries 
in the region. These components contributed to a coherent and effective 
export promotion policy.
Yet, the country’s export performance has been increasingly based 
on specialization in exporting a few natural-resource-intensive com­
modities. Export products are mainly primary goods with very low pro­
cessing levels, thus precluding the incorporation of technological inno­
vations that have a strong potential for yielding widespread positive 
externalities on the economy.
Moreover, the importance of copper has decreased steadily since 
the 1970s, but it still accounts for over 40% of the country’s exports and 
a significant portion of the revenue of the public sector.
Together with that, there is a strong concentration of export mar­
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kets: almost half of Chile’s exports go to only five countries. 
Furthermore, there is a significant concentration of export activity in a 
small number of companies, while a significant proportion of other 
export firms export only intermittently.
These features of Chile’s export performance make the country 
highly vulnerable to the fluctuations in export markets. For example, 
the country’s exports dropped by over 13% during 1998 in the wake of 
the economic turbulence in Asia that later spread to Latin America.
Nevertheless, the downturn of exports over the past year is not only 
due to the aftermath of Asia’s economic troubles, but is also the result 
of macroeconomic policies that got off track in the recent years, at least 
as far as promoting export growth. The strong appreciation of the 
exchange rate over a long period combined with an increase in domestic 
costs has cut exports by Chilean firms. This is particularly true for com­
panies exporting goods that do not benefit from an extraordinary com­
parative advantage, such as copper, wood, and fish. The long-term 
effect of appreciation is to discourage investment in export projects for 
a wide range of industries.
At the same time, another determinant that contributed to dampen­
ing export growth is that export promotion policies, in spite of their 
very good record, are past their peak. New activities introduced by 
ProChile in the recent past have been insufficient to spark a new export 
drive. More radical, widespread, and swift measures would have been 
required to have a sizeable impact. In retrospect, export promotion does 
not appear to have been a top priority in the government’s economic 
agenda. The policies that contributed to Chile’s high export growth rate 
have run out of steam. The sluggish growth of nontraditional exports 
most recently is a clear indicator of this. New policies are needed for 
the country to go back to the high export growth rates of the late 1980s 
and early 1990s.
This need for new policies is compounded by the fact that the coun­
try’s export promotion instruments will become less effective for 
encouraging export diversification once the export subsidies are phased 
out. Their phasing out is necessary to allow Chile to comply with the 
country’s commitments in the Uruguay Round Agreements. An impor­
tant share of the medium-sized companies exporting goods other than 
commodities are heavily dependent on the Reintegro Simplificado, as 
was demonstrated by the study on the behavior of export firms.
In the absence of a firm set of innovative policies that ultimately 
lead to export growth and diversification, the most reasonable forecast 
is that even if export growth is resumed once the demand for commodi­
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ties in the global markets recovers, nontraditional exports will continue 
to lag in the long run. This situation will be reinforced if the apprecia­
tion of the exchange rate continues at its present level, particularly in 
comparison with the larger markets in Latin America. In other words, if 
the present policy mix is carried on, the dampening of nontraditional 
exports will persist.
It may be that nontraditional exports will increase their rate of 
growth in the short run as manufacturers try to offset the fall of demand 
in the domestic market. Yet in the long run, as demand recovers, the rate 
of growth of nontraditional exports will most probably be weak because 
the prevailing economic policies do not encourage investment in 
export-oriented projects, with only the exception of those industries that 
have extraordinary comparative advantage in natural resources.
The authorities that work closely with exporters, such as ProChile 
and the Ministry of the Economy, and the exporters’ trade associations 
are clearly concerned about these challenges, particularly in light of the 
requirement to eliminate export subsidies. They have put together a 
series of instruments and policy proposals in the program, “Plan de 
Desarrollo de la Competitividad de Chile 1998-2003.”
Some of the proposals in this program seek to strengthen ProChile 
and its support for encouraging firms to have a regular presence in for­
eign markets. Another array of measures is aimed at increasing the pro­
ductivity in a wide range of companies in the country so as to widen 
Chile’s export base. This is a step in the right direction, since the best 
way to encourage sustained export growth is to progressively increase 
productivity levels across the economy, for companies selling only on 
the domestic market and for those that export.5
These proposals have the additional advantage of not being aimed 
exclusively at the exporter, allowing them therefore to be compatible 
with the Uruguay Round Agreements. Policies to upgrade productivity 
will probably become more important in the coming years in Latin 
America because such agreements restrict export subsidies for nonagri­
cultural goods while allowing support that is not directed at exporters.6 
From that standpoint, the program is a useful example for other coun­
tries seeking to design an export promotion policy compatible with the 
new multilateral trade rules.
Nonetheless, even if they are put into practice, the measures pre­
sented in the “Plan de Desarrollo de la Competitividad de Chile 1998- 
2003” will not be sufficient to give the country’s exports the thrust 
needed to regain high growth rates for nontraditional exports and an 
increasingly diversified export mix.
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These proposals could be complemented by the following addition­
al measures:
1. Setting up a program that allows companies that export regularly 
high volumes of output to fulfill highly streamlined import and 
export formalities, based on the ALTEX Program from Mexico
2. Revising the current formalities required by the drawback sys­
tem to facilitate its use by a large number of firms, particularly 
as the Reintegro Simplificado is phased out
3. Providing assistance for small and medium-sized exporters to 
enable them to gather the paperwork required for using the 
drawback
4. Improving the instruments used for export financing and insur­
ance
5. Carrying out a complete revision of the current export promotion 
instruments to establish their effectiveness (any instrument that 
is used by less than a handful of firms is either operating below 
its potential or unnecessary)
Still, the main task that must be tackled at present goes beyond 
building a piecemeal export promotion policy. If Chile wants to get 
back to high export growth rates that are sustainable even when there is 
turbulence in global markets, the country needs a new, coherent set of 
policies aimed at encouraging export growth and diversification. This 
implies policies designed to promote widespread increases in productiv­
ity.7 The government must also assign a high priority to investments in 
infrastructure projects with the goal of facilitating exporting. In addi­
tion, ProChile needs to be allowed a greater autonomy, an increase of 
its funding, and a tightening of its links to private-sector organizations, 
as described in the project sent to Chile’s Congress.
At the same time, there is a need for an exchange rate policy that is 
simultaneously stable in the long run and conducive to investment in a 
wide variety of export industries: long-term currency appreciation 
should reflect increases in productivity. It must be stressed that even the 
best export promotion policies will be powerless for increasing exports 
if the long-term exchange rate is systematically appreciated. Past expe­
rience in Chile itself has demonstrated that exchange rate policies play 
a key role in export performance (Agosin 1993b).
In the short run, exporters are the ones who bear the cost of the 
lower export growth rate. In the long run, the cost will be borne by the 
country as it reinforces its export specialization in a few commodities
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and the option of exporting goods with higher value added is relin­
quished. Moreover, given the importance of export growth as a motor 
for the rest of the economy, the decrease in export growth rates may 
lead to lower GDP growth rates over the long run.
In sum, to have effective export promotion policies, the issue that 
the government and the private sector must address at present is the 
design of a new, coherent, comprehensive, and effective export promo­
tion strategy that allows it to increase export growth rates and diversifi­
cation. The decision to design and adopt this policy must be a priority 
for the government and the private sector. The government must pro­
vide evidence that it is committed to this goal. In the absence of such a 
commitment at the highest level, the country will continue to face a 
dwindling growth in nontraditional exports and will reinforce the spe­
cialization in a few export commodities. Therefore, it will be increas­
ingly vulnerable to external shocks.
Notes
1. The information included in this section, unless otherwise specified, is from 
ECLA C (1999b) and (1999c) and from  prelim inary  data from  ECLA C based  on 
official figures.
2. Chile has other policy instruments to support firm upgrading, such as partial 
subsidies of the cost o f hiring consultants for management, environment, and design 
capability , am ong o ther areas. T hese instrum en ts , w hich seek to  encourage the 
d em and  fo r such  a c tiv it ie s  by  firm s , are  o ften  re la te d  to  e x p o rt a c tiv it ie s . 
Nevertheless, they were not included here because they are not specifically oriented 
to w ard  ex p o rt f irm s . F o r ex am p le , co m p an ies  have  access  to  the  F o n d o s de 
A sis tenc ia  T écn ica  (FAT), the P royectos de Fom ento  (PR O FO ), and the Fondo 
N acional de D esarrollo  Tecnológico y Productivo (FONTEC). There are also cen­
ters managed by trade associations that seek to promote firm upgrading, such as the 
Centro de Productividad Industrial (CEPRI). They have played a significant role in 
improving export supply capability by allowing firms to upgrade.
3. This section is based on Carla M acario (1998b).
4. Input procurem ent is not always considered a source o f econom y of scale 
because the reduction o f costs takes place outside the production process and does 
not im ply a sh ift o f the p roduction  function. T herefore, th is k ind o f econom y of 
scale is sometimes described as pecuniary economy of scale.
5. See M acario  (1998c) fo r a descrip tion  o f the “P lan  de D esarro llo  de la 
Competitividad de Chile 1998-2003.”
6. See Wilson Peres (1997) for a thorough presentation of the competitiveness 
policies in Latin America.
7. See M anuel A gosin and R icardo Ffrench-D avis (1998) fo r policy  recom ­
mendations aimed at upgrading productivity in Chile.
B r a z i l :  T h e  C h a l l e n g e  o f  I m p r o v i n g  
E x p o r t  P e r f o r m a n c e
Regis Bonelli
The expansion in Brazil’s international trade links has been reflected in 
stronger flows of goods and services, as well as in financial flows, since 
the early 1970s. There has also been a long-term increase in exports 
based on natural resources and skilled labor products and, to a lesser 
extent, of exports from the metalworking industry. Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to tell whether the positive performance of the late 1980s was 
the result of an aggressive foreign exchange policy, of the growth in the 
world economy, or of the existence of widespread idle capacity in the 
Brazilian economy for many years, especially in industry. In recent 
times this scenario has undergone significant changes, particularly since 
1994.1
Trade and financial liberalization in Brazil since the early 1990s 
has gone hand in hand with a successful stabilization process, since 
mid-1994. One of the least understood, or most controversial, aspects of 
stabilization is foreign exchange policy. The importance of this policy 
in the adjustment of domestic and external prices contrasts with the pol­
icy’s role as a source of competitiveness, in light of the “strong real” 
policy that characterized Brazil’s exchange rate up to the beginning of 
1999. It has also been observed that the cornerstone of Brazil’s stabi­
lization process is the combination of foreign exchange policy and trade 
liberalization: it is the open economy that keeps price increases for trad­
ables in check and causes prices of nontradables to become stable over 
the medium and long term. Clearly, this was possible thanks to the exis­
tence of a deindexed exchange rate.
Exports play a vital role in this new context of foreign exchange 
policy and external trade liberalization. The strategy pursued by Brazil 
requires export growth to avoid balance-of-payments problems, espe­
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cially since trade liberalization coupled with an exchange rate anchor 
makes imports extremely attractive, thus potentially jeopardizing the 
external trade balance. Thus exports need to grow primarily as a source 
of foreign exchange, rather than as a source of growth for industrial and 
agricultural output.2 Policies to promote exports assume a central role 
in strategies like that chosen by Brazil, since they cannot rely on a boost 
to exports resulting from the low levels of utilization of installed indus­
trial capacity nor on an undervalued exchange rate, as was the case with 
the export drive of the 1970s and early 1980s.
The fact that it is not possible to rely on an undervalued exchange 
rate to boost exports adds an additional cost to economic policy, and 
requires that policymakers show a great deal of skill. The solution 
adopted— which has acquired a greater importance over the medium 
term— is based on the implementation of measures aimed at reducing 
the so-called Brazil cost, that is, the implicit cost entailed in a range of 
charges, inefficiencies, and transport and communications costs that 
reduce the systemic competitiveness of Brazil’s production, particularly 
its exports.
Brazil’s export performance over the past years has been lackluster, 
owing to the above factors. However, it is essential to boost export 
growth over the medium and long term, lest the current stabilization- 
cum-growth strategy be jeopardized. What means has the Brazilian gov­
ernment used to pursue this strategy? What has been the experience at 
the microeconomic level of firms engaged in exporting? What obstacles 
have there been to expanding exports, especially nontraditional ones? Is 
there a learning process associated with exporting? Which government 
measures have proved most effective in stimulating exports, and how 
do companies rate the existing instruments?
These are a few of the questions that this chapter attempts to 
answer, using empirical evidence provided by field interviews with 
twelve firms from four manufacturing industries: car parts, pulp and 
paper, machinery and equipment, and textiles. The diversity of the 
industries selected helped enrich the analysis and set policy proposals in 
a more real-world context.
The Macroeconomic Environment
Main Characteristics of Brazil's Recent Macroeconomic Policies
The 1990s have been a period of significant change for Brazil’s econo­
my and society. On the one hand, the economy has been stabilized after
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nearly 15 years of high inflation, which was also irregular, but showed 
an upward trend. On the other, the country has experienced trade and 
financial liberalization on a scale that seemed unthinkable up until only 
a few years ago. One of the consequences of this transformation has 
been that the degree of openness of the Brazilian economy— measured 
by the sum of imports and exports over GDP— has almost doubled, 
going from 11.1% in 1990 to 20.2% in 1998 (see Table 4.1).3
After forty years of accelerated growth, marked by only brief inter­
ruptions, the economy went into a period of unprecedented stagnation 
between 1981 and 1992. Over this period, GDP grew by a mere 16% 
while population increased by 26%, resulting in a loss of per capita 
income of roughly 8%. Brazilian industry, in particular, was producing 
less in 1992 than in 1980! As could be expected, the contraction in out­
put came with deep pessimism and disillusionment. The investment rate 
in constant 1980 U.S. dollars— a barometer of the corporate sector’s 
expectations— fell from an average of 23.3% of GDP in the 1970s to 
around 18.3% in the 1980s and to barely 13.6% in 1992.4
The recessions of 1981-1983 and 1990-1992 had very little effect, 
if any, on the inflation rate, since the Brazilian economy functioned 
with ever more refined and generalized indexation mechanisms. The 
result was that in 1993, on the eve of implementation of the Real Plan, 
the inflation rate had reached a whopping 2,600% per year.
Between 1986 and 1992, Brazil experienced a total of five stabiliza­
tion plans, most of which imposed wage and price freezes and voided 
contractual agreements, without producing any long-lasting effects. 
Indeed, the main result was to increase uncertainty among economic 
agents and reduce the credibility of successive governments and eco­
nomic teams.
By contrast, the economy’s performance over 1993-1995 was 
exceptional. GDP rose by about a cumulative 15%, or 10% in per capita 
terms. GDP increased another 2.9% in 1996 and 3.8% in 1997. By con­
trast, growth was interrupted in 1998 as Brazil faced the aftermath of 
the turbulence in Asia. The growth standstill has significant conse­
quences for the region because Brazil’s is by far the largest economy in 
the region, with an output of over US$700 billion for 1998 (in 1995 
prices), that is almost 40% of Latin America’s GDP.
In the mid-1990s, investment rates increased, though only moder­
ately, reaching close to 16% (in 1980 prices). The quality of investment 
improved substantially, with an ever increasing share of capital invest­
ment accounted for by machinery and equipment, especially imported, 
whose technological content is clearly higher. With all that, labor pro-
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Table 4.1 Brazil: Economic Indicators
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 19988
GDPa 571,293 576,828 575,232 601,216 638,662 665,422 684,460 710,223 711,870
GDP growth ratesb -4.6 1.0 -0.3 4.5 6.2 4.2 2.9 3.8 0.2
Importsa’c 22,603 24,289 25,455 33,930 43,618 63,293 65,902 80,896 81,945
Exportsa’c 40,641 39,640 45,569 51,432 53,074 52,641 51,734 58,189 61,771
Import ratiod 4.0 4.2 4.4 5.6 6.8 9.5 9.6 11.4 11.5
Export ratio (all goods)d 7.1 6.9 7.9 8.6 8.3 7.9 7.6 8.2 8.7
Export ratio (manufactures)6 51.9 54.8 56.9 58.7 54.8 53.1 53.1 53.1 54.2
Exchange ratef 0.000025 0.00015 0.0016 0.032 0.64 0.92 1.01 1.08 1.16
Source: ECLAC (1999b) and (1999c), and other information from ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
a. Millions of U.S. dollars at 1995 prices.
b. Average annual rates at 1995 prices.
c. Goods and services.
d. Percentages of GDP at 1995 prices. Includes goods and services.
e. Percentages of total value of FOB exports of goods.
f. Nominal exchange rate in reals per dollar.
g. Preliminary figures.
Information is from different sources, so there may be discrepancies.
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ductivity, measured in terms of gross output (rather than added value), 
expanded by 34% in 1993-1995. The share of manufacturing was 
21.1% in 1997.
Inflation as measured by the general price index dropped consider­
ably, falling to around 10% in 1996 (January-December). Table 4.1 
summarizes some of the macroeconomic indicators for the period 
1990-1998.
At the same time the role of the state in the economy has been radi­
cally transformed. Trade and financial liberalization, declining barriers 
to entry and exit, a more open approach to the role of foreign capital, 
and the lifting of price controls are all increasingly part of the economic 
landscape in Brazil. This is in line with the trend observed in other 
Latin American countries.
The economy was successfully stabilized thanks to the Real Plan, 
an ambitious program that involved the deindexation of prices, the 
exchange rate, and wages without any termination of contracts. In fact, 
the Real Plan constitutes a bold change in the thrust of economic poli­
cy. The plan was implemented in three stages.5 The first stage consisted 
of a temporary adjustment to the public accounts, which produced a 
lower operating deficit in 1993 than in 1992 and enabled a surplus to be 
posted in 1994. Next, an Emergency Social Fund was set up, renamed 
the Fiscal Stabilization Fund upon its extension, which was approved 
by Brazil’s Congress in February 1994. The fund made it possible for 
the government to freely reallocate (or choose not to spend) 20% of 
funds in question (previously earmarked for specific areas and min­
istries).
The second stage of the plan was launched in March 1994 with the 
creation of the unit of real value (URV), an accounting unit set daily at 
par with the value of the U.S. dollar. The unit was an ingenious indexa­
tion mechanism that made it possible to align prices, wages, and infla­
tionary expectations. Thus, during the four-month transition period in 
which the URV was in force, relative prices were realigned (though not 
completely), thus avoiding the residual inflation that would probably 
mar the third stage of the plan, as happened with other stabilization ini­
tiatives both in Brazil and in other Latin American countries. At the 
same time, there were concerns— which proved unfounded— that the 
speedup in inflation that would follow the introduction of the URV (on 
account of the widespread use of daily indexation, with the indexation 
period dropping from longer periods, as before) would get inflation out 
of control. The increase in the inflation rate was only moderate by 
Brazilian standards, though. As a result, prices and wages were not
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frozen because certain guidelines were established in respect to wages, 
rents, school tuition, and other activities.
The third stage of the plan began on 1 July 1994, once all prices 
and wages had been converted into URVs (i.e., units of account). The 
government proceeded to change all the currency in circulation, along 
with its name. Henceforth, prices were quoted in reals, rather than 
URVs, thus making the real a means of payment and not just a unit of 
account (as the URV had been).
The drastic slowdown in inflation led to an immediate increase in 
real incomes and credit, and this reinforced the upswing in economic 
growth already evident in 1993. Consumer durables in particular bene­
fited from this situation. Output of these goods grew by an impressive 
47% between the last quarter of 1992 and the last quarter of 1994. At 
the same time, “the combination of a monetary policy of high interest 
rates and a foreign exchange policy consisting of an ‘asymmetrical 
band’ caused the real to appreciate vis-à-vis the dollar, from a one-to- 
one parity at the outset of the plan to R$0.846 to the dollar in late 
December 1994, a nominal appreciation of 15%, which thus contributed 
to an additional decline in the exchange rate-wage ratio.”6
By the end of 1994, the rise in domestic demand, which was 
increasingly met through import growth, led to an increase in the levels 
of installed capacity utilization— along with the risk of inflationary 
pressures— and a rapid worsening of the trade balance. This was the 
backdrop to the Mexican crisis. The outflow of international capital that 
followed threatened to upset Brazil’s stabilization unless tough meas­
ures to control aggregate demand, such as interest rate hikes and stiff 
credit controls, were put in place. Such measures were duly implement­
ed in the first half of 1995. In March 1995, the adoption of a floating 
band contributed to a real devaluation of the real.
The imposition of high short-term interest rates generated substan­
tial net foreign capital inflows, temporarily relieving balance of pay­
ments constraint after reserves had declined by about US$10 billion in 
the first half of 1995. In addition, there was a marked slowdown in the 
level of economic activity, with quarterly GDP declining in the second 
and third quarters of that year.
The financial situation of various firms and banks was aggravated 
by a number of factors: the drop in the level of activity, along with high 
interest rates; substantial wage rises granted by firms that still harbored 
doubts about the changes in economic policy; mounting debts contract­
ed during the consumer and investment boom of 1994; and the impact 
of the intensification of trade liberalization. The volume of loans over­
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due rose, aggravating the problems of commercial banks that were 
already facing losses from the end of spreads that had allowed profits 
during the high inflation period.
The fragility of the financial system was obvious. The government 
was beset by a serious crisis of confidence until it implemented a plan 
to restructure private banks. High interest rates claimed another victim, 
the public accounts, owing to the debts racked up earlier by all three 
levels of government and the need to issue high interest bonds to reduce 
the liquidity that would result from the capital flows attracted by high 
interest rates. Accordingly, the balance of the consolidated public sector 
as a proportion of GDP shifted from a surplus of 1.34% in 1994 to a 
deficit of 5.00% in 1995, nearly half of which was accounted for by 
states and municipalities. Interest rates had a clear role in this deteriora­
tion; the expenditure on interest went from 3.8% of GDP in 1994 to 
5.4% in 1995.
This shows that the key challenge faced by the adjustment and sta­
bilization of Brazil’s economy is how to cut the public deficit. 
Accordingly, the states and municipalities are making efforts, along 
with the federal government, to renegotiate debt, though the process has 
not been without its setbacks. Still, the operational deficit reached about 
5.0% of GDP in 1997, while the balance-of-payments deficit on current 
account reached 4.2% of GDP. This brings us to an examination of 
trends in the external accounts, and in particular of the role and recent 
performance of exports, a key variable in the success of Brazil’s stabi­
lization strategy.
Export Performance
One of the few disappointing results of Brazil’s macroeconomic per­
formance since the implementation of the Real Plan has been sluggish 
export growth. Consequently, Brazil has posted a trade deficit since 
1995, something that had not happened since 1980. For a number of 
analysts, the rapid deterioration of the balance of payments is a cause 
for concern. However, the authorities do not seem overly perturbed by 
this trend, since Brazil has a high level of international reserves.
Slow export growth reflects the fact that Brazil’s exports have not 
kept pace with the growth in world trade: Brazil accounted for around 
1.4% of world exports in 1979, but this figure had fallen to just 0.897% 
in 1995, a result often attributed to the revaluation of the local currency. 
Table 4.2 illustrates the degree of processing in merchandise exports. 
The table shows that the bulk of Brazil’s exports are made up of goods
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Table 4.2 Brazil: Profile of Exports: Value FOB and Breakdown, 1989-1996 
(Percentage)®
Year Valueb Commodities Semimanufactures Manufactures
1989 34,405 28.9 16.9 54.2
1990 31,414 29.4 16.3 54.2
1991 31,620 27.6 14.8 56.2
1992 35,862 24.7 14.4 59.7
1993 38,592 24.3 14.1 60.8
1994 43,545 25.4 15.8 57.3
1995 46,506 23.6 19.7 55.0
1996 47,746 25.5 17.5 55.3
Source: FUNCEX (Center for the Studies of Foreign Trade Foundation) bulletins, vari­
ous issues.
a. Totals do not add up to 100% because special transactions are not included. Some of 
the main commodities are iron ore, soya meal, raw coffee beans, ground soya, and leaf tobac­
co. Some of the main semimanufactures are pulp, raw aluminum, soybean oil, granulated 
sugar, and iron and steel semimanufactures.
b. Millions of U.S. dollars.
featuring some degree of processing. At least three-quarters of exports 
are processed products, even though a substantial proportion involves 
only a small amount of processing and value added.
R. Iglesias (1996) shows that the difficulties experienced by 
Brazilian exports are not only attributable to the “strong real” policy. 
Exports began to loose momentum long before that, since the late 
1970s.7 For example, between 1974 and 1979, Brazil’s total exports 
grew at an average rate of 14.1% per year, but this figure fell to 10.2% 
in 1980-1985 and again to 8.8% in 1986-1989. Table 4.2 indicates that 
exports grew at barely 5.1% on average over 1989—1995. For 1996 the 
rate fell to 2.7%. This loss of dynamism was due in part to domestic 
factors, since both the world economy and the trends in prices of nonoil 
commodities were favorable to Brazil’s exports during most of the peri­
od in question (except for 1996).
Furthermore, it can be demonstrated that the real effective 
exchange rate was high (indicating loss of competitiveness) in a number 
of periods when Brazil’s export returns were mediocre, such as in 1986, 
the year of the Cruzado Plan. In particular, export returns were espe­
cially poor in the wake of the (largely unsuccessful) stabilization plans, 
irrespective of the real exchange rate. It appears that growth in domestic 
demand, and not just the exchange rate, explains export results (in addi­
tion to export prices, growth in trade and the level of activity in the 
world economy). Table 4.3 summarizes the relevant information.
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1985 -5.06 160.0 7.8 2.0
1986 -12.83 166.7 7.5 2.7
1987 17.34 159.1 3.6 -9.3
1988 28.85 156.6 -0.05 -3.4
1989 1.76 1100 3.2 2.9
1990 -8.64 100.0 -4.4 9.5
1991 0.66 117.3 0.4 -2.4
1992 13.41 124.5 -0.8 -4.1
1993 7.63 119.0 4.2 8.0
1994 12.82 108.3 5.9 7.9
1995 6.80 99.6 4.2 1.7
Source: Iglesias (1996).
Thus, export performance appears to be associated with the slow­
down in domestic demand— which enables utilization of idle capacity 
with a view to redirecting sales toward the external market— and to the 
relative prices (i.e., real exchange rate changes). In addition, export 
results also vary according to the progress in regional integration initia­
tives and to the exchange rate for the Argentine peso (Argentina was the 
most dynamic market for Brazilian exports in 1991-1994).8 A further 
factor contributing to the unsatisfactory export performance, since the 
late 1980s, was the insufficient expansion of production capacity orient­
ed toward exports.
In light of the option of adopting the exchange rate anchor, albeit 
with devaluations in line with a periodically readjusted band, the 
description presented above suggests that future prospects for export 
growth should not rest on a devalued exchange rate. The alternative 
economic policy pursued has pinned many of its hopes for improved 
export performance and trade balance on enhancing systemic competi­
tiveness through lowering the “Brazil cost,” and specific trade policies. 
This will be discussed below.
Trade and Industrial Policies
June 1990 marked the adoption of the most important package of indus­
trial policy and external trade measures seen in Brazil: the General
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Guidelines on Industrial Policy and Foreign Trade (PICE), which 
announced a new tariff structure to be gradually implemented over the 
following five years (1990-1994). In 1994, the modal import tariff 
would be 20%, with a ceiling of 40% and an average rate of 14%. 
Given the natural protection provided by transport, insurance, and port 
costs in the 20-40% range— depending, for example, on how far away 
the supplier was located— the arrangements offered a satisfactory level 
of protection under normal economic conditions and in light of the 
timetable for the implementation of tariff reduction.9 Table 4.4 details 
the changes made to the tariff structure since the program was launched.
The changes introduced to the tariff reduction schedule in late 
1994, toward the end of the administration of Itamar Franco, represent­
ed the final phase of the trade liberalization process.10 In early 1996, an 
average import tariff of 12% came into force, and no significant import 
restrictions remained.
As already discussed, one of the features of the stabilization pro­
gram introduced on 1 July 1994, the Real Plan, was cutting the link 
between the exchange rate and domestic price movements— that is, the 
deindexation of the exchange rate. A combination of the residual infla­
tion during the first months of the plan, huge foreign capital inflows, 
and use of the exchange rate as an anchor for the prices of tradables 
contributed to breaking the link between the exchange rate and general 
price index changes.
Any discussion of the direction of competitiveness policies in 
Brazil should begin by acknowledging that economic policy making has 
given top priority to the goal of stabilization. With regard to industrial 
and foreign trade policies, the government has justified a number of 
exceptional protectionist measures recently taken by pointing to the 
need to stabilize the trade balance or shore up employment in industries
Table 4.4 Brazil: Tariffs, 1990-1995 (Percentage)
Date Average Mode Mean Range
Standard
Deviation
1990 32.2 40 30 0-105 19.6
February 1991 25.3 20 25 0-85 17.4
January 1992 21.2 20 20 0-65 14.2
October 1992 16.5 20 20 0-55 10.7
July 1993 14.9 20 20 0-40 8.2
January 1995 12.1 14 10 0-20 6.1
Source: A. C. Pinheiro (1996).
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hardest hit by trade liberalization. In addition, any trade liberalization 
program has a long-term goal of reducing protection by seeking to bring 
the range of domestic relative prices in line with international ones, thus 
shifting the allocation of resources over the long term toward those 
tradables that can be produced most efficiently.
Competition from imported products, in a context of a relatively 
high exchange rate had a clearly beneficial impact on price stability in 
the post -Real Plan period owing to the competition’s effect on demand. 
However, supply factors assume greater importance over the longer 
term. The liberalization of trade entails changes to the productive struc­
ture that streamline resource use and improve the quality of final prod­
ucts. The overall result is to lower the costs of production, with pre­
dictable effects on price stability. Imports of raw materials and capital 
goods have benefited from substantially lower interest rates on foreign 
loans compared with domestic ones. That has helped improve the com- 
petitivity of domestic goods, partially offsetting the high interest rates 
hitherto prevailing in the domestic market (especially for working capi­
tal), even though rates showed declines from late 1995 onward.
Export Promotion Policies
The specific export promotion measures adopted by Brazil during the 
1990s were of a financial nature, which explains why they attracted 
considerable attention. A brief presentation of the main mechanisms is 
presented below.11 That is followed by a discussion of the measures 
taken to reduce the “Brazil cost.” It should be pointed out that it is the 
financial type of export promotion measures and schemes to reduce the 
“Brazil cost” that have undergone the most rapid and exhaustive 
changes recently.
Export Financing12
Export financing is becoming a well-established mechanism in Brazil. 
The private sector has been involved in financing exports of goods with 
short production runs through advances on currency exchange contracts 
(or ACCs, the acronym in Portuguese), advances on export contracts (or 
ACEs, the acronym in Portuguese), and securitization of exports. With 
respect to goods with longer production runs, such as machinery and 
equipment and engineering services, financing is provided by the gov­
ernment through such agencies as the National Bank for Economic and
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Social Development (BNDES) and such programs as PROEX Programa 
de Financiamiento de Exportações, administered by the Banco do 
Brasil. A brief description of some of the main export financing instru­
ments in Brazil today is given below.13
In the case of the BNDES, the most traditional financial product is 
the Fundo de Financiamento de Exportações (FINAMEX) program, 
comprising indirect operations (i.e., through agents) aimed at financing 
exports of machinery and equipment, both for preshipment (since late 
1990) and postshipment (since 1991). An examination of the perfor­
mance of the FINAMEX program between 1993 and 1995 allows us to 
conclude that the results achieved are meager, given the volume of 
Brazil’s exports of machinery and equipment. In fact, out of total mer­
chandise exports that qualify for financing by the program, estimated at 
US$6.29 billion in 1995, the amount actually financed came to only 
US$373 million.
In the second semester of 1995, FINAMEX set up a new instru­
ment, the Fundo de Amparo ao Trabalhador-Cambial (FAT-Cambial) 
aimed at Brazilian producers competing internationally. It also allowed 
the program, Financiamento às Empresas (FINEM) (the traditional 
BNDES financing facility for companies) to be used for export-oriented 
investments. Success has been very limited in both cases, with FINEM 
being confused, for practical purposes, with financing for working capi­
tal. In fact, the Manufacturing Exports Promotion Program, which was 
forecast to cover up to US$1 billion, found no takers. This was because 
industries that were interested in this instrument felt that the financial 
conditions imposed for assistance to the ten selected manufacturing sec­
tors (namely, 5% and 6.5% over Libor, depending on the sector) were 
unfavorable.
Those results prompted the government, acting through the 
BNDES, to seek alternative instruments for financing exports. A set of 
measures introduced in October/November 1996 broadened the scope 
of BNDES by including exports of capital goods, engineering services, 
and turnkey plants as eligible for financing on request.
Another export-financing program is PROEX, which is operated by 
the Banco do Brasil. The aim of PROEX, created in June 1991, is 
twofold: financing of exports of goods and services and equalization of 
interest rates.14 Export financing was not regulated until the end of 
1995. The Central Bank and the Ministry of Industry, Commerce, and 
Tourism (MICT) have issued regulations that stipulate financing terms 
and the list of goods and services eligible for assistance. In practice, the 
Banco do Brasil directs requests for financing to the Export Credit
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Committee, a body made up of several government agencies that deter­
mines whether to extend credit through the PROEX program. The terms 
provide for interest rates equivalent to the Libor rate fixed in respect to 
the period of financing or variable in accordance with the payback peri­
od, with maturities ranging from 18 to 120 months, depending on the 
merchandise financed. Financing covers 85% of the value of merchan­
dise with a minimum local content of 60%, and the proportion financed 
declines relative to the decrease in local content.
The interest rate equalization mechanism was also regulated by the 
Central Bank and MICT toward the end of 1995, with rules that set out 
new criteria for the eligibility of goods and services. Equalization oper­
ations totaled US$243.3 million in 1995, with US$194.2 million 
approved and US$49.1 million paid out. Financing operations amount­
ed to US$80.9 million, with US$32.6 million approved and US$48.3 
million paid out. Clearly, these figures are barely a fraction of the vol­
ume of export transactions.
Financing for prepayment of exports was regulated in June 1991 by 
the Central Bank. Merchandise exports qualify for early payment using 
resources obtained from importers and other forms of financing, over a 
period of up to 180 days between the date of the exchange contract and 
the date the goods are actually shipped. Interest rates on the transaction 
are freely agreed to between the contracting parties, without any Central 
Bank interference. Such a hands-off approach to interest rates tends to 
promote competition. That tends to increase the amount of external liq­
uidity available for financing Brazilian exports.
Banks dealing in foreign currency grant advances on ACCs. This 
instrument entails either the partial or the total early payment of the 
local currency equivalent of the amount of foreign currency purchased 
in advance from those exporters by the bank. It is the advance of the 
cost in foreign currency that the bank negotiating the foreign exchange 
grants the exporter. The aim is to provide the exporter with funds to 
undertake the different activities associated with production and selling, 
thus acting as an export incentive. The advance is obtained at below 
market cost.15
Advances on ACCs can be granted at two stages. In the first stage, 
the advance is granted anywhere up to 180 days before shipment 
(financing of production). The second type of advance is granted with 
the merchandise already shipped, and may be requested up to 60 days 
after shipment. If entered into at this stage, the contract is known as an 
ACE, and the term may be extended up to 180 days from the date of 
shipment.
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The maximum term for advances on ACCs varies depending on the 
Central Bank’s interest in administering inflows of foreign exchange, 
and may extend to 180 or even 360 days. The drawer of an advance on 
an ACC that does not have the merchandise at time of shipment is 
required to pay a financial transaction tax (IOF) for breach of contract. 
Regulations have recently been modified.
One gauge of the importance of this mechanism (ACC) is that of 
the total flow of foreign currency used to finance exports in 1994, about 
87.6% were in the form of the advances and early payment.16 In 1995 
the proportion of funds accounted for by advances, and early payment 
reached 89.1% and in the first half of 1996, 87.4%.
Another mechanism to provide exporting with financial support is 
the export note, a contract by which export credit is extended. Under 
this type of contract, the exporter obtains funds in the country together 
with local investors, banks, or businesses. After signing a contract, the 
exporter transfers sale rights to the investor in return for a cash amount 
in Brazilian reals equivalent to the value in foreign currency. Thus the 
funds are used to finance the production run.
In the meantime, securitization of exports is becoming increasingly 
widespread in Brazil, especially for large export contracts. This instru­
ment, established by the Central Bank in July 1991, entails the issuance 
of a security in the international market based on future export sales. It 
is useful because external financing costs are lower than domestic ones. 
Another option is loan securitization, which provides, since late 1996, a 
legal means for exporters to obtain abroad up to 200% of the value of 
exchange contracts they had held up until 31 July 1996, with no need to 
pay the IOF. One of the results of the new measure has been a drop in 
the volume of new advances, currently replaced by the method of rais­
ing funds promoted in the resolution described above.17
Export Credit Insurance
In October 1996 the credit insurance mechanism was finally regulat­
ed.18 The purpose of this mechanism is to provide insurance against 
political, extraordinary, and commercial risks. The federal government, 
through the Brazilian Reinsurance Institute, a state-owned agency, cov­
ers political risks. The federal government’s share of any net losses is 
limited to a maximum of 85%, with the balance borne by the insured 
party. The total limit of insurance coverage is approximately US$3 bil­
lion. A term of up to five years is contemplated, but this may be extend­
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ed to twelve years to cover exports of capital goods with lengthy pro­
duction periods, as well as exports of engineering services.
An incorporated insurance company whose equity is mostly pri­
vately held undertakes coverage of commercial risks: the Sociedade de 
Crédito à Exportação. The company is owned by the Banco do Brasil, 
with up to a 30% stake, and the French agency Compagnie Française 
d’Assurance pour le Commerce Extérieur. Other traditional Brazilian 
insurers, Sul América and Bradesco, are also candidates to take equity 
stakes.
Other Financial and Fiscal Mechanisms
One important measure taken recently was the decision to exempt 
exports of semimanufactured goods and commodities from the mer­
chandise and services sales tax (ICMS), that is, a value-added tax. The 
measure was to start in August 1996, and the exemption, which had pre­
viously applied to manufacturing exports, is now extended to other 
products, including purchases of investment goods on the domestic 
market and electricity used in production (both from November 1996 
onward). Beginning in 1998, the measure has also been extended to 
consumer goods used in production. In essence, all these measures are 
designed to reduce the “Brazil cost.”
The credit squeeze caused by the still rather high interest rates pre­
vailing in mid-1996— despite the new BNDES lines (FAT-Cambial)—  
prompted the monetary authorities to search for alternatives to prevent 
the trade balance from registering a substantial deficit and to sustain the 
level of economic activity, especially in manufacturing. Accordingly, in 
early September 1996, the Central Bank proceeded to create a new form 
of financing in a bid to enhance export competitiveness and reduce the 
difficulties for obtaining credit faced by export firms that had conclud­
ed contracts with foreign parties, but had yet to ship the merchandise. 
Resources for the financing facility are to be raised abroad through the 
banking system and made available to exporters, and have some advan­
tages over preexisting options. In addition, loans granted through this 
facility are exempt from the IOF, which is applied to foreign currency 
loans with maturities of under five years. The cost of the facility was 
estimated by the Central Bank at between 11% and 12% per annum. 
Each exporter will be able to take out a loan equivalent to 200% of the 
volume of unsettled ACCs, with merchandise yet to be shipped. This
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indicates how concerned the Central Bank is about assisting firms fac­
ing difficulties in producing or shipping goods as arranged.
In regard to measures that are more general and to institutional 
changes, there have been a number of other initiatives (in general, hori­
zontal policies). The measures aimed at reducing the Brazil cost and 
changes to the institutional framework, especially in the sphere of trade 
policy, are particularly important.
Measures to Reduce the Brazil Cost
Measures in this area hold out the most hope of enhancing the competi­
tiveness of Brazil’s industry through reductions in various sorts of costs 
and increased efficiency of infrastructure. The measures are also the 
slowest to implement and to yield results. They encompass a broad 
range of processes from tax breaks for exports to export financing 
(processes already under way, as discussed above). Other measures 
include reductions in nonwage labor costs that affect the cost of indus­
trial labor;19 privatization of concessions for utilities (with the electrici­
ty distribution enterprises EXCELSA and Light, and Rede Ferroviária 
federal Sociedade Anônima, already privatized) and ports; lower inter­
est rates on long-term loans by BNDES (reviewed earlier); enactment of 
a new law on transport and communications infrastructure; and a proj­
ect to reduce corporate income tax. In fact, in addition to the negotia­
tions aimed at consolidating the Motor Vehicle Agreement20 and those 
on export financing, the main measures taken by the current govern­
ment have sought to reduce the Brazil cost.21 The issue of how to 
increase the “systemic competitiveness” of Brazil’s economy will need 
to be tackled in this manner over the medium and long term. In the 
short term, efforts are focused on measures to finance exports.
Enhancing Brazil’s export competitiveness can be achieved pri­
marily through a combination of the following measures: a reduction in 
the fiscal cost of exports; improved conditions for financing production 
of exports and for export financing (including export credit insurance); 
and greater efficiency and lower costs in port, communications, and 
transport infrastructure.
As part of the efforts to reduce the fiscal cost of exporting, the pay­
ment of social security contributions by the Programa de Integração 
Social and Contribução para o Financiamento da Seguridade Social 
levied on purchases in the domestic market of raw materials, intermedi­
ate goods, and packaging materials for use in the distribution process
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was abolished, in the form of a presumptive Industrial Products Tax 
credit.
With respect to transport and port services infrastructure, expecta­
tions are centered on the Utility Concessions Law that authorizes the 
private sector to lease or operate, among others, toll roads, railways, 
ports, electricity generation, and distribution companies.
The privatization of Brazil’s ports has proceeded at a slow pace, a 
fact that adversely affects export competitiveness. In a bid to end this 
situation, the dockyards were included in the National Development 
Program in early September 1996. Consequently, any decisions con­
cerning privatization of the port system must now be taken at the minis­
terial level. The dockyards of Río de Janeiro, Bahia, Ceará, São Paulo, 
Pará, Maranhao, Rio Grande do Norte, and Espírito Santo were all 
affected.
Privatization activity is also anticipated in the telecommunications 
field. A law has been passed authorizing private interests to operate B- 
band cellular telephone services, and it is expected that private firms 
will be invited to bid for satellite exploration. The issue of regulating 
basic services has come in for rigorous examination, with a view to pre­
venting collusion and other noncompetitive practices.
The tax structure remains under scrutiny, owing to a combination of 
rapidly increasing exemptions, taxation differentials between groups 
(which generates inequality), the complexity of the tax system, delays 
in payment of indemnities/rebates for exporters on some taxes, and, 
above all, the high tax rates compared with those of other countries. 
These factors amount to both an explicit and implicit tax on Brazilian 
exports.
Firms' Export Behavior
The Performance of the Manufacturing Sector
As was the case in other Latin American countries, the development of 
Brazil’s industry was upset by the debt crisis of the early 1980s. The 
late 1970s had been marked by efforts to adjust the macroeconomic and 
trade policies, against a backdrop of serious imbalances in the global 
economy. Nevertheless, the economic team that assumed power in mid- 
1979 reversed this situation when the team turned to an expansionary 
economic policy.
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The government decided to slow down the level of economic activi­
ty at the end of 1980, mainly to curb the trade deficit and generate net 
export surpluses. The recession that hit Brazil’s industry in 1981-1983 
highlighted the need to adjust economic policy to cope with the external 
debt crisis, whose effects would influence the macroeconomic perfor­
mance for the rest of the decade.
The external debt issue and its repercussions dominated economic 
policy discussion throughout the 1980s. Therefore, the strategies aimed 
at promoting industry went against the tide of other developments, such 
as the speedup in inflation and the recession of 1981-1983, the stagna­
tion that took place after 1986, and, above all, the genuine threat of 
hyperinflation that loomed toward the end of the 1980s.
It is against this background that the lack of attention paid to manu­
facturing in that period needs to be examined. Concern about industrial 
performance had had a low priority, and so in the early 1990s the indus­
trial sector was the same size as ten years earlier. Furthermore, industry 
no longer generated employment for an ever increasing working popu­
lation; it operated with substantial idle capacity; and it was more 
dependent than ever on external demand for growth. Never before had 
this sector’s performance been so mediocre.
At the very beginning of the 1990s, Brazilian industry was hit by a 
crisis that lasted for three consecutive years (1990—1992). The defen­
sive strategy adopted by many firms, with a drastic reduction in struc­
tures and the use of new management techniques, paved the way for a 
new entrepreneurial mentality and new ways of doing business. 
Industry did not play a passive role in the face of the new macroeco­
nomic trends, but instead participated actively in a broader restructuring 
effort, the effects of which have yet to be fully understood.
Beginning in late 1992, however, the liberalization of the economy 
ushered in a new phase of growth in production. As a result, there fol­
lowed a period of intense change in firms’ internal production struc­
tures, while the intersectoral profile remained largely unchanged. In 
fact, that trend had begun prior to implementation of the Real Plan, 
since the economy, and particularly industry, was emerging from the 
recession of the early 1990s and showed clear signs of a recovery in 
installed capacity— though with no corresponding surge in new invest­
ments.
Industrial investments in the first half of the 1990s were clearly 
marginal and defensive in nature, aimed almost exclusively at replacing 
obsolete equipment and incorporating innovations, without major 
increases to installed production capacity already in place. The growth
Brazil 91
in imports of machinery and equipment, parts, and accessories in that 
period was extraordinary, with domestic products largely replaced by 
imports. One case in point is the trend in imports of machinery and 
accessories for the metal products industry, which shot up from 
US$1.55 billion in 1987-1988 to US$5 billion in 1994-1995. The main 
feature of industrial performance in the first half of the 1990s, then, was 
the boom in imports that followed the opening up of foreign trade. This 
had a substantial impact on manufacturing performance, including some 
of the sectors studied in this chapter. Furthermore, all the indicators of 
competitive performance based on export-import ratios showed a con­
siderable worsening.
From the standpoint of trends in production, growth in the 1993- 
1995 period was led by consumer durable goods-manufacturing sectors. 
Nondurables also recorded good results, mainly after the stabilization 
plan, thanks to the reduction of the losses in real income caused by 
inflation. In fact, the poorest sectors, which make up the bulk of the 
population, enjoyed huge increases in purchasing power. Not surpris­
ingly, household consumption reached record levels as a result. This 
was especially so in the initial phase of stabilization. In early 1995, as 
indicated above, the government was forced to adopt a series of mone­
tary and credit restrictions whose effects were felt in late 1995 and the 
first half of 1996.
Export performance by industry. Despite huge changes at the micro- 
economic level in the wake of stabilization, the sectoral profile of 
Brazil’s exports showed relatively little change. Apart from exports 
whose external prices varied markedly (such as wood pulp), the export 
profile changed little in the 1990s, although an analysis of the
Table 4.5 Brazil: Yearly Variations in GDP, Investments in Industrial Production, by Selected Periods (Percentage per year)
1990-1992 1993-1995
Gross domestic product -1.63 4.76
Fixed capital formation -7.20 11.02
Capital goods industry -8.06 9.25
Intermediate goods industry —4.52 4.03
Consumer durables industry —4.99 19.37
Consumer nondurables industry -2.46 4.23
Construction -7.88 3.61
Source: Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute (IBGE).
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1985-1995 period as a whole reveals considerable diversification. 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 provide the empirical evidence for this.
Evaluation of the Brazilian industrial classification at the two-digit 
level shows a marked concentration of exports in the manufacturing 
industry.22 Exports of primary (i.e., agricultural) products have varied 
considerably, averaging under 5% of total exports. Mining exports have 
followed an upward trend, growing at average annual rates of 5-6% 
between 1985-1987 and 1993-1995, and account for close to 6.5% of 
total exports.
Processed food products are the main export industry. Up until 
recently this sector showed signs of losing ground: its relative share of 
the total declined from almost 28% in 1985 to roughly 20% in 1989- 
1990, and again to 18% in 1991-1993. However, from then onwards the 
sector increased its share, reaching 23% in 1995. The evidence suggests 
that diversification increases when there is export growth and that, on
Table 4.6 Brazil: Exports 1985-1989 (FOB, in Millions of U.S. Dollars)
Categories 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Agriculture 1,374 757 1,111 1,195 1,632
Extractive minerals 1,895 1,835 1,846 2,257 2,631
Nonmetallic minerals 159 181 203 267 286
Metallurgical products 
Metal manufacturing and
2,904 2,801 3,096 5,910 6,303
machinery 
Electrical and
844 716 955 1,130 1,477
communications equipment 926 1,162 1,247 1,492 1,587
Transport equipment 2,393 2,128 3,401 3,829 3,885
Wood products 299 308 399 504 408
Furniture 43 46 40 45 48
Pulp and paper 562 693 785 1,338 1,307
Rubber 231 199 237 293 282
Chemicals 3,122 1,902 2,338 2,994 2,882
Pharmaceuticals 64 65 88 91 63
Perfumes, soaps, candles 24 25 29 33 43
Plastic products 150 178 95 98 54
Textiles 858 753 1,037 1,090 1,119
Clothing and footwear 1,029 1,080 1,240 1,369 1,411
Hides and skins 210 187 265 446 327
Food products 7,622 6,532 6,936 8,212 7,253
Beverages 9 18 18 24 37
Tobacco products 459 413 432 553 539
Other 210 232 274 323 518
Scrap iron 6 7 6 8 7
Total 27,378 24,202 28,065 35,490 36,090
Source: Department of Foreign Trade (SECEX), Ministry of Industry and Commerce.
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the contrary, when the pace of growth declines there is a trend toward 
export concentration.
The second most important sector is the metallurgical industry, 
which exhibited significant growth, especially up until 1989. 
Metallurgical exports increased their share of the total from 11.1% 
in 1985-1986 to 17.5% in 1989, while the value of all exports com­
bined rose by 32.0% over that same period. In the last two-year peri­
od presented in Table 4.6, metal and metallurgical exports reached 
around US$7 billion, or 14.8% of Brazil’s total exports in 1994- 
1995.
The third most important industry in terms of the value of exports is 
transport equipment; this sector increased its share of exports from 
around 9% of the total in 1985-1986 to around 10% in 1994-1995 (i.e., 
average growth was close to that registered for total exports). In 
descending order came the following industries, with relative shares in 
1985-1986 and 1994-1995 as indicated:
• Chemicals, 9.7% and 7.1%
• Metal manufacturing and machinery, 3% and 5%
• Pulp and paper, 2.4% and 4.9%
• Electrical and communications equipment, 4.1% and 4.4%
• Clothing, footwear, and knitted articles, 4.1% and 3.7%
• Textiles, 3.1% and 2.5%
• Tobacco products, 3.1% and 2.3%
• Wood products, 1.2% and 2.3%
• Rubber products, 0.8% and 1.2%
• Hides and skins, 0.8% and 1.2%
Based on the tables above it is possible to conclude that the indus­
tries whose exports increased the most, over the period in question, in 
decreasing order of average growth rates, were: pulp and paper, wood 
products, metal manufacturing and machinery, rubber and hides, tobac­
co products, metallurgical products, transport equipment, and electrical 
and communications equipment. Roughly speaking, the higher the tech­
nological content, the slower the growth of exports.
In respect to the sectors selected for the present study, substantial 
increases were recorded in industrial machinery, car parts, and paper—  
though this was not the case for natural, synthetic, or artificial textiles. 
The inclusion of textiles is because the quality of exported fabrics has 
changed dramatically and because the industry has undergone an 
intense transformation.
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Table 4.7 Brazil: Exports 1990-1995 (FOB, in Millions of U.S. Dollars)
Categories 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Agriculture 1,387 906 1,322 1,487 1,883 1,336
Extractive minerals 2,860 3,079 2,746 2,748 2,779 3,122
Nonmetallic minerals 241 258 321 431 438 481
Metallurgical products 
Metal manufacturing and
5,389 6,053 6,253 6,350 6,535 7,197
machinery 
Electrical and
1,155 1,224 1,510 1,851 2,247 2,370
communications equipment 1,444 1,534 1,727 1,917 1,934 2,141
Transport equipment 3,265 3,120 4,265 4,361 4,827 4,366
Wood products 426 443 554 833 1,044 1,082
Furniture 40 58 126 241 267 316
Pulp and paper 1,233 1,264 1,478 1,561 1,825 2,731
Rubber 284 337 443 505 550 578
Chemicals 2,591 2,350 2,594 2,900 3,237 3,363
Pharmaceuticals 69 90 99 105 123 157
Perfumes, soaps, candles 37 49 73 118 120 134
Plastic products 37 45 90 116 120 110
Textiles 1,016 1,142 1,217 1,115 1,133 1,197
Clothing and footwear 1,315 1,371 1,624 2,123 1,825 1,657
Flides and skins 301 319 408 421 481 593
Food products 6,732 6,158 6,861 7,406 9,734 10,821
Beverages 54 67 75 95 150 147
Tobacco products 594 799 960 880 1,010 1,145
Other 558 621 758 775 820 826
Scrap iron 5 15 3 6 21 7
Total 33,025 33,292 37,497 40,337 45,096 47,871
Source: Department of Foreign Trade (SECEX), Ministry of Industry and Commerce.
The Behavior of Export Manufacturing Firms
The interviews were all conducted in the Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo 
areas between October and December of 1996. The results for each 
industry are presented separately below. A summary of these results is 
included in the following section.
The first conclusion of interest to this study is that economic liber­
alization affected the industries under examination in different ways. 
The effects were felt more strongly in the car parts and the machinery 
and equipment industries, and less so in the pulp and paper as well as 
the natural textiles ones.23
The car parts industry. The automobile parts industry is of particular 
interest because it illustrates all the effects of trade liberalization: the 
effects of a change in the organization and technology of production,
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Table 4.8 Brazil: Exports and Imports by Selected Sectors (In Millions of U.S. 
Dollars)3
Year Machinery for industry Car parts Paper and paperboard Natural textiles
1985 187 (150) 1,121 (379) 251 (71) 155 (2)
1986 123(280) 997 (565) 332(129) 151 (4)
1987 146 (445) 1,219(617) 357 (167) 168 (7)
1988 195 (559) 1,586 (580) 664 (144) 179 (7)
1989 660(919) 1,571 (599) 598 (257) 177(17)
1990 516(1,352) 1,589 (714) 603 (252) 148 (38)
1991 536(1,382) 1,599 (731) 648 (315) 176 (30)
1992 615 (1,399) 1,849 (942) 699 (219) 237(19)
1993 865 (1,550) 2,112(1,322) 783(280) 226 (44)
1994 1,101 (2,319) 2,334 (1,813) 928 (280) 222 (70)
1995 1,092 (6,08 l)b 2,507 (2,235) 1,215 (821) 241 (866)c
Source: Department of Foreign Trade (SECEX), Ministry of Industry and Commerce.
a. FOB for exports and CIF for imports; imports CIF given in brackets.
b. Includes nonindustrial machinery and parts and accessories in 1995.
c. Includes yam in 1995, imports of which rose from an annual average of just over 
US$200 million in 1989-1992 to US$799 million in 1993 and US$704 million in 1994.
which has brought about an authentic business revolution in a short 
period; the impact of global outsourcing; and the effects of the opera­
tion of a motor vehicle regime that entitles assembly firms in Brazil to 
import parts and spare parts at a tariff rate of just 2%, in contrast to 70% 
for imports of motor vehicles (in the case of makes without a local 
assembler) or 35% (in the case of makes with a local assembler).
The final outcome has been devastating for the performance of 
local car parts firms. Nevertheless, the future growth prospects of the 
motor vehicle industry in Brazil are bright, in light of the potential of 
Mercosur. This has led to a series of mergers and acquisitions of parts 
manufacturers in the last couple of years— and it is not coincidental that 
this has been accompanied by economic stabilization and improved 
prospects for foreign capital. In fact, throughout 1996 two of the three 
firms selected were acquired by foreign-owned companies operating 
internationally in the parts business.
All the firms included in the investigation manufacture car parts, 
while the Companhia Fabricadora de Peças (COFAP) is also Brazil’s 
leading (and traditional) manufacturer of shock absorbers. Exports had 
expanded until 1995, when exchange rate movements caused a down­
turn in the industry. The industry comprises large firms,24 operating a 
number of plants, some of which are located abroad.25
In regard to technical aspects the degree of vertical integration is
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generally high, particularly where production is concerned. Purchases 
of raw materials are concentrated in sheet steel (for COFAP’s shock 
absorbers), powder for the plastic production process (Metal Leve), 
basic raw materials for bronze parts (Metal Leve), and a number of 
components (aluminum, silicon). SABO even has a machine-tooling 
factory. Imports of raw materials (e.g., chemicals) are extremely low, in 
most cases amounting to less than 5% of total purchases.
However, in all the cases studied outsourcing has made substantial 
inroads, especially since 1990, in terms of such support services as data 
processing, cleaning, maintenance, and catering. The trend was evident 
in all of the manufacturing sectors studied, and accounts in part for the 
huge productivity gains achieved by Brazilian industry since 1990. This 
is a more or less obvious aspect of the increased flexibility of manufac­
turing that has affected practically all industries in Brazil.
As could be expected, because the firms in question are big players 
and major exporters in their respective business segments, export sales 
are substantial— especially in contrast to the other sectors analyzed 
here. Export sales are in the vicinity of US$80 million for Metal Leve, 
US$130 million for COFAP, and US$25 million for SABO. In the case 
of some lines, nearly half of production capacity is exported.26 It is pos­
sible to conclude that this is one industry in which exporting provides a 
spur to business activity, in contrast to some of the other ones examined 
here. In point of fact, it is hard to envisage these firms surviving in their 
current form were it not for the exporting link.
It is interesting to note that in all cases, exports are priced slightly 
below goods sold domestically. This has been especially evident in 
recent years due to the appreciation of the exchange rate since mid- 
1994.
All these firms were established or consolidated in the first half of 
the 1950s, before the car industry was implanted as a result of the Plano 
de Metas launched by the government of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956— 
1961). Firms moved into the automobile parts business in the wake of 
the crisis caused by the shortage of foreign exchange that marked the 
Brazilian economy throughout the 1950s and that primarily curbed 
imports of consumer durables, as well as their parts and accessories.27 
Initially devoted to the production of a single item, diversification pro­
ceeded apace in the first half of the 1970s to encompass motor vehicle 
assembly, which was stepped up in the 1970s.
The cycle of export-oriented investment followed a characteristic 
pattern,28 and from the mid-1970s onward exports gained momentum 
thanks to an aggressive policy of support for exports of manufactured
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goods. Recently, companies have invested in a number of finished 
plants abroad: COFAP has factories that produce shock absorbers in 
Portugal and the United States, and SABO is involved with General 
Motors in a project to manufacture in Detroit.
The interesting conclusion to be drawn is that whether conducted 
directly or through joint ventures, diversification of investments in the 
car parts sector has encouraged the creation of manufacturing plants 
abroad. This poses something of a dilemma for industrial policy. Should 
the Brazilian government, acting through its agencies, provide assis­
tance, financial or otherwise, to Brazilian firms setting up investments 
abroad? Thanks to the technologies and methods connected with global 
outsourcing, this phenomenon is more typically associated with car 
parts but does not, however, make it any less interesting.
It is noteworthy that imported equipment is playing an increasingly 
important role in the investment cycle, except in the case of SABO, 
which manufactures a good part of its own equipment. The lead time 
varies from one to two years, depending on the type of product manu­
factured. In all cases, it is possible to make net marginal investments 
(i.e., those that increase output without the need to invest en bloc to cre­
ate a production unit). In other words, modular investment is possible 
even in areas such as smelting, and working three shifts is not uncom­
mon, depending on the level of demand.
As regards marketing, firms in the sector sell directly to customers 
because two of them have foreign subsidiaries. This situation is rein­
forced by the fact that a substantial portion of exports has a captive 
market composed of customers (car assembly firms) that make regular 
purchases of original equipment.29 None of these firms goes through 
trading companies or dealers. Some firms have their own offices 
abroad, along with sales and engineering departments. All firms have 
underlined the importance of participating in trade fairs at home and 
abroad (especially the fair held in Frankfurt, Germany).
Firms began exporting for different reasons, in decreasing order of 
importance: technology development (updating technology); diversifi­
cation; and boosting overall sales (using BEFIEX, a now defunct export 
promotion program). Competing abroad encompasses a number of fac­
tors: technology and quality; price (especially in foreign markets); and 
availability of the logistics of product delivery and complementary 
services.
The exporting strategy of two of the firms analyzed depends on the 
level of domestic demand, and a specific policy is in place. In this 
regard the sector shows maturity and does not obtain a lot of export
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business on the spot market. Exposure in terms of foreign currencies is 
concentrated, with the bulk of exports paid for in U.S. dollars. All the 
firms surveyed agreed that the truly significant exchange rate fluctua­
tion is that of the real vis-à-vis the dollar, though one of the firms 
expressed concern about fluctuation against the deutsche mark.
The companies have learned a number of important lessons from 
exporting. In particular, more than one firm began acquiring technology 
by copying and then went on to develop its own technology and adapt it 
to exports. One firm surveyed had recourse to foreign designs. 
Moreover, given that foreign markets are more demanding in terms of 
quality control, exporting has led to significant improvements in quali­
ty. However, all the firms recognized that the domestic market has itself 
become more demanding in recent years. Certification is also impor­
tant: one firm has certification by the main client, while the others have 
ISO 9000, QS 9000, and ISO 1400 certification.
Notwithstanding the multiple lessons learned through exporting, 
there was unanimous agreement that the red tape associated with 
exporting cuts profits. Firms learn a lot about such features as the need 
to have available local support and advanced technology skills. 
However, confronted by port and transport problems, the firms are 
obliged to find complex solutions to storing their merchandise.
One major difference between domestic and foreign markets that 
benefits sales in the domestic market are the demands of exporting in 
terms of quality, pricing, deadlines, and technical support. In addition, a 
closer relationship with large customers (automotive assembly firms) 
makes it possible to upgrade skills ranging from management to logis­
tics, since, as one firm put it, “the cost of a product that is returned is 
huge in terms of its impact on the brand.”
One of the questions that elicited the greatest degree of consensus 
was that concerning sources of competitiveness. The inquiry about 
whether the cost of labor was a source of competitiveness met with a 
unanimous response of “not any more.” The same held true for inputs, 
which are no longer viewed as a source of competitiveness vis-à-vis 
foreign firms, and domestic financing. One aspect stressed was the sup­
ply of skilled labor, and especially the issue of whether it was adaptable 
and flexible enough to take on new functions in the factory. Two firms 
placed even greater emphasis on product differentiation. And, obvious­
ly, the exchange rate was perceived as the great villain of recent years.
There were no great surprises when it came to the requirements of 
the legal environment, the existence of unfair trade practices, and the 
importance of PTAs. One firm pointed to the low wages in China, India,
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and Poland as an example of unfair trade practices. All firms reported 
that they made little use of drawbacks, because of their complexity. The 
company executives stated that Mercosur had as yet generated little 
activity.
When asked what barriers were an obstacle for export growth, all 
firms singled out the same factors. First and foremost was the exchange 
rate, though two firms indicated that this will become a less significant 
problem over the long term (as the “Brazil cost” is brought down). Then 
there are the problems and challenges associated with infrastructure, 
especially ports and roads, in terms of their inefficiency and high costs, 
that constitute enormous obstacles; the complexity of the tax system; 
and the legal and regulatory frameworks, criticized for being corrupt 
and excessively bureaucratic (e.g., several documents being required 
for the same purpose). Certificates of origin for Mercosur differ from 
one country to the next. One respondent even felt that Brazil’s negative 
image in some business forums hampers exports.
The textile industry. In Brazil’s industrial profile the textile-manufac­
turing sector has been poorly represented in external markets. Up until 
just recently imports were insignificant. Even in spite of a big rise in 
synthetic and blended textile imports, they still supply only a small por­
tion of the total market. Meanwhile, the domestic industry does not 
have a tradition of exporting: in fact, Brazil was a large-scale exporter 
of textiles only during World War II.
In contrast to the car parts firms, textile companies included in the 
study are not noted for very large export volumes, and essentially serve 
the domestic market.30 They include a manufacturer whose main prod­
uct is fabric for shirts made of 100% cotton with exports on the order of 
US$1.7 million, a manufacturer of fine textiles, and a maker of synthet­
ic textiles primarily for packing sacks. Two of the firms have multiplant 
operations, with a high degree of vertical integration in production 
(close to 90%). This is in marked contrast to the production structure of 
the car parts sector. Of all the textile firms in our sample, only one had 
undertaken a generalized restructuring of production methods.
Exports amount to 10 to 15% of production capacity. Imports 
account for between 10 and 20% of the value of raw materials. One 
firm even imports raw cotton, a product that Brazil has traditionally 
exported. The reasons for this are the superior quality of the imported 
raw material and the financing terms for those imports, a common com­
plaint by businesspeople in this industry.
All the firms have been operating for a considerable time in the
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domestic market, but have been involved only intermittently in export­
ing since they were established. One firm alone has exported products 
continuously since the late 1960s. For the others exporting is secondary 
to production for the domestic market: the companies do not have a 
strategy of investing specifically for export. Given the characteristics of 
textile production processes, investments may either be incremental or 
en bloc, depending on the product line (e.g., yam, fabrics, garments).
Both dealers and trading companies are involved in the sales 
process, with a small portion of sales made directly through a firm’s 
export department. None of the firms has its own offices or factories 
abroad, but some have entered into operating agreements. Mirroring the 
views of virtually all the others in the sample, these firms see atten­
dance at trade fairs as vital for introducing products to clients.
In most cases competition is based on price. However, for the finest 
textiles competition is also based on product differentiation. These 
cases provide the best opportunities for boosting exports. The exporting 
strategy, where one exists, is based on exporting a set portion of total 
production as the main way of maintaining a minimal, stable share in 
export markets. As with the other firms surveyed, fluctuations in the 
exchange rate are a major factor, given that the bulk of exports go to 
countries with whom trade is negotiated in U.S. dollars. One of the 
firms pointed out that exchange rate considerations carry enormous 
weight in negotiations with foreign customers.
Exposure to the world market provides an opportunity for constant 
learning. For instance, exporters take advantage of visits to trade fairs 
and exhibitions to seek out the information they need to renew styles 
and patterns for both domestic and foreign markets. However, it is the 
domestic market that exporters have in mind. Some firms hire consult­
ants or designers, while others simply copy the trends observed abroad 
in order to sell to both markets. Clearly, product design gives a boost to 
exporting, which requires stricter quality control that in turn steers 
firms to a learning process, whose results are reflected in domestic 
sales. One firm indicated that quality control was the same for both 
markets. None felt there was a need for certification in either case, nor 
for ISO certification.
With respect to transport logistics the findings of the study were 
varied. One of the firms uses FOB contracts, thus making the customer 
assume responsibility for all aspects of transport. The firm in question 
even exports by air. Other firms also send small cargoes by this means. 
Technical assistance is less important in this sector than in others,
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though all firms stated that they provide such assistance on an ongoing 
basis.
In contrast with other sectors, the sources of competitiveness 
emphasized here are labor and the exchange rate. However, product dif­
ferentiation is also of greater importance: all firms indicated this factor 
as the major source of competitiveness. Financing arrangements are a 
potential source of competitiveness, especially since textile imports are 
now accompanied by foreign supplier credit provided under extremely 
favorable terms.
The main barriers faced by exports include, above all, the exchange 
rate; a lack of sufficient and appropriate export financing; high non­
wage labor costs (on the order of 100% of the wage bill); port costs 
(primarily at the port of Santos, São Paulo State); and the high financial 
cost of loans in the domestic market. Some of these issues have come 
under government attention. In any event, it is unlikely that significant 
progress can soon be made in the infrastructure reform required to 
reduce the cost of exporting from Brazil or in reforms to the Brazilian 
federal constitution.
The pulp and paper industry. Out of the four industries chosen for the 
present investigation, the pulp and paper industry presents the greatest 
degree of heterogeneity in terms of product range (even taking into 
account the capital goods segment, which is characterized by a wide 
range of technologies and type of product). The sector contains one 
large integrated firm manufacturing pulp and printing and writing paper 
in rolls— set up specifically with exporting in mind— a semi-integrated 
medium-sized firm producing reams for writing and printing, and a 
small firm producing specialty paper. The problems of such diverse 
firms are to a certain extent dissimilar. However, as we shall see, there 
are marked similarities in some aspects.
The firm of Bahia Sur, which has a plant in Mucuri, in Bahia State, 
manufactures pulp fiber from eucalyptus trees on its own plantation. 
This is a huge integrated venture, which started operating only recently. 
Roughly 40% of its nominal capacity of 500,000 tons of pulp are used 
to manufacture paper, with the rest sold as is.31 Close to 80% of pulp is 
exported, which means that the firm’s revenues depend substantially on 
trends in overseas prices, which fluctuate markedly over time, and the 
exchange rate. Still, the firm has almost 40% of the domestic market for 
the type of paper it manufactures.
The industry has a complete vertical integration. Subcontracting is
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concentrated in forestry services and is nonexistent in manufacturing 
proper. One recent development is the outsourcing of some services in 
such areas as security and cleaning. Levels of utilization of installed 
capacity are high (above 90%), as one would expect in projects of this 
nature. Neither raw materials nor any other sorts of materials are 
imported.
The project has had an export orientation since its conception in 
1985. Operations began in 1988, and vertical integration of paper pro­
duction dates from 1990. From then onward investments were made 
specifically with a view to exporting; manufacturing paper was one way 
of adding value to the production process. This objective is shared by a 
range of large pulp-manufacturing firms.
Pirahy, a medium-sized firm, has a small presence in both domestic 
and foreign markets. Vertical integration is relatively advanced, except 
in the case of pulp, which is acquired from third parties, always in 
Brazil. Meanwhile, Daru imports almost all raw materials, in particular 
paper, for quality reasons. Technological modernization is an ongoing 
feature.
Most equipment is produced domestically, especially in paper man­
ufacture, though this is not the case for specialty paper. The digester for 
the manufacture of cellulose pulp is imported. The nature of the produc­
tion process is such that it is possible to carry out marginal investments 
in the manufacture of various types of paper, but not in manufacturing 
pulp.
Agreements to supply large customers with exports take the form of 
commitment letters. The use of trading companies for sales and market­
ing is not common. Large firms are the exception, since they have their 
own trading companies. In contrast to the other sectors already ana­
lyzed, pulp and paper firms do not regard attendance at trade fairs and 
exhibitions either in Brazil or abroad as particularly relevant. One 
important aspect of this sector’s competitiveness is the reliability in the 
supply of products. For the specialty paper firm, differentiation in 
respect of the quality of the paper and precision is an important factor.
Pulp and paper firms were the first to highlight the issue of quality 
control and the need for certification, particularly for pulp exports to 
Europe. Foreign customers are more demanding in quality and dead­
lines. When asked about the export learning process, firms once again 
mentioned Brazil’s excessive bureaucracy as regards standards and 
laws.
The sources of competitiveness alluded to show little variation 
from the cases examined above. Once again, the firms examined have
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reported that the advantage of cheap labor has disappeared in recent 
years. One of the specific features of this industry is that the wood used 
to manufacture pulp is a major source of competitive advantage. 
Another notable advantage has to do with the projects’ being self-suffi­
cient in energy.
Drawbacks are not especially relevant to the sector as a whole, 
since few inputs are imported. By contrast, the drawback mechanism 
figures prominently for the specialty paper firm because it mostly 
imports raw materials. Securitization of exports is a major form of 
financing for pulp and paper sales. This is not the case of specialty 
paper manufacturers, who tend to use advances on exchange contracts 
to finance production for export. The elimination of the state merchan­
dise and service sales tax (ICMS), where applied to exports of semi­
manufactures, was seen as a boost to exports. The only country singled 
out for unfair trade practices was Indonesia, for engaging in dumping to 
penetrate pulp markets. And as for barriers to exports, firms alluded to 
the familiar set of factors, including, above all, the exchange rate slip­
page, deficient infrastructure (especially port facilities), and the lack of 
a specific export policy at the federal level. Respondents also pointed to 
the excessive proliferation of government bodies divided among differ­
ent ministries as an obstacle to an effective export policy.
The machinery and equipment industry. The machinery and equipment 
industry suffered the most from the impact of trade liberalization in 
Brazil and the “strong real” policy of recent years.32 In this industry, 
import penetration ratios (defined as imports’ share of apparent con­
sumption) now reach as much as 40 to 50% in some segments, compared 
with under 10% up until the late 1980s. Levels of idle capacity remain 
very high, quite similar to those seen during the recession of the 1980s.
Of all of Brazil’s manufacturing industries, it is the capital goods 
sector as a whole that has lagged most in terms of technological mod­
ernization. Highly protected up until the late 1980s, the industry faced 
intense competition from imports by the mid-1990s. This competition 
was reinforced by supplier credits granted to imports under terms very 
favorable in contrast to those prevailing in Brazil.
This has been the panorama facing the firms selected for the 
study.33 Companies have often engaged in exporting to take advantage 
of existing idle capacity. The exception was the firm that manufactures 
lathes— computer numerically controlled— that exports 30% of its out­
put. For this firm, exporting is an important source of revenue and 
therefore is an integral part of the firm’s strategy. This company
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accounts for 70% of Brazil’s exports of lathes, as well as 40% of 
domestic sales.
The firms investigated are single-plant operations. Unlike as in 
almost all the other sectors, they have not made substantial changes to 
either management methods or subcontracting arrangements. Electronic 
equipment and components make up the bulk of imports. The firms sur­
veyed have been in business for some years, with two of them 
approaching the 100-year mark. The firms are also vertically integrated.
The technological evolution in this sector, perhaps even more than 
in the textile-manufacturing sector, has encompassed all the classical 
stages of import substitution. Initially production catered to the domes­
tic market. Later, mainly in the 1970s and 1980s, the sector recorded 
export growth, owing to either a devalued exchange rate, low capacity 
utilization, or specific export incentives for the export of manufactures 
(which were discontinued in the 1980s). Under this process, product 
lines were frequently changed to reflect demand requirements.
Investments are predominantly short-term in nature, and it is often 
possible to increase the scale of production with marginal, incremental 
investments. This should make it easier to adapt to new product lines. 
However, product line reorganizations have not been the prevailing 
trend among the firms surveyed.
Initially, products enjoyed the benefit of foreign know-how, often 
obtained by copying. In this sector, copying is not only an unpleasant 
reality, reflecting technological backwardness, but was the normal way 
of acquiring technology in the past. The situation is somewhat different 
today because there is some endogenous development of technology. 
Product design is conducted in-house by firms. There are no particular 
quality controls for exports, nor is it necessary to obtain certifications to 
export.
The problems involved in supplying technical assistance to poten­
tial customers pushed one firm to operate an assembly plant abroad— in 
Kentucky.
A variety of arrangements are used for the sales and marketing of 
exports; these range from subsidiaries in the United States and contracts 
in Europe (e.g., Ferrostaal) to designated agents (138 in the United 
States, in the case of Nardini), as well as dealers and trading companies. 
Firms emphasized the importance of participating in trade fairs, espe­
cially abroad.
The tradition of exporting is considered a source of competitive­
ness: hence the importance of providing technical assistance, comple­
mented by product differentiation, and, to a lesser extent, by price com­
petition. Exports go mainly to dollar countries and/or are sold in U.S.
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dollars. One firm conducts business in deutsche marks. Clearly, then, 
the exchange rate fluctuation of most significance is that of the real in 
relation to the U.S. dollar.
One important part of the export learning process cited by two 
firms was dealing with bureaucracy.34 There is still a huge amount of 
red tape associated with exporting.
Among the sources of competitiveness cited were these:
• Product differentiation, which is seen as fundamental.
• The supply of skills in terms of adaptability and flexibility for 
the execution of the most diverse tasks. Here again, it was stated 
that the cost of labor had ceased to be a source of competitive­
ness, as was borne out in all the other interviews, following the 
enactment of the 1988 constitution and the implementation of 
the Real Plan.
It is worth pointing out that the appreciating exchange rate has rep­
resented a not insubstantial competitive advantage for firms that import 
raw materials, equipment, and components on a large scale. However, 
even taking this into account, in the final analysis devaluation was 
judged necessary and urgent. Almost all the businesspeople surveyed 
believe that devaluation is also important to correct or counterbalance 
the competitive disadvantages generated by the high Brazil cost.
As was the case with all other sectors and businesses, managers in 
the machinery and equipment industry were unanimous in their criti­
cism concerning (1) the lack of financing whose terms, amounts, and 
maturities were on a par with those enjoyed by competing imports and 
(2) the exchange rate lag. In addition, there were the usual complaints 
about problems experienced with ports (especially Santos, in São Paulo 
State), the excessive red tape associated with exporting, and the lack of 
an authentic export-import bank to provide export financing. None of 
the firms found useful the form of export financing made available by 
BNDES specifically for capital goods (i.e., FINAMEX). All the compa­
nies use or have used advances on exchange contracts or advances on 
export contracts.
Conclusions
The combination of a three-year recession (1990-1992) with a gradual 
process of trade liberalization— which was more clearly perceived by 
the productive sector and consumers from 1993 onwards— forced
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Brazilian industry to rethink its production methods and change the 
thrust of its efforts to overhaul management and technological prac­
tices. These changes signaled a genuine turning point in the perfor­
mance of the manufacturing sector. The course charted since that time is 
proof that expanded international trade linkages have a cost, but that 
they are vital to improving business competitiveness. Brazil, like so 
many other countries that underwent similar processes, is no exception 
to this rule.
The industrial structure and dynamic emerging from these process­
es have yet to be consolidated. Industries have demonstrated resiliency 
in the face of foreign competition. However, it is important to recognize 
the need to foster a new model of industrial development. It can be 
hoped that the defensive posture adopted by industry since the early 
1990s is only a temporary response, since Brazil requires investment 
strategies that increase production capacity. The manufacturing industry 
has recently begun to show signs of adopting an “offensive” investment 
strategy. However, investments in manufacturing have not yet reached 
such a level that one can speak of the advent of a new model.
Meanwhile, some recent changes— notably a striking increase in 
the import penetration ratio in a number of sectors— indicate, given the 
size of domestic and foreign markets and Brazil’s technological tradi­
tion, that the time is fast approaching when scale of production will jus­
tify investing in local manufacture of many goods that today are import­
ed. At the same time, substantial productivity gains in industry, coupled 
with investment in production for export, will generate greater export 
sales than Brazil has recorded up until quite recently.
As repeatedly emphasized in this chapter, stabilization with the 
exchange rate anchor as part of the macroeconomic strategy of a strong 
real has brought about a relative appreciation of the exchange rate since 
mid-1994.35 The microeconomic impact of macroeconomic policies 
should not be minimized: all the firms surveyed felt that the overvalued 
exchange rate was one of the main barriers to export growth. However, 
the more perceptive among them have now become aware that this state 
of things will change only gradually and that it is not possible to rely on 
significant devaluations of the exchange rate as an element of external 
competitiveness in the short run. In this regard, recent foreign exchange 
policy has been one of small devaluations ahead of wholesale industrial 
goods’ price increases. Moreover, this policy has in its favor huge pro­
ductivity gains.36
Continuing high interest rates are a second macroeconomic factor 
noted in interviews. The combination of a hitherto insufficient fiscal
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adjustment, the need to attract foreign capital in order to finance the 
domestic account, and the need to monitor the growth in credit (which 
could overheat demand to excessive levels) has led to very high real 
interest rates, and that has discouraged productive investment. Interest 
rates are trending downward gradually, as efforts are made to reduce 
public-sector deficits by a variety of means.
The forms of financing available to industry are perceived as being 
very expensive. It is worth noting that the National Bank for Economic 
and Social Development (BNDES) has recently announced measures 
aimed at improving export financing.37 The initiatives by the bank have 
up until quite recently not been well received by exporting firms: in 
fact, not one of the firms surveyed accorded any importance to those 
forms of financing. The inadequacy of export financing was another 
significant factor alluded to in the course of the interviews.
Mention should also be made of the advances in exchange contracts 
and the advances in export contracts already described briefly. These 
mechanisms will no doubt tend to lose importance over the medium and 
long term, as nominal domestic interest rates start to align themselves 
with rates prevailing internationally (after considering exchange rate 
devaluation and a Brazil risk premium).
One of the most surprising facts to come out of the study has to do 
with sources of competitiveness. In this regard, labor received a special 
mention. Nonwage labor costs that amount to nearly 100% of the wage 
bill, thus comprising one of the main components of the Brazil cost, 
pose a major burden. In addition, the wages of industrial labor (i.e., the 
product wage) have consistently risen in real terms from the beginning 
of the 1990s to mid-1996; their growth has even outpaced the huge pro­
ductivity gains recorded by industry, as evidenced by wages’ increased 
share of the value of production. With a strong exchange rate, the cost 
burden imposed by the labor expense component reduces profit margins 
and accelerates the cut in the use of labor.38 In this manner, Brazil has 
recently lost what should have been one of its potential sources of com­
petitiveness: the low cost of labor.
One positive aspect noted about the labor force pertains to its quali­
ty. A number of those interviewed referred to this and underlined the 
ease of learning, the positive capacity for improvising and seeking solu­
tions for problems and related issues— in Portuguese, jeitinho 
brasileiro. This is surprising, in view of the low average level of formal 
qualifications of workers in Brazil’s industry. Hence this factor should 
be considered as a major source of competitiveness.
All those surveyed agreed that there was too much interference and
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red tape associated with exporting. Several of the interviews were 
notable for frequent criticism about the excessive number of forms 
required and of regulations.
The bureaucracy that has sprung up to harness the benefits of free- 
trade agreements (Mercosur) also came in for harsh criticism. There 
were problems with the issuing of certificates of origin and the prepara­
tion of declarations of origin, because norms varied from one member 
nation to the next.
The proliferation of government agencies divided among a range of 
ministries is also an obstacle to exporting: there needs to be a single 
authority. The lack of a foreign trade policy formulated at the federal 
level was also stressed. Initiatives at the state level, for their part, have 
much more to do with attracting firms to the respective regions than 
with providing support and incentives to export.
Predictably, business people complained about the high cost and 
inefficiencies of port systems, in particular, as well as of road and rail 
transport systems. Some in business were in favor of the privatization 
initiatives undertaken in those areas, but all expressed doubts concern­
ing the results of privatizations and new concessions over the medium 
term.
As for their contacts with customers, firms declared that it was very 
useful to make regular visits to countries where they had distributors, in 
those cases when they did not have their own offices abroad. Likewise, 
and taking into account potential customers, all the firms, irrespective 
of their size and field of activity, underlined the importance of attending 
foreign trade fairs.
Economic policy recommendations that can be made on the basis of 
the conclusions drawn are all relatively straightforward. The difficulty 
lies in actually implementing them. Thus complaints about the appreci­
ating exchange rate, so frequent in public statements by exporters, have 
recently begun to lose weight: (1) the Brazilian government frequently 
reaffirms its foreign exchange policy; and (2) in practice, the govern­
ment undertakes discrete real devaluations in the exchange rate, partic­
ularly in relation to market prices for industrial goods. The aim of the 
government over the short and medium term is to reduce the Brazil cost 
as a way of boosting the profitability of exports.
However, the most feasible way of expanding exports is in the area 
of financing and related items (e.g., credit insurance, financing extend­
ed to importers of Brazilian products). For at least the past three years, 
there has been discussion about the need to set up an export-import
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bank to promote exports. Some time ago, the BNDES announced that it 
intended to expand its role in this sphere, even focusing on activities 
typically undertaken by an export-import bank, though the BNDES has 
only been partially successful up to now. This, however, is not some­
thing that can be achieved overnight. The lack of a tradition in this area 
and in others generates frustration and disenchantment in business cir­
cles.
The main difficulties in the area of export financing come from the 
fact that the task of supplying credit is split among a number of govern­
ment agencies. Besides, there is uncertainty over budgetary allocations 
for equalization of interest rates. Furthermore, the rules governing pri- 
vate-sector operations are not entirely stable. Export insurance has 
existed for quite some time but has never functioned satisfactorily, 
owing to inadequate management of commercial and political risks, 
combined with overestimates of compensation by claimants. The sys­
tem is currently under review.
The key issue concerns the funding of exports, not only in terms of 
the rates and conditions applied to loans, but also of the amounts 
required in a country the size, and with the exporting tradition, of 
Brazil. Turning to overseas sources for financing may prove an interim 
solution while the fiscal adjustment is worked through and domestic 
interest rates decline. Even then, it would be necessary to envisage a 
review fee of a small (or nil) amount to make loans attractive.
On the other hand, it is somewhat naive to believe that in the cur­
rent phase of Brazil’s stabilization effort, the National Treasury can 
finance the cost of interest rate equalization on a sufficient scale to pro­
mote exports (and deny promotion to many competing industries, rang­
ing from housing finance to agriculture, for example) in a country 
where the consolidated government operating deficit is currently on the 
order of 5% of GDP.
Similarly, it is essential to invest in production to encourage 
exports, and not just in the sale and marketing of exportable products. 
There is recognition that various product lines were not accompanied 
by investments in the past. In view of the time it takes for investments 
to bear fruit, there is always a lag before any appreciable growth occurs 
in export sales. Moreover, the terms of financing for those new invest­
ments run up against the same difficulties mentioned above in relation 
to investments in sales and marketing. Consequently, it is very difficult 
to come up with short-term solutions.
It is necessary to stress again the importance placed by virtually all
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respondents on a versatile, flexible labor force as a source of competi­
tiveness. In fact, in several cases, this was the only positive factor of 
competitiveness reported by those surveyed for the study.39 It is difficult 
to imagine how a policy can be formulated to expand or reinforce this 
factor— apparently intrinsic and connected, perhaps, to more permanent 
cultural traits of Brazil’s labor force. How can this positive aspect of 
industrial labor be encouraged? That question is beyond the scope of 
this chapter. In the meantime, hopes are that an improvement in the 
level of formal schooling of the labor force— very low in Brazil, as in 
other countries of Latin America— will help enhance further these traits 
of flexibility and versatility.
During the investigation, the need for Brazil to have a more explicit 
foreign trade policy was clearly identified. Such a policy should, of 
course, offer viable alternatives for shaping what could and should be 
Brazil’s export future within the framework of the new economic policy 
regime that has emerged since the stabilization plan was launched.
This policy should, at a minimum, do the following:
1. Clearly define the objectives and instruments of Brazil’s foreign 
trade policy, particularly in relation to exports
2. As part of these instruments, emphasize the role of financing 
production for export and financing the sales and marketing of 
exportable products
3. Provide for clear linkages to industrial policy, technology policy, 
and measures to reduce the Brazil cost
4. Centralize in one or a small number of institutions the task of 
administering instruments and measures
5. Take steps to reduce the bureaucracy associated with foreign 
trade activities and implement measures aimed at simplifying 
the bureaucratic procedures involved in exporting,40 (notwith­
standing the considerable improvement noted since September 
1992, when the export module of the computerized integrated 
foreign trade system [SICOMEX] came into operation)41
6. Ensure stable rules of the game
7. Promote participation in trade fairs and exhibitions in Brazil, 
and especially abroad, by providing logistical and financial 
assistance for firms42
8. Seek out means and methods of fostering a versatile and flexible 
industrial labor force because this factor is particularly pertinent 
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3. The in fo rm atio n  used  fo r th is ch ap te r com es from  d iffe ren t sources. 
Therefore there may be discrepancies.
4. Parts o f th is section  are based  on A. C. P inheiro  (1996). The B razilian  
G eographical and S tatistical Institu te  (IBG E) and the C entral B ank provided the 
information, especially that pertaining to the national accounts o f Brazil.
5. See E. Bacha (1995) and (1996).
6. Ibid. p.3.
7. For purposes o f com parison, if  Brazil had m aintained the share o f world 
exports it had in 1979, in 1995 exports w ould have totaled U S$72.6 billion, some 
60% above the level actually recorded in 1995 (US$45.5 billion).
8. One exam ple show s the ro le  o f the exchange rate: in 1995 the value of 
B razil’s exports to Japan rose by 20.5% , and the main reason was the appreciation 
of the yen in that year.
9. This schedule was speeded up in February 1992, and again in 1994.
10. In fact, the schedule was not altered. It was the tariff rates in  force in  the 
sch ed u le ’s com pletion  that changed. T ariff reductions w ere brought forw ard by 
three months in line with Mercosur, and, given that rates were modified only slight­
ly, the only effect felt was in terms o f expectations, and not on the competitiveness 
o f local products.
11. E aflier experience w ith export prom otion m echanism s such as BEFIEX  
and FINEX turned out to be disastrous due to inefficiency, corruption, the high level 
o f subsidies and the drain on public finances. This probably explains why the issue 
has of late been treated w ith caution and why the econom ic authorities have been 
re luctan t to adopt m ore com prehensive in itia tives at a tim e w hen all efforts are 
focused on dealing with the fiscal situation and the trade balance.
12. In addition to the instrum ents m entioned in the text, there are others less 
widely used, tem porarily not in use, or specific to certain sectors (e.g., agriculture): 
exchange debentures, com m odities lines, forfeiting (forward sales, capital goods, 
and prom issory notes), and w arrant discounts, among others. An analytical descrip­
tion o f these mechanisms can be found in E. Fortuna (1994).
13. See Bonelli (1997) for a thorough description of these instruments.
14. In its initial phase of operation, up until 1995, the program was plagued by 
problem s and represen ted  a considerable cost for public finances and hence was 
rarely used.
15. Note that because of this (and the high differential betw een dom estic and 
foreign interest rates at the outset of the Real Plan, w ith a progressive appreciation 
o f the exchange rate), it becam e comm on practice to take resources from advances 
on exchange contracts and invest them  at m arket ra tes. T his practice  w as subse­
quently discontinued.
16. Inform ation provided by the C entral B ank o f B razil; exports paid  for in 
advance accounted for 13.6% of total exports in 1994 and 1995 and around 20.0% 
in the first half of 1996.
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17. This type of loan has been term ed “exporters’ 63,” in reference to Central 
Bank Resolution 63, which regulates the inflow o f funds for loans both by comm er­
cial and investment banks.
18. In fact, the decree regulates Law 6704 of 26 October 1979.
19. A ccording to  estim ates by the N ational C onfederation o f Industry, basic 
social costs o f industrial labor am ount to 102% of wages! These are the m andatory 
expenses for hiring  a w orker in industry, a little  over tw ice the contractual wage. 
This issue was constantly referred to in the interviews conducted with business peo­
ple.
20. A part from  stim ulating industrial investm ents, this agreem ent also con­
tributed to a reduction in the Brazil cost, since it reduced the tax on exports o f capi­
tal goods and raw materials, thus allowing a drop in the fiscal costs o f investment.
21. After coming to power, the current administration enacted Law 9000/95 on 
16 March 1995, which increased the list o f exemptions from the industrial products 
tax (IPI) to include purchases o f a range of capital goods— m achinery, equipm ent, 
new  devices and in strum en ts , bo th  im ported  and m ade in  B razil, as w ell as the 
respective accessories, especially tools— thus initiating the first steps toward reduc­
ing the fiscal cost o f investm ents. This law  rem ained in force until 31 D ecem ber 
1995, with the exemptions to the IPI kept in place thanks to temporary measures.
22. W ith the exception of the first two activities listed in the table, agriculture 
and mining, these activities comprise manufacturing industry.
23. The penetration  o f im ports o f synthetic and blended textiles (especially  
from  South K orea and C hina) has been so in tense that it caused the shutdow n o f 
entire regional segm ents, such as the textile center in the city o f Am ericana in São 
Paulo. There roughly ha lf the factories set up before 1990 closed their doors. As a 
general rule it was the oldest textile-producing plants that were the hardest hit. The 
bulk of textile production is made up o f blended synthetic and natural fabrics.
24. For exam ple, COFAP has 72% of the domestic m arket in shock absorbers 
and 81% in rings. It also accounts for 85% o f all shock absorbers and 90% of rings 
exported by Brazil. M etal Leve has 60% of the domestic market in pistons— 90% in 
bronze parts and 50% in plastic parts. Its share o f the export m arket is 50% for p is­
tons, 100% fo r bronze parts, and 50% for p lastic  parts. SA BO  has roughly  tw o- 
thirds o f the domestic m arket in retainers, and both companies have a 35% share of 
hoses.
25. M etal Leve has four plants in Brazil and three abroad; COFAP has eight in 
B razil and one abroad, while SABO has three in Brazil and four abroad (including 
one in Buenos Aires). Some plants are operated in association w ith foreign firms. In 
D ecem ber 1996 COFAP announced plans to  open two additional p lan ts in 1997, 
worth US$40 million each: one in Argentina and one in the United States.
26. M etal Leve exports 40%  o f its production  capacity  in  p istons— 20% in 
bronze parts and 10-15%  in p lastic  parts. COFAP exports 50% of its production  
capacity  in shock  abso rbers and 45%  in rings, w hile  SA BO  exports 30%  o f its 
capacity in retainers and 15% in connection tubes and hoses.
27. M etal Leve began production of pistons in 1950, diversifying into bronze 
parts in 1956-1957. Plastic parts only began to be produced in 1976. COFAP started 
producing rings in 1951-1953 , w hich grew  w ith the export o f b locks, and after 
1970 began exporting rings.
28. M etal L eve w as fa irly  d iffe ren t in a num ber o f w ays. The firm  began 
exporting to other Latin A m erican countries at the beginning of the 1960s, having 
m ade investm ents fo r that specific purpose. At the end o f the 1960s, M etal Leve 
carried out investm ents w ith a view to exporting diesel and airplane engines to the
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N orth American m arket. It was only in the 1970s that the com pany took conscious 
steps to invest in the production of pistons for export.
29. One o f the firm s manages to sell about tw o-thirds of its exports to captive 
clients, w ith the rem ainder going to the spare parts m arket through representatives 
and distributors.
30. Ferreira G uim ares holds 45% o f the dom estic m arket fo r dyed knitw ear 
and p rin ts  and 40%  fo r lig h t and heavy  ind igos. N ova A m erica  has 35%  o f the 
domestic market for fabric for shirts.
31. A nnual p ro d u c tio n  o f  p rin tin g  and  w ritin g  pap er in  ro lls  am ounts to 
around 180,000 tons.
32. Exports o f capital goods, including parts, com ponents, and accessories, 
typically  reached U S $3-4  b illion  a year no t too long ago. Recently, exports have 
not exceeded US$3 billion, and their share o f total exports has declined.
33. Thus in the case o f one firm , exports dropped from around US$25 m illion 
in the m id-1980s to under US$17 m illion in 1995. A nother firm  even recorded nil 
exports in some years.
34. It needs to be recognized  that th is is an ex trem ely  negative aspect: the 
main lesson learned from exporting is how to cope with excessive bureaucracy.
35. It would not be appropriate to spell out the huge variety o f measurements, 
each  fea tu ring  a d iffe ren t p rice  index , tha t have been  u sed  to  estim ate  B ra z il’s 
“ex change  ra te  la g .” A p p aren tly  in d ep en d e n t m easu rem en ts  p rep a red  by the 
em ployers association CNI (Confederação N acional de Indústria)— using the real 
exchange rate for industrial products— show that between June 1994 and December 
1996, the exchange rate had appreciated by roughly 6 to 8%.
36. A ccording to estim ates based on gross real industrial production , labor 
productivity has increased on the average by about 7.5% per annum betw een 1990 
and 1995. Estim ates for the year under way point to a sim ilar figure, w ith indica­
tions that it may even go higher. These productivity gains clearly occurred w ith less 
domestic value added than before, given the growth in im ports o f com ponent parts 
that follow ed liberalization. In addition, m ajor job  losses w ere noted in industry, 
though m ost were due to the recession of 1990-1992.
37. In  la te  1996, the bank  ann o u n ced  its  in te n tio n  to  g u a ran tee  ex p o rts  
financed by im porters o f Brazilian products abroad. A group o f foreign banks were 
to  receive accreditation to act as agents, operating with transfers of its credit lines.
38. It is highly significant that when asked in the survey whether labor was an 
important factor o f competitiveness, almost all the firms replied “not any more.”
39. The degree o f unanim ity on the importance of this factor is somewhat sur­
prising.
40. A ll B razilian  exporters are required  to reg ister w ith the D epartm ent o f 
Foreign Trade, at the M inistry o f Industry, Commerce, and Tourism.
41. The system  uses a sing le  export record  fo r m ost p roducts. E xceptions 
include exports financed at term s of over 180 days. The term s require a document 
de ta iling  a reco rd  o f a loan  and a num ber o f p roducts se lected  fo r eco log ica l or 
strategic reasons, which require a special authorization.
42. The BNDES operates a schem e to provide financial assistance for trade 
fairs and exhibitions. However, this line o f funding is rarely used, perhaps because 
firms are unaware of its existence.

C o l o m b i a :  R e g a i n i n g  t h e  U p p e r  H a n d  
i n  E x p o r t  P r o m o t i o n
Carla Macario
Colombia was the first country in Latin America to establish a coherent 
set of export promotion policies in the late 1960s. The nation became a 
model for the other countries in the region that were attempting to 
design efficient export assistance policies. Therefore, it was essential to 
include it in the project that assessed the impact of export promotion 
policies on the behavior of export firms.1
The Macroeconomic Environment
The Colombian economy grew at a rate of 0.7% in 1998. The country is 
one of the mid-sized economies in Latin America— along with Chile, 
Peru, and Venezuela— with a GDP of US$84 billion (at 1995 prices) in 
1998 (see Table 5.1).2
The country’s macroeconomic stability during the 1980s was out­
standing when compared with that of other Latin American nations. 
This allowed Colombia to have an annual average rate of growth of per 
capita GDP of 1.6%, while many other countries in the region ended the 
decade with lower levels than in 1980.
Manufacturing’s share of GDP was 18.4% for 1997, down from 
20.8% in 1990. Industrial output, excluding coffee processing, has 
grown at a rate of 6.7% between January and June 1998 (DANE 1998c).
Colombia exported US$14.7 billion of goods and services in 1998, 
while imports were US$18 billion. Imports of goods and services were 
21.6% of GDP in 1998, more than twice as much as in 1990 before the 
trade liberalization reforms. In contrast, exports’ share of GDP has only 
increased from 13.3 to 17.5% over the same period. The country’s
115
Table 5.1 Colombia: Economic Indicators
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 19988
GDPa 65,028 66,100 68,662 71,740 76,245 80,400 82,058 83,310 83,904
GDP growth rates15 3.3 1.6 3.9 4.5 6.3 5.4 2.1 1.5 0.7
Importsa’c 5,776 5,972 8,439 11,706 14,373 15,825 16,299 18,019 18,097
Exports3’0 8,634 9,669 10,212 10,885 10,852 12,144 12,679 13,477 14,662
Import ratiod 8.9 9.0 12.3 16.3 18.9 19.7 19.9 21.6 21.6
Export ratio (all goods)d 13.3 14.6 14.9 15.2 14.2 15.1 15.5 16.2 17.5
Export ratio (manufactures)6 25.1 33.3 31.8 39.9 36.9 38.0 33.6 30.7 32.2
Exchange ratef 502 633 679 787 827 913 1,037 1,141 1,426
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
a. Millions of U.S. dollars at 1995 prices.
b. Average annual rates at 1995 prices.
c. Goods and services.
d. Percentages of GDP at 1995 prices. Includes goods and services.
e. Percentages of total value of FOB exports of goods.
f. Nominal exchange rate in pesos per U.S. dollar.
g. Preliminary figures.
Information is from different sources, so there may be discrepancies.
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degree of openness (the sum of imports and exports over GDP) was 
39.1% in 1998 compared to 22.2% in 1990, an increase that is mainly 
due to import growth.
Colombia’s main export product is crude petroleum (20.3% of 
exports in 1997). Oil has replaced coffee as the country’s chief export 
product. Coffee’s share of exports has gone from 49.1% in 1985 to 
19.6% in 1997.
The rise and fall of the price of coffee in international markets was 
for many years the main determinant of the availability of hard curren­
cy. Therefore it had a strong impact on the domestic business cycle. In 
consequence, the growing importance of oil has diversified the coun­
try’s exports and has decreased the economy’s vulnerability to the fluc­
tuations of the price of coffee. Nevertheless, there is now a greater 
exposure to the variations of the oil market. After oil and coffee, the 
next leading exports are coal (7.6%), cut flowers (4.7%), fresh bananas 
(4.4%), and oil products (3.2%).
Export growth during the first half of the 1990s was mainly the 
result of an increase of nontraditional exports, which increased by 37% 
between 1991 and 1995. The main nontraditional exports are textiles, 
chemical products, emeralds, bananas, and flowers (OMC 1997b).
Export performance has been dampened by the appreciation of the 
exchange rate during the 1990s as a result, among other factors, of the 
discoveries of new oil fields. Over this period, the Colombian peso has 
appreciated against the currencies of most of its trading partners, with 
the exception of Argentina and, to a lesser extent, of Venezuela (DANE 
1998a). This appreciation of the Colombian peso has been somewhat 
compensated for by its recent devaluation following the economic tur­
bulence in Asia. Nevertheless, there has been a major appreciation of 
the peso with respect to the currencies of such Asian countries as South 
Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand, which are among Colombia’s chief 
rivals on the export markets for manufactured goods. This, along with 
the decrease of demand in Latin American countries, contributed to a 
decrease of exports during 1998 as compared to the same period during 
the previous year (-6.38%), while nontraditional exports grew by a 
modest 0.7% (DANE 1999b).
Trade Policy
Colombia adopted import substitution policies in the 1930s. These were 
combined with export promotion programs two decades later. While the
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intensity of these policies varied throughout the years, partly as a result 
of the fluctuations of the price of coffee, this “mixed strategy” was suc­
cessful in stimulating export growth and diversification. This combina­
tion of policies also contributed to consolidating the manufacturing sec­
tor.
In 1967, the government’s resolve to adopt a new set of policies 
contributed to providing the mixed strategy with a more coherent 
framework (Ocampo 1994). These included new export promotion poli­
cies that were a model for the other countries in Latin America (see 
below). The reforms were very successful and led to unprecedented 
high growth rates and export diversification during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, a period that is known as Colombia’s golden age.
All the same, the policies in place also led to very high effective 
rates of protection for some consumer goods industries, such as textiles, 
clothing, and footwear. Moreover, these policies were combined with 
widely scattered tariff levels and a predominance of nontariff barriers, 
therefore increasing the level of protection. At the same time, short­
term macroeconomic goals often had a more decisive influence on trade 
policy than long-term development goals (Garay et al. 1998).
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the decrease in the rates of 
growth and the shift in the policy environment in Latin America had led 
the Colombian government to abandon the mixed model and replace it 
by an outward oriented strategy (Ocampo and Villar 1995). This new 
strategy included changes of the trade policy, tax reform, and greater 
flexibility in exchange controls (Pardo 1996).
The main changes in trade policy were the following: the average 
nominal tariff— which had already been substantially cut during the 
previous years from 41.7% in 1984— went down from 26.6% in 1989 to 
6.1% in 1991 (Ocampo 1994). The proportion of imports that required 
prior licensing went from 60.1% in 1989 to 1.4% in 1991 (Garay et al. 
1998).
At present, tariffs go from 0% to 35%. The average tariff is 11.5% 
and the maximum tariff binding at the WTO for nonagricultural prod­
ucts is 35% (OMC 1997b).
Regional integration, through preferential trade agreements, has 
been a key goal of Colombia’s trade policy. Colombia belongs to the 
Comunidad Andina (the former Grupo Andino) since it was established 
by that country together with Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela in 
1969. The purpose of the Comunidad Andina is to provide a larger mar­
ket, particularly for manufactured goods. Around 20% of the country’s
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exports go to the Comunidad Andina, and almost half of these are 
exports to Venezuela.
Colombia also has had a specific trade agreement with Venezuela 
since 1992. Trade between the two countries went up from US$1.0 bil­
lion in 1992 to more than US$2.5 billion in 1997.3 This agreement pro­
vides Colombia with an opportunity to export goods with greater value 
added, since 80% of the country’s exports to Venezuela are manufac­
tured goods (Pardo 1996).
Colombia has a preferential trade agreement with Mexico within 
the framework of the agreement between the two and Venezuela— also 
known as the G-3— that took effect in January 1995. Colombia has also 
negotiated preferential tariffs with the Mercosur countries, that is 
Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay. An agreement with Chile, 
which took effect in January 1994, reduced tariffs to zero for over 70% 
of the tariff items by 1997. The country also has agreements with the 
Caribbean Community and Common Market and with the countries of 
the Central American Common Market.
Colombian exports are granted tariff preferences in the United 
States and in Europe under several programs, which range from the 
Generalized System of Preferences to special programs that seek to 
encourage export diversification in countries in which illegal drug traf­
fic originates.
Export Promotion Policies
Colombia’s export promotion policy originates in Decree 444 of the 
1967 reform aimed at designing a comprehensive strategy based on the 
following instruments: Proexpo, the country’s export promotion agency 
and an instrument that grants a tax credit to exporters, the Certificado 
de Abono Tributario (CAT). At the same time the Plan Vallejo, a scheme 
allowing firms to be exempted from duties on imported inputs that had 
been in operation since 1961, was expanded.4 These reforms made the 
country a forerunner in export promotion.
The main purpose of Proexpo was to provide firms with support for 
marketing abroad and with export credit, and was very effective. 
Therefore, it became a model for other Latin American and Caribbean 
countries that set up trade promotion organizations (TPOs). For 
instance, ProChile— the Chilean TPO— was designed using Proexpo as 
a benchmark.
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The changes in trade policy carried out during the early 1990s also 
included reforms directly related to export promotion, such as the estab­
lishment of a ministry in charge of trade, the Ministerio de Comercio 
Exterior. At that moment, Proexpo was replaced by two different agen­
cies: BANCOLDEX, the foreign trade bank, and Proexport, responsible 
for trade promotion. While the original law stated that the Ministerio de 
Comercio Exterior would be in charge of customs, this was not put in 
practice and operating customs became in fact the responsibility of the 
Finance Ministry, the Secretaría de Hacienda.5
Proexport was set up as a trust fund to allow a greater flexibility 
and autonomy than the standard public-sector agency. Proexport’s pro­
grams provide exporters with support for marketing abroad under a 
cost-sharing arrangement. Most of these programs are based on the 
Unidades Exportadoras, small groups of entrepreneurs that export simi­
lar goods. In 1996, 100 Unidades Exportadoras were in operation, coor­
dinating the export activity of 556 firms (OMC 1997b). Proexport’s 
1999 budget is approximately US$26 million, of which US$10 million 
will be used for trade promotion activities and US$13 million to cover 
operating expenses.6
BANCOLDEX provides export credit for domestic exporters and 
loans for importers of Colombian goods abroad. The trade bank pro­
vides loans at rates that are no longer subsidized. The bank is linked to 
the Ministerio de Comercio Exterior. It operates as a second-tier finan­
cial institution that channels its funds through commercial banks, and 
has recently set up an office to ensure that small and medium-size 
exporters have access to its loans (Ochoa 1998).
The export bank provides financing in pesos and in dollars for pre- 
and postshipment working capital, and for investment and industrial 
restructuring. Almost 80% of the loans provided by the bank in 1996 
went to manufacturing firms, mainly from the textile and food-process­
ing industries (Garay et al. 1998). In 1998, BANCOLDEX provided 
loans for a total of US$889 million to 529 large firms, US$146 million 
to 581 small and medium-sized firms, and US$59 million to 114 very 
small firms. Firms exporting nontraditional goods received 95% of 
these funds.7
The CAT set up by the 1967 reform was replaced by the Certificado 
de Reembolso Tributario (CERT) with the goal of increasing its effec­
tiveness. The CERT, in operation since 1984, allows exporters of non­
traditional goods a tax credit equivalent to a given percentage of the 
FOB value of the exported goods.8 The purpose of this scheme is to 
reimburse an equivalent of the amount paid by exporters on tariffs and
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domestic indirect taxes. It is also aimed at offsetting the added costs 
entrepreneurs face when exporting from Colombia, such as those for 
infrastructure.
Exporters using the CERT can get a tax credit of 2.25%, 3.6%, or 
4.5% of the FOB value, depending on the product and the country being 
exported to. In 1995, 2,577 tariff items could benefit from this instru­
ment. The funds used for the CERT in 1996 were estimated at US$93 
million. It was used by around 30% of the country’s exports between 
1992 and 1994. Banana and flower exports were the two main products 
that used the CERT over that period (OMC 1997b). The percentages of 
the FOB value refunded as a tax credit and the criteria used for applying 
the different levels have varied throughout the years.
The Plan V allejo (a lso  known as S istem as E specia les de 
Importación-Exportación, or SIEX), allows companies exemption from 
part or all taxes on inputs, equipment, and spare parts used to manufac­
ture exports or goods to be used in manufacturing exports. In the case of 
equipment and spare parts 70% of output has to be for export. For raw 
materials all of the output has to be exported.
Exports using this instrument accounted for 38.5% of total exports 
in 1995. Coal and agricultural goods were the main products benefiting 
from this scheme between 1993 and 1996. The share o f nontraditional 
exports that used the Plan Vallejo was 58% between 1991 and 1995 
(Garay et al. 1998).
Although they were established to offset the taxes paid by exports, 
the CERT and the Plan Vallejo have a subsidy component. Therefore 
they will have to be modified or phased out— for nonagricultural prod­
ucts— at the latest by 2003 to fulfill the country’s commitments to the 
Uruguay Round Agreements.
Phasing out or elim inating the CERT and the Plan Vallejo w ill 
undoubtedly have negative consequences for export performance in the 
short run. The evidence presented above demonstrates that a significant 
share o f exports uses these instruments. The research in successful 
export firms confirms this evidence (see below).
However, these schemes do not appear to contribute to an increase 
of export diversification at present: the funds allocated through these 
instruments are very concentrated on a few products. Moreover, there 
does not seem to have been an important change in the main products 
exported through the Plan Vallejo between 1985 and 1995 (Garay et al. 
1998).
The subsidy component o f Colom bia’s export promotion instru­
ments led the United States to investigate the country’s exports in the
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early 1980s. These investigations were suspended after the two coun­
tries resolved that Colombian exports going to the United States would 
not benefit from the CERT, from export loans at preferential rates, or 
from the Plan Vallejo (Garay et al. 1998).
At present, the Pastrana administration has announced that increas­
ing exports (specifically manufactured exports) will be the uppermost 
priority for the government. With that goal in mind, it has been decided 
to reorganize Proexport by focusing most o f its services on firms that 
are highly committed to exporting. Meanwhile, Proexport will continue 
providing information and trade fair support to a larger number of 
firms. At the same time, the trade promotion organization has been 
structured in units according to sectors (agricultural, manufacturing, 
clothing, and service industries).9
The government has also announced the elimination of the CERT 
for nonagricultural products, with the goal of complying with the coun­
try’s com m itm ents with the Uruguay Round A greem ents (D A N E  
1998b). The funds presently used for the CERT for nonagricultural 
products will go to productivity enhancement programs that will be 
channeled through a special fund set up for that purpose, the Fondo de 
Productividad y Competitividad. The Plan Vallejo will be maintained 
for inputs and will therefore be phased out for equipment.10
At the same time, the Pastrana administration has presented a new 
program for increasing exports o f goods with higher value added 
(Consejo Superior de Comercio Exterior 1998). This program includes 
numerous measures aimed at increasing productivity and decreasing 
export obstacles. It calls for an improved coordination among the differ­
ent government agencies responsible for programs in the fields that 
have the potential for a strong impact on productivity. The main fields 
are innovation and technology, education and training, and assistance 
for small and m edium -size export firms. The program also seeks to 
favor regional export strategies and to encourage foreign investment in 
high-value-added industries.
Firms' Export Behavior
The findings o f research in export firms in Colombia are presented 
here. The issues addressed were the following. Which are the main fac­
tors that lead firms to export? Is there a learning process when compa­
nies export? If there is such a learning process, does it only take place 
in matters directly related to the export activity or does it have a larger
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scope? Are the export promotion instruments useful or not? Which are 
the main export obstacles? What is the influence o f PTAs on compa­
n ies’ export opportunities? These issues were selected because of their 
importance for designing and assessing export promotion policies.
The twenty-one firms included in the study belong to the printing, 
leather products (mainly luggage and leather footwear), textiles, cloth­
ing, and food processing industries.11 These industries were picked 
because they were among the top exporters o f manufactured products 
with relatively high levels of value added.12 One other firm, a software 
producer, was included in the survey because it is a growing, although 
small, export business in Latin America. Most of the companies are 
large by Latin American standards, at least in terms of the number of 
employees. Two of the firms were located in Cali, seven in Medellin, 
and the rest in Bogotá.
The interviews with executives of export firms were supplemented 
by others with representatives of trade associations. Government offi­
cials also provided information. The research in the Colombian firms 
was done at the end of 1995.
M ain  Factors In fluencing  F irm s' Export Decisions
Companies decide to start exporting because it allows them to manufac­
ture on a larger scale. Secondly, existing excess capacity can be used 
that could not otherwise be absorbed by the domestic market, given the 
firm ’s share in it. These two reasons may appear closely related, but 
they are different in that making better use o f installed capacity is not 
the same thing as increasing the scale of the plant to take better advan­
tage of long-run economies of scale.
The third reason that compels a company to export is the need to 
achieve a scale that allows it to preserve market share in the domestic 
market. This factor is related to the first two motives. However, there is 
a difference in that the company has to invest in upgrading its technolo­
gy to protect its share of the domestic market from growing competi­
tion, particularly from imports. These new technologies often entail a 
volum e o f manufacturing output larger than the firm ’s share in the 
domestic market.
For instance, one of the clothing firms in the study in Medellin had 
to upgrade its technology so as to manufacture higher quality products 
to preserve its share of the domestic market. The technology upgrade in 
turn implied a larger scale of production, which therefore led the firm to 
try to export.
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Hence there is a link between exporting and economies of scale. To 
improve their ability to face import competition, firms shift their pro­
duction function. Doing so forces entrepreneurs to look for larger mar­
kets, and thus to export. This demonstrates that in the case of relatively 
small economies, exporting allows firms to achieve economies of scale 
that could not be possible when manufacturing only for the domestic 
market.
The proportion of exports when compared with the companies’ total 
output was widely scattered. This was true irrespective of the industry. 
However, there is a threshold under which most firms do not export, 
owing to the fixed costs of exporting. The fixed costs result from more 
stringent quality controls, additional administration, transportation and 
marketing expenses, and the need to conform with the formal steps 
required for exporting.
Most firms export directly without going through traders. This was 
seen in the case of printing companies, since the highly precise product 
specifications require a close coordination between the firm and the 
client. Nevertheless, the absence o f traders is more surprising in the 
other industries. One explanation is that executives o f export firms 
believe that traders eat up the profit margins. If traders cannot cut their 
take, products becom e too expensive for export markets because 
Colombian industries do not manufacture these goods at low enough 
prices. Therefore, once the initial links to export markets are estab­
lished, traders can be bypassed. At the same time, traders have also 
moved their activity to regions where the cost of producing manufac­
tured goods is much lower, such as in Asia.
All the companies sell the same products in the domestic and export 
markets. Trade liberalization has eliminated the market segmentation 
that allowed firms to sell completely different products in these two 
markets, sending the better quality products abroad. Now, in most com­
panies different production lines for the two markets are not found.
Nevertheless, the product mix for export tends to be different from 
that aimed at the domestic market. Larger companies, which tend to 
have a greater variety of products, export a product mix that is more 
expensive than the one sold at home. This choice makes sense given the 
higher transportation costs for exports than for products made for the 
domestic market. For instance, brochures— a relatively lighter product 
than books— represent a higher proportion o f printing com panies’ 
exports than their production for the domestic market. Similarly, the 
clothing firms export goods that are the same as the ones sold domesti­
cally, but they tend to have a higher proportion o f higher range prod­
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ucts. One o f these com panies, which sells expensive suits for men, 
manufactures all its products on the same production lines, but uses 
expensive imported fabrics for export products.
The smaller companies export without a section set up exclusively 
for that purpose, and export negotiations are the responsibility of the 
firms’ owners. As companies get larger, they start having nonexclusive 
agents abroad. The next step, as the size of the firm increases and/or 
exports grow, is to establish an export section. The largest firms have 
their own offices abroad. This progression results from a greater ability 
to cover administrative costs as the size o f the firm increases. It also 
shows the need for agents closer to foreign clients as exports grow.
Learning by E xporting
Learning to export. Executives from a printing firm begin to export by 
going to trade fairs abroad. In a few cases, a company starts to export 
when a foreign client contacts it for that purpose. This first export expe­
rience often prompts the com pany’s corporate managers to get more 
information about the export formalities and the available export assis­
tance. In general, it is relatively easy for Colombian printing firms to 
export due to the printing industry’s good reputation established by 
large companies such as Carvajal.
Leather products firms start exporting through business contacts 
made in the industry’s trade fair in Bogotá. One of the industry’s entre­
preneurial associations asked Proexport, the Colombian TPO, to under­
write a trade fair in Bogotá instead of providing financing for compa­
nies to go to trade fairs abroad. The Bogotá trade fair has been very 
successful. A majority of the footwear and luggage firms included in the 
study started exporting through contacts made during these events. 
After a few initial export experiences company executives start going to 
trade fairs abroad, also with partial financial support from Proexport.
The interviews show that obtaining information about rules and 
regulations in faraway export markets can be difficult. For example, one 
of the food-processing companies had difficulties at first when finding 
out the requirements for U .S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
approval. Provision of such information is important for firms that want 
to export.
In contrast, exporting to neighboring markets in Latin America does 
not require much information about standards, since they are quite simi­
lar. Sending goods to the regional markets, such as Venezuela or other
126 Regaining the Upper Hand in Export Promotion
countries of the Comunidad Andina, requires fewer efforts than export­
ing to other regions. For the regional markets, a key element that can be 
more difficult than gathering information is organizing the logistics to 
allow goods to reach their final destination. This is particularly impor­
tant in the export of perishable goods.
Learning fro m  exporting. The executives interviewed in the study said 
that exporting provides them with learning opportunities. A primary 
opportunity is in trade fairs, where products can be compared with the 
company’s products and where main trends in an industry are estab­
lished. The fairs also provide an occasion for finding out about new 
inputs and contacting suppliers. At the same time, a firm’s executives 
can identify their main competitors and establish a sort of benchmark­
ing.
The relationship with the clients from abroad also allows firms to 
get on a steeper learning curve. Some of the clients send consultants to 
assist the exporting firm, thereby allowing it to improve its production 
practices and to upgrade more rapidly— not to mention establishing 
links with an updated consultant network.
For exam ple, one o f the manufacturers interview ed in Bogotá  
became a supplier of m en’s leather footwear for JCPenney and Wal- 
Mart. In that process, the U .S. com panies provided the standards 
required for the products’ acceptability. This made the firm s’ techni­
cians pay attention to many details of which they had been unaware. As 
a result, the company was able not only to be a successful exporter, but 
also improve the quality of its products for other clients, domestic as 
well as foreign.
Several of the other corporate managers have had similar experi­
ences. Exporting allows them to learn better production practices so as 
to comply with international standards; this in turn enables them to 
increase their market share in the domestic market.
Exporting is particularly useful for learning about quality standards 
and quality control practices, since export markets are often more 
demanding. The executives interviewed also believe that selling abroad 
has enabled them to streamline their companies to better meet dead­
lines.
One of the few company executives who said that exporting has not 
provided him with learning opportunities attributed this to the fact that 
he began making footwear a fter  visiting the plants of leading manufac­
turers in the United States, such as Timberland. He has also hired an 
American consultant to assist him in setting up the firm.
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The manager of one of the footwear trade associations believes that 
the export firms in his industry are those that are in the best position to 
protect themselves from competing imports due to lessons learned in 
international markets.
H ow ever, there is a d ifference betw een the learning process  
observed in Colombian firms and that in the Chilean and the Mexican 
companies in the project. Chilean firms (and even more so Mexican  
ones) rapidly introduce the changes in all their production lines, but the 
same is not true for all Colombian firms. For example, one Colombian 
food-processing firm manufactures candies for the United States fo l­
lowing FDA standards, while it continues selling candies with FDA-for- 
bidden additives in Colombia and other Latin American countries.
Colombian firm executives often have an attitude different from 
that observed in the other two countries, particularly Mexico. The cor­
porate managers of exporting Mexican manufacturing firms see their 
dom estic market and the U .S . market as one single market. In this 
sense, the learning process from exporting is not as strong in Colombia 
as it is in Chile and Mexico.
The main explanations for the lower intensity of the export learning 
process in Colombian firms in contrast to that in Chilean and Mexican 
ones are the following. First, learning is stimulated by competition and 
exposure to demanding international standards. Import competition in 
Colombia is less intense than in the other two countries.
Second, Colombian entrepreneurs, who are among the most dynam­
ic entrepreneurs interviewed during the investigation, spend a consider­
able amount of time and energy trying to overcome the numerous obsta­
cles they face when trying to manufacture and export. Therefore, they 
have less time and energy to focus on exploiting all the potential learn­
ing opportunities derived from exporting.
Third, learning to manufacture goods that can compete in world 
markets requires that companies have easy and expeditious access to 
imported inputs. This condition is not always fulfilled in Colombia.
Export Prom otion Policies: U sefulness fo r  E xport Firms
One of the goals of the research was to evaluate the export promotion 
instruments from the perspective of firms. Companies’ executives were 
asked if  they benefited from policy instruments when exporting. This 
was done without mentioning the specific instruments so that the inter­
view would reveal whether the instruments were known or not.
The interviews showed that Colombia has a quite efficient export
128 Regaining the Upper Hand in Export Promotion
promotion system when seen from the perspective of individual compa­
nies. Eighteen of the twenty-one firms included in the survey make use 
of the export promotion instruments, which was to be expected since 
the country is a pioneer in this field.
The export financing provided by the Banco de Comercio Exterior 
de Colombia (BANCOLDEX) is the most frequently used export pro­
motion instrument. Companies often have d ifficu lties in obtaining 
export credit from other financial institutions because borrowers have 
assets that cannot be seized in case of default. That credit is available is 
useful for export firms, and in fact Colombian companies have better 
access to export financing than those in most other Latin American  
countries.
In addition to its availability, the financing provided by B A N ­
COLDEX has two advantages. First o f all, the interest rates (though no 
longer subsidized) are generally lower than those offered on the domes­
tic market. At the same time, the loans are available for longer periods 
than commercial bank loans.
The largest com panies included in the study are not using  
BANCOLDEX’s export financing as intensively as in the past because 
they can get comparable financing elsewhere. The smaller firms, which 
have difficulty in gaining access to financing in general— and to export 
financing in particular— do use the institution’s loans frequently. In 
fact, one reason that a few o f the firms included in the study began to 
export was precisely to get export financing.
For example, a visit to the plant of one of the Bogotá garment firms 
in the study revealed an impressive set of new, up-to-date equipment for 
dyeing fabric. The purchase of this equipment had been heavily subsi­
dized by export financing, during the last period o f intensive export 
subsidies, and having such equipment allowed the company a preferred- 
supplier certificate from Reebok. This in turn permitted the firm to 
attract other foreign buyers, thus contributing to an increase in exports.
The second most important export promotion instrument for the 
companies covered by the study was the Plan Vallejo. Most corporate 
managers said that it would be very difficult to export without the assis­
tance provided by this scheme. However, this incentive is not compati­
ble with the new rules of the Uruguay Round and will have to be modi­
fied.
CERT, the tax credit scheme, is the third most important export pro­
motion instrument mentioned by the executives interviewed. However, 
corporate managers often complain about the reduction in the tax credit 
percentage and, above all, about the frequent changes in the amount to
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be credited. The fluctuations make it difficult for executives to estimate 
the returns they will get from exporting. In any event, this instrument 
must also be phased out in the coming years— for nonagricultural prod­
ucts— to allow the country to com ply with its com m itm ents in the 
Uruguay Round.
Firm executives interviewed believe that Proexport provides useful 
export assistance. The TPO’s support for trade fair participation, both in 
organizing trade fairs in the country itse lf  and in providing partial 
financing for participation in trade fairs abroad is very useful. Some of 
the firms included in the study were participating in the program of 
Unidades Exportadoras aimed at organizing export firms by industry.
While some of the executives interviewed stated that the assistance 
provided by Proexport’s offices abroad was poor, most of those inter­
viewed believe that it is useful. For instance, several executives avoid 
having to finance offices abroad by using Proexport’s facilities.
Firm managers express a pervasive nostalgia for the period when 
Colombia had promotion instruments that allowed companies to benefit 
substantially from exporting. In those years, the 1970s and 1980s, 
export subsidies through tax credits were significant— and at the same 
time rates for export financing were subsidized.
Moreover, the fact that these export subsidy programs were not 
designed from the start as short-lived temporary support to firms in 
their initial export push made entrepreneurs believe that the programs 
should be permanent.
A dvantages fo r  and Obstacles to Exporting
Companies’ exporting capability is strongly influenced by the advan­
tages and obstacles they meet in their economic environment. This sec­
tion will describe the main obstacles faced by Colombian firms when 
they export, as well as the chief advantages. Last, the obstacles that are 
most directly related to policy will be discussed.
A first obstacle faced by the firms included in the study is specific 
to their industry. Printing firm executives complain about the poor qual­
ity of the inputs available on the domestic market, but, at the same time, 
they have considerable difficulties in importing inputs due to problems 
in Colombia’s customs. The difficulties in getting access to good-quali- 
ty inputs restrain the com panies’ exports. In comparison, competing 
firms in other countries, such as Chilean printing firms, have easy, inex­
pensive, and prompt access to high-quality imported inputs.
The firms that use leather as an input also face serious problems
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because o f the widespread violence in the Colombian countryside. 
Guerrilla, paramilitary, and drug dealer activities have led to a sharp 
decrease in cattle breeding. This has cut the domestic supply of leather. 
M eanwhile, the problems with customs make imported inputs very 
costly.
By contrast, one of the advantages accruing to the food-processing 
firms covered by the project is the availability of inexpensive and good- 
quality sugar in the domestic market. Likewise, printing firm executives 
believe that the excellent reputation of the Colombian printing industry 
is very helpful when they look for new clients abroad.
At the same time, other obstacles are not industry specific and are 
faced by a number of firms. First, the general climate o f uncertainty 
pervasive in Colombia in recent years has had a negative impact on 
investment decisions. Second, the appreciation of the peso during the 
1990s adversely affected the export performance o f the firms in the 
survey.
Moreover, shipping to export markets is difficult due to the low fre­
quency of shipments and high cost, both caused in part by a poor trans­
portation infrastructure. There are yet the difficulties for importing, 
which may becom e less relevant if  the barriers to legal imports are 
reduced.
Another obstacle is smuggling, which is estimated to be as high as 
1% of GDP (DANE 1999a). Smuggling was supposed to decrease as the 
country cut tariffs and liberalized trade in the early 1990s, yet it has 
grown substantially.
The firms most directly hurt by smuggling are those with products 
that compete with the smuggled goods. The fact that the firms lose mar­
ket share to smuggled goods weakens them in the domestic market and 
therefore impairs their ability to export. Even though smuggling does 
not introduce goods that compete with all those of the firms included in 
the project, it hurts all the companies. It is more costly for firms to work 
in the formal market; those companies that operate in the informal 
economy pay no taxes.
Inadequate infrastructure is a very significant obstacle for export 
firms: the poor state of ports, airport facilities, and roads, and the prob­
lems with energy supply, are extremely costly for companies. This is 
one barrier that corporate managers mention repeatedly. In fact, a visi­
tor to the industrial neighborhoods can observe a striking contrast 
between the evident investment inside manufacturing plants and the 
deplorable state o f the roads that lead to them. This is more so the case 
in Bogotá than in Medellin.
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Of course, the worst obstacle to exporting is the general violence in 
the country. The first cost of the violence is the high expense of ensur­
ing security both inside plants and when transporting goods and 
employees to and from production facilities. Medellin, for example, is 
still recovering from the war waged by the drug lord Pablo Escobar 
against extradition, which caused widespread bombings and killings in 
the city. There was evidence of the damage to infrastructure, as well as 
to lives during most of the interviews. Furthermore, the high probability 
of export shipments’ being highjacked on their way to a port is pushing 
some companies to move their plants to coastal locations— or to neigh­
boring countries.
Companies face substantial costs in certifying that drugs are not 
included in their shipments, to avoid ruining their reputation abroad. In 
line with the drug problem, Colombian firms also face higher costs than 
other companies in the region because Colombian firms’ goods have to 
undergo thorough inspections when they get to the U nited States. 
Naturally, clients abroad are often reluctant to import from Colombia 
because of the risk of receiving shipments containing drugs (if this hap­
pens, the whole shipment could be seized by the authorities).
The climate of violence scares foreign clients away. They are often 
disinclined to v isit the plants, even though the v isits are generally 
required if  a firm is to be certified as a supplier to large companies 
abroad. As well, corporate managers have difficulties in hiring consult­
ants from abroad. One food-processing firm that deals in dairy products 
found it increasingly hard to convince Swiss consultants to assist in 
upgrading the quality of the products.
Nevertheless, executives interviewed believe that their firms also 
have advantages in their own environment. The first advantage, and one 
mentioned by every executive, is the country’s location: Colombia is 
close to both the United States and Latin American markets. An entre­
preneur from Medellin pointed out that his plant is four hours away by 
plane from the East Coast of the United States, closer than some firms 
in that very country, and the geographical proximity to Venezuela is 
also considered a strong advantage.
Good-quality human capital— both entrepreneurial capability and 
availability of skilled workers— is another advantage that corporate 
managers believe to be very important. Every executive interviewed in 
Medellin mentioned this, which is quite in contrast to other countries in 
Latin America where entrepreneurs often complain about their employ­
ees’ low productivity.
Corporate managers believe that the system of efficient export pro­
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motion institutions is a major advantage. In fact, most firm executives 
feel that the only government institutions they have collaborative rela­
tionships with are precisely these TPOs.
Entrepreneurs also feel that the red tape involved in exporting is 
much greater than necessary. They believe that the frequent changes in 
export promotion policy (e.g., percentages applied to the CERT and 
changes in other export rules) make it very difficult to plan long-term 
investment in export activities. The same is true for the irregularity in 
the time taken by the government to give out tax credit certificates and 
refunds. A change in the delay of from 30 to 180 days can dramatically 
increase the financial cost for a firm.
Furthermore, in contrast to their positive impression of export pro­
motion institutions, executives feel that the other government agencies 
do all they can to hinder productivity and export growth.
The most significant export barrier put up by the government is 
customs: getting inputs through customs is a painful ordeal that can take 
anywhere from two weeks to forty days. Some firms pay the cost of 
transporting their goods by air only to find that it takes the goods twen­
ty days to clear customs. The practice of inspecting a high percentage of 
the shipments com ing into the country is one cause for delay. The 
unpredictable delays, combined with theft from the goods in customs, 
and the frequent changes in the rules and requirements by custom offi­
cials, increase the cost o f importing inputs. Thus companies have to 
carry higher inventories, which requires a larger amount o f working 
capital.
For instance, the CEO of very large printing company in Bogotá 
explained that in the early 1990s it was possible to import a spare part 
that he needed urgently and then to complete the paperwork required to 
do so. At the time of the interviews, the paperwork had to be completed 
before the part was allowed into the country. This kind of red tape, com­
bined with the delay in getting the part out o f customs, forces him to 
keep several parts in stock and therefore increases his costs.
The difficulties in getting goods through customs are sometimes 
considered the result of lobbies pressuring the government to slow the 
import of competing goods. For instance, delays in importing fabric and 
the use of reference prices for customs valuation purposes for textile 
imports are widely attributed to pressure by textile manufacturers.
Entrepreneurs believe that the difficulties for importing are a signif­
icant source of cost increases. They also find the difficulties irritating in 
the extreme, considering that the country is flooded with smuggled
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goods. And, of course, the difficulty in getting goods through customs 
encourages smuggling.
The Influence o f  the Preferential Trade Agreem ents  
on F irm s' Business O pportunities
Colom bia’s membership in the PTA with the Andean countries, the 
Comunidad Andina (formerly the Grupo Andino), has allowed the 
nation’s companies to see the other countries of this customs union as 
an extension of the companies’ domestic market. This is particularly so 
for Ecuador and Venezuela.
Half of the firms included in the study cited Venezuela as one of the 
main export markets. In effect, the trade agreement signed with that 
country in December 1991 has had the strongest influence on these 
companies’ export opportunities.
The impact of the trade agreement among Colombia, Mexico, and 
Venezuela (the G-3) on business opportunities has not been significant 
because exports to M exico plummeted after the 1994 Mexican peso 
devaluation. The interviews showed that Mexico had been an important 
market for the Colombian manufacturing firms before the devaluation, 
but that was due to some extent to the appreciation o f the M exican  
peso.
The entrepreneurs interviewed for the project found it easier to 
begin exporting to neighboring countries and then to move on to more 
demanding markets. Therefore, the regional PTAs provide an opportu­
nity for firms to begin developing their export capability.
C onclusions
Colombia has had exemplary export promotion policies for decades. 
The policies it used to assist export firms were very effective over a 
long period given import substitution development strategy, needs of 
export companies, and former multilateral trade rules applicable to 
developing countries.
The state of affairs at the end of the 1990s is radically different. The 
country is no longer follow ing an import substitution development 
strategy. The growing complexity of the challenges faced by firms in 
export markets implies the need to bring up to date the policies required 
for export assistance. M oreover, C olom bia’s com m itm ents to the
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Uruguay Round Agreements entail phasing out export subsidies for 
non-agricultural goods.
In these circumstances, the need remains for the country to have 
export promotion policies that allow it to increase and diversify nontra­
ditional exports. This would enable it to become less vulnerable to the 
fluctuations in the price of oil and of coffee.
At the same time, a growing number of Colombian manufacturing 
firms need to export in order to have the scale and the technologies to 
maintain market share in the domestic market. Hence, the domestic and 
export markets complement each other by allowing companies to make 
better use o f their installed capacity (for some companies) or to shift to 
a more efficient scale (for others). Moreover, the project’s findings 
show that exporting provides firms with important learning opportuni­
ties and that these could be even greater if  obstacles to importing and 
exporting were reduced. Effective export promotion policies would also 
allow companies to have a higher productivity and to get on steeper 
learning curves.
Up to now, the CERT and the SIEX/Plan Vallejo have been the 
instruments used by exporters to offset or to be exempted from the taxes 
paid when importing inputs used for exports. The CERT has the advan­
tage that the payments are easy to calculate. The SIEX/Plan Vallejo is 
also relatively simple to use. However, the payments made to exporters 
under these schemes may have a subsidy component because the pay­
ments do not correspond strictly to the amount of taxes paid on import­
ed inputs. Therefore, they w ill have to be m odified to com ply with 
Colombia’s commitments with the Uruguay Round Agreements.
At the same tim e, the evidence discussed above shows that the 
CERT and the Plan Vallejo have outlived their effectiveness since they 
are no longer contributing to increasing and diversifying exports.
The transformation of the CERT and the SIEX/Plan Vallejo to com­
ply with the new multilateral trade rules provides a good opportunity 
for Colombia to set up a new coherent export promotion strategy that 
w ill be functional for facing the challenges of exporting in the years 
ahead.
Colombia has already taken a step in the right direction by cutting 
tariffs, since these are the main source of an antiexport bias. The best 
way of encouraging exports is to decrease the antiexport bias instead of 
subsidizing exporters to offset it.
In addition to reducing this bias by cutting tariffs, exporting must 
be facilitated by policies that allow export firms to have access to com­
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petitively priced inputs and to avoid paying taxes twice, that is, both in 
Colombia and in the country exports go to.
First, Colombia must make sure that it has a streamlined drawback 
scheme that allows export firms to promptly obtain refunds for the 
duties paid when importing inputs to manufacture export goods. An 
efficient drawback system  has not been important up to now, since 
firms could use the CERT and the Plan Vallejo. N onetheless, it w ill 
become essential as these schemes are modified or phased out for non­
agricultural exports.
Second, com panies should also have access to a system  that 
exempts them from paying duties on inputs imported to manufacture 
exports. The difference between this instrument and the drawback is 
that the first one allows export firms to suspend payment of taxes on 
imported inputs, whereas the drawback implies a refund. The drawback 
scheme is customarily used by occasional exporters. Companies that 
export continually prefer exemption from taxes on imported inputs 
because it decreases the need for working capital. If the goal is to 
encourage firms to export regularly, they should be able to use a duty 
exemption system that is efficient and easy to use. The Plan Vallejo for 
inputs presently in use is a good proxy for such a system, though care 
must be taken so that it is not taken for an export subsidy.
Both instruments are aimed at avoiding double taxation and at pro­
viding a free-trade regime. The instruments are not properly export pro­
motion instruments, but they are key policy schem es for a country 
wanting to encourage nontraditional exports.
The formalities required to benefit from these instruments should 
be as simple as possible to keep red tape from being an export obstacle. 
Efficient drawback and duty exemption schemes that are streamlined, 
operate quickly, and are easily accessible to most firms provide the best 
foundation for policies seeking to facilitate exporting.
The time taken by government agencies to grant authorization to 
use export promotion schemes should be limited to a few weeks. There 
should be an understanding that if no additional information is request­
ed and no objection is presented within a short time— say two weeks—  
the authorization for using the instrument will be automatically granted. 
The public sector’s experience in managing such schemes as the Plan 
Vallejo and the CERT indicates that the sector should be able to acquire 
the ability to administer the new instruments.
It is important that the government make efforts to set up the new 
instruments as soon as possible. The data available on exports using the
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CERT, the SIEX/Plan Vallejo, and the interviews with corporate man­
agers demonstrate that exporters are heavily dependent on these two 
schemes. This implies that the instruments replacing them should be in 
place as soon as possible.
One possible option is to initially establish the duty exemption sys­
tem for firms that have a long-standing export record and then progres­
sively extend it to other firms. A good example is the ALTEX Program 
in Mexico.
The study of successful export firms demonstrates that the export 
financing provided by BANCOLDEX has a significant impact on the 
firms. In fact, export financing is the export promotion instrument most 
frequently used by the firms included in the research. Concurrently, 
Proexport is very effective in assisting export firms by providing infor­
mation and support for trade fair participation and by creating strategies 
to export specific goods through the Unidades Exportadoras. Exporters 
can also use the agency’s offices abroad as a base during their business 
trips.
Nevertheless, the present structure of Proexport and BANCOLDEX 
must be assessed to make sure that these institutions have the potential 
to provide export firms with the support needed to export nontraditional 
goods in the years ahead. This is indispensable because the assistance 
provided to exporters by these two institutions will become decisive as 
the subsidies provided through the CERT and the SIEX/Plan Vallejo are 
eliminated. Therefore, it is important to ensure that these TPOs are as 
effective as possible in encouraging new firms to export and that more 
occasional exporters have a permanent presence in markets abroad. The 
recent measures aimed at ensuring that credit from BANCOLDEX is 
available to small and medium-sized exporters are a step in the right 
direction. The same can be said of the current changes in Proexport’s 
structure that demonstrate the government’s determination to improve 
that TPO’s performance.
Instituting efficient drawback and duty exemption schemes and 
ensuring that Proexport and BANCOLDEX are as effective as is possi­
ble should be the main goals o f a new export promotion strategy for 
Colombia, one that will allow it to increase nontraditional exports. Only 
when these tasks are accomplished should the government start consid­
ering other policies that have the potential of contributing to exporting 
new goods while being WTO compatible. At the same time, it would be 
useful to lay out new measures aimed at facilitating exporting services. 
Most of the export promotion instruments used by Colombia— and by
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the other Latin American countries— are not appropriate for encourag­
ing the export of services.
Once the government— working closely with the private sector—  
has established what the new foundations of the export promotion strat­
egy are to be, it should ensure that the policies are stable and that they 
do not constantly vary.
Entrepreneurs, whether or not they export, need a long-term hori­
zon in which to plan their investments. One of the most frequent com­
plaints expressed by corporate managers during the interviews was that 
the frequent changes in export promotion policies (such as the percent­
age o f tax rebate granted through the CERT) made it very difficult to 
make investment decisions. As a result, entrepreneurs are often reluc­
tant to invest important amounts in export projects, given that the rules 
change recurrently.
The government should make sure that the instruments described 
above are not revised to counter short-run fiscal contingencies. Such 
schemes as the drawback and duty exemption are not incentives, but 
strictly policies to avoid having exports pay taxes twice, in Colombia 
and the importing country.
In addition to policies that assist export firms, the government 
should try to decrease export obstacles as much as possible. Not even 
the most efficient export promotion system in the world nor the best 
negotiated PTA can compensate companies for the antiexport bias that 
results from the numerous obstacles they face when trying to export.
The main export obstacle in Colombia, the persistent state o f vio­
lence, is outside the powers of the authorities in charge of trade policies 
and thus beyond the reach of this chapter. But another important barrier 
to export— the poor state of the infrastructure— is partly due to the vio­
lence, which will take a long time to reduce. There are, however, other 
obstacles that can be eliminated more easily  and that are within the 
capabilities o f the M inisterio de Com ercio Exterior, the m inistry  
responsible for trade.
The chief obstacle to export within the reach of the trade ministry is 
customs, which should stop being mainly a tax-collecting entity and a 
barrier to imports competing with domestic goods. Many entrepreneurs 
believe that the practice customs has of inspecting a high proportion of 
import shipments— thus substantially increasing the delay for clearing 
goods— is in fact the result of protectionist pressures applied by domes­
tic industrial lobbies. Whether this is true of not, it would be much more 
efficient to carry out random checks and set high penalties for infrac­
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tions. Entrepreneurs also find that the cumbersome customs procedures 
are particularly galling in light of widespread smuggling.
The Pastrana administration’s export program shows that increasing 
exports, particularly nontraditional exports with higher value added, has 
a high priority. Several of the measures adopted recently (e.g., getting 
exports through customs, slashing the red tape for export formalities, 
and cutting smuggling) clearly confirm this priority and the administra­
tion’s determination to move ahead in this. At the same time, phasing 
out the CERT for nonagricultural products and limiting the use of the 
Plan Vallejo exclusively for inputs demonstrates the government’s will­
ingness to comply with the Uruguay Round Agreements. The export 
program set forth by the present administration could have an important 
positive impact on export growth if the measures it suggests are all car­
ried out and if  other policy aspects that are key to export growth are 
also guided in the proper direction. One of these is the behavior of the 
exchange rate.
Exchange rate appreciation is an issue that is beyond the reach of 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Yet, peso appreciation has an important 
impact on export performance, both in the short term through its influ­
ence on the ability of Colombian exporters to compete with goods from 
other countries (in the domestic market and abroad) and in the long 
term, since it provides a disincentive for investing in export projects.
A certain degree of appreciation is to be expected if the country is a 
successful exporter and productivity increases. Nevertheless, the extent 
of the sustained appreciation o f the Colombian peso since the early 
1990s damaged exporting. (The depreciation during 1998 has somewhat 
offset this problem.) Yet it must be stressed that it is preferable, from 
the standpoint of promoting exports, to avoid a substantial appreciation 
and at the same time to avoid sharp devaluations. The optimal policy is 
to aim for a currency that is stable over the long run and that appreci­
ates chiefly in proportion to improvements in productivity.
Colombia was a pioneer in export promotion p o lic ies in Latin 
America for many decades. The new state of affairs— a new develop­
ment strategy, the more complex challenges faced by export companies, 
and the m ultilateral trade rules arising from the Uruguay Round 
Agreements— has compelled the country’s government to design a new 
strategy for increasing nontraditional exports. Colombia is once again 
becoming a forerunner in designing the new policies that are appropri­
ate for promoting exports in light of the challenges faced by firms in the 
years ahead. From that perspective, the strategy set forth in Colombia’s 
new export plan is a good example for the Latin American governments
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that want to promote higher export growth rates that are sustainable in 
the long run.
N otes
1. I  w o u ld  lik e  to  a c k n o w le d g e  th e  c o n tr ib u tio n  o f  M s. M a g d a le n a  P a rd o  fo r  
th e  s tu d y  o n  th e  b e h a v io r  o f  e x p o r t  f irm s  an d  in  p re p a r in g  a  b a c k g ro u n d  p a p e r  th a t  
w a s  u s e d  fo r  w r itin g  th is  c h a p te r  (P a rd o  1996). S h e  is n o t  r e sp o n s ib le  fo r  th e  v ie w s  
e x p re s s e d  in  th is  c h a p te r .  T h e  in fo rm a t io n  p ro v id e d  b y  C o lo m b ia ’s M in is te r io  d e  
C o m e rc io  E x te rio r  is  a lso  g ra te fu lly  ac k n o w le d g e d .
2 . A ll  th e  in f o rm a t io n  in  th is  s e c t io n ,  u n le s s  o th e r w is e  s p e c i f ie d ,  is  f ro m  
E C L A C  (1 9 9 9 b ) a n d  (1 9 9 9 c).
3. In fo rm a tio n  p ro v id e d  b y  C o lo m b ia ’s M in is try  o f  F o re ig n  T rad e .
4 .  T h is  s e c t i o n  d o e s  n o t  d e s c r i b e  f r e e - t r a d e  z o n e s ,  s i n c e  th e y  w e r e  n o t  
in c lu d e d  in  th e  r e s e a r c h .  T h e  f i r s t  la w  a l lo w in g  f r e e - t r a d e  z o n e s  in  C o lo m b ia  is 
f ro m  1 9 5 8 , b u t  th e  r e fo rm s  o f  1991 a lso  a u th o r iz e d  p r iv a te  e n tre p re n e u rs  to  se t  u p  
su c h  z o n e s . S e v e ra l p r iv a te ly  m a n a g e d  f re e -tra d e  z o n e s  h a v e  b e e n  se t u p  in  B o g o tá , 
C a li, C a rta g e n a , an d  M e d e llin  s in c e  then .
5. T h e re fo re , c u s to m s  h a s  g iv e n  th e  h ig h e s t  p r io r i ty  to  c o lle c tin g  ta x e s . T h is  
h a s  h a d  n e g a tiv e  im p lic a tio n s  fo r  th e  p ro d u c tiv e  se c to r  (P a rd o  1996).
6 . In fo rm a tio n  p ro v id e d  b y  th e  M in is try  o f  F o re ig n  T rade .
7. In fo rm a tio n  p ro v id e d  b y  th e  M in is try  o f  F o re ig n  T rade .
8. E x p o rts  to  B o liv ia , E c u a d o r, a n d  V e n e z u e la — m e m b e rs  o f  th e  C o m u n id a d  
A n d in a — h a v e  b e e n  e x c lu d e d  f ro m  u s in g  th e  C E R T  s in c e  1993 . E x p o rts  to  P e ru  ca n  
s ti l l  b e n e f it  f ro m  th is  in s tru m e n t (G a ra y  e t  al. 1998).
9 . P re s e n ta t io n  m a d e  b y  M r. D ia z  U r ib e , D ir e c to r  o f  P ro e x p o r t ’s R e p re s e n ­
ta t io n  in  C h i le  d u r in g  th e  W o rld  C o n f e r e n c e  o f  T ra d e  P ro m o t io n  O rg a n iz a t io n s ,  
S a n tia g o , O c to b e r  1998.
10. In fo rm a tio n  p ro v id e d  b y  th e  M in is try  o f  T rad e .
11. S ee  C a rla  M a c a r io  (1 9 9 8 d )  f o r  a  d e ta i le d  d e s c r ip tio n  o f  th e  f irm s  in c lu d e d  
in  th e  s tudy , th e  c r i te r ia  f o r  se le c tin g  th e m , an d  th e  m a in  f in d in g s  o f  th e  re se a rc h .
12. In d u s tr ie s  th a t  a re  su c c e s s fu l  e x p o r te rs  m a in ly  d u e  to  an  in tr in s ic  n a tu ra l-  
re s o u rc e  c o m p a ra tiv e  a d v a n ta g e  w e re  e x c lu d e d  f ro m  th e  s tu d y . T h e  sa m e  c r i te r io n  
w a s  u se d  fo r  th e  re se a rc h  in  th e  o th e r  c o u n tr ie s .
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Conclusions and Recommendations: 
Policies for Export Growth
Carla Macario
Latin American and Caribbean countries have achieved significant 
transformations in their macroeconomic and trade policies during the 
past decade. They have set aside import substitution strategies and have 
opened up their economies. The new economic model has given a high 
priority to increasing exports.
Yet Latin A m erica’s export performance is still deficient. The 
region’s share o f world exports has decreased from 5.8% in 1983 to 
5.3% in 1997 (WTO 1998a). This demonstrates that the countries in the 
region are not taking advantage of the considerable opportunities result­
ing from the expansion o f global trade. At the same time, most o f the 
countries’ economies depend on a few export products (ECLAC 1999a). 
Moreover, the bulk o f exports are still commodities, which are highly 
sensitive to international market fluctuations. Furthermore, commodi­
ties have the additional disadvantage of prices that tend to decline rela­
tive to the prices of manufactured goods and that will continue to do so 
during the coming decades (World Bank 1999).
Latin American exports o f manufactured goods are for the most 
part countercyclical, so that they fall when demand recovers in the 
dom estic markets. The only excep tions, to a certain extent, are 
Barbados and Brazil. The other exception is M exico, which has man­
aged to have a spectacular growth of its manufactured exports (see 
Chapters 1 and 2). The majority of the other countries in the region still 
lacks the capability to sustain continuous exports of high-value-added 
goods.
However, the export promotion instruments presently used by the 
governments in the region are for the most part insufficient for acquir­
ing this capability. Most Latin American countries, therefore, will have
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to redraft their export promotion policies to ensure that they are effec­
tive in light of the challenges now faced by export firms.
The future export promotion strategies will need to be fully com­
patible with the Uruguay Round Agreements by the year 2003. The new 
rules that result from these agreements w ill have important con se­
quences for developing countries. To begin with, the rules open the way 
for improved market access and permit a strengthened dispute settle­
ment procedure, thus favoring smaller nations. Moreover, the rules will 
entail significant affects on the export policy environment, because sev­
eral of the instruments customarily used in free-trade zones need to be 
modified or eliminated.
The most important multilateral rules regarding export promotion 
polices are set forth in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures of the Final Act o f the Uruguay Round signed at Marrakesh 
(GATT 1994). This agreement defines subsidies and limits the possibili­
ty that countries have o f using export subsidies for nonagricultural 
goods. Subsidies contingent on export performance or on the use of 
domestic goods over imported ones are prohibited. At the same time, it 
allows subsidies for industrial research and precompetitive develop­
ment activity, assistance to disadvantaged regions, and support for com­
panies’ adaptation to new environmental requirements, provided that 
the assistance for environmental requirements meet a set of specifica­
tions. Developing countries are granted a special and differential treat­
ment in that the agreement does not apply to the poorest developing 
nations and that the other developing-country members have a longer 
period in which to comply with its provisions.
Therefore, nonagricultural export subsidies will have to be cut in 
the vast majority o f Latin American and Caribbean nations. Even in 
those countries (that are among the least developed nations) that can 
subsidize nonagricultural exports without breaking the WTO rules, it 
would make no sense to allocate large sums for this purpose. The new 
rules on nonagricultural export subsidies, far from hindering export 
development in the long run, will put greater pressure on governments 
to address inefficiencies at the source and to focus resources on increas­
ing productivity in the entire economy. This is the best way of develop­
ing a sustainable export capability. Hence, the key issue that must be 
addressed is what export promotion policies are relevant under the pres­
ent circumstances (Tussie and Lengyel 1998).
Nevertheless, in the region there is a wide disparity about the need 
to renovate these policies. There are some countries that will have to 
rebuild the foundations of their export promotion strategies, while some
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others already have instruments that are effective and fully compatible 
with the WTO requirements and therefore require only minor adjust­
ments to reach a larger number of firms.
This chapter lays out a wide range of policy recommendations that 
need to be adapted to the specific needs of a given country after estab­
lishing the government’s priorities.
It must be pointed out that the proposals in this chapter involve  
decisions by numerous high-ranking civil servants, not only those in 
charge o f the TPOs. N evertheless, it is necessary to stress that it is 
important that managers in charge o f TPOs realize that they must 
attempt to ensure the application of these proposals even when the pro­
posals are beyond their immediate responsibilities. TPO executives 
should discard the notion o f sim ply focusing on export promotion  
instruments while setting aside the other issues mentioned here. For 
instance, promoting exports without facilitating imports is a mercan­
tilist notion that w ill be fruitless for developing a sustainable export 
capability. TPO managers will be most successful if  they view them­
selves as trade facilitators and assume the responsibility o f promoting 
trade, facilitating imports as w ell as exports, and trying to remove 
obstacles to trade. If these managers fail to do so, their efforts to pro­
mote exports will have few chances o f being successful. Trade should 
be facilitated in general if export activity is to be encouraged.
A rgum ents for P o licies to Prom ote Exports
Do Latin American countries really need export promotion policies? 
This is the first issue that must be addressed. In fact, if  there are no 
compelling arguments to justify instruments that encourage firms to 
export it would be wrong to allocate resources for such a purpose. In 
fact, it would then be preferable not to have export promotion policies 
at all, thus contributing to streamlining policy and to allowing the use 
o f governm ent funds for programs that have higher priorities. 
Therefore, this section presents reasons for which countries should con­
template export promotion policies.
First, such policies are needed to compensate for the antiexport 
bias. This bias has been considerably reduced in the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries during the recent years, but it still is prevalent in 
many nations. The first source of the antiexport bias is the presence of 
tariffs. Even if tariffs have been cut and are low in comparison with 
those of the past decades, they are still often relatively high. Nontariff
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barriers have also been cut but are still pervasive. On top of these, firms 
that want to export often face many obstacles that lead to concentrating 
on domestic markets. This is all compounded by weak competition poli­
cies, which also contribute to making manufacturing for the domestic 
market more profitable than exporting. If the goal is to make it as prof­
itable to invest in exporting goods with high value added as it is to 
invest in manufacturing for the domestic market or in a limited range of 
natural-resource-intensive commodities, there is a need for policies that 
encourage companies to become exporters.
Second, there are positive externalities arising from the export 
activity of pioneer export companies. These positive externalities bene­
fit other firms in the country. Pioneer export companies often have to 
spend a significant amount of time and financial resources to be able to 
begin exporting. Yet, once they have managed to break into foreign  
markets, their export success immediately provides a signal to other 
firms in the same industry. Other companies often begin to export a 
given product following the example of a leading firm. Pioneer export 
firms face higher costs than latecomer companies because the pioneers 
have to make attempts in several markets before being successful. 
(They also face the risk o f failing.) In contrast, the follow ers in an 
export market incur lower costs. Hence, the investment in new export 
industries will be suboptimal if  the assistance for firms exporting new 
products or to new markets is inadequate.
Third, exporting allows firms access to economies of scale. This is 
particularly the case for companies based in medium and small-sized 
econom ies. From a theoretical p erspective, the introduction o f  
economies of scale in the trade models has substantially improved the 
consistency o f the predictions o f these models with the stylized facts 
that characterize trade nowadays (see Chapter 1). At the same time, 
economies of scale are among the chief sources of the increase of trade 
of nontraditional goods following the PTAs signed by Latin American 
countries in past years (Devlin and Ffrench-Davis 1999).
Providing com panies with assistance that enables them to start 
exporting increases their efficiency by fostering a shift of their produc­
tion function toward a larger scale. It also allows firms to acquire updat­
ed technologies. This, in turn, leads to productivity improvements and 
strengthens the companies’ positions in the face of import competition 
in the domestic market. Consequently, Latin American firms should be 
encouraged to sell on export markets in addition to their domestic mar­
ket business. The export and the domestic markets should be viewed as 
complementary. Being a successful exporter allows a company to offset
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the fluctuations of demand in the domestic market, but at the same time 
a strong standing in the domestic market enables a company to cover 
the costs incurred when it breaks into markets abroad.
Fourth, exporting allows firms to get on steeper learning curves 
than when they sell only in the domestic market. Companies are forced 
to develop the ability to face the intense competition on export markets 
and the more stringent standards o f their foreign  clien ts. S im ul­
taneously, companies have access to better information that allows them 
to accelerate upgrading.
To manufacture higher quality products, companies have to upgrade 
equipment operating on the production line and improve quality control 
practices. At the same time, closer contact with more sophisticated  
clients enables export firm managers to closely follow the trends and 
innovations in their specific market. This allows them to introduce new 
products. In other words, exporting forces companies to modernize their 
production and distribution practices.
This accelerated learning by exporting is not restricted to the firm 
that sells the product abroad. The ability to manufacture higher quality 
products is partly dependent on upgrading inputs. Therefore, the pres­
sure to upgrade also reaches the domestic suppliers to these exporting 
companies, because the domestic suppliers’ products have to progres­
sively meet higher standards. The upgrading of the export products and 
the domestic inputs used to make them has positive spillovers in the 
domestic market as improved production practices disseminate through­
out the economy. Consequently, providing assistance for firms that are 
beginning to export is a way of fostering a faster learning process and 
increasing productivity.
M easures to D ecrease the A ntiexport Bias
The first step that must be taken to decrease the antiexport bias is to tar­
get one of its main sources, that is to cut tariff rates as much as possible 
within a range that is consistent with the other priorities of economic 
policy. Reducing tariffs is essential, since a significant part of their cost 
is ultimately borne by exports (Clements and Sjaastad 1984). The tariff 
schedule must be assessed by comparing it with those that prevail in 
other nations at the time and by estimating which tariff rates would lead 
to a greater increase in productivity and exports. By contrast, using the 
past history o f tariffs as the main reference is not advisable. Next, 
measures should be taken to reduce nontariff barriers, which have
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become more binding as tariffs have been cut in Latin American coun­
tries.
At the same time, governments should take steps to reduce or elimi­
nate as much as possible the inefficiencies that pose obstacles to export 
firms (Laird 1999). The main principle that should guide this action is 
to address the source of inefficiencies instead of paying out subsidies to 
offset their consequences. The experience in most Latin American  
countries during the past decades shows that export subsidies may have 
undesirable effects because they are often regressive and tend to con­
centrate on a small number of firms, some of which are large compa­
nies, both domestic and transnational.
Moreover, entrepreneurs often end up believing that subsidization 
should be permanent and are therefore not encouraged to upgrade and 
attain the productivity levels that would allow them to survive without 
such compensation. Furthermore, export subsidies can end up being 
very costly for the public sector’s budget. From that perspective, the 
Uruguay Round Agreements have made a positive contribution by mak­
ing it easier for governments to resist pressures from industrial lobbies 
that have thrived on these subsidies in the past.
Infrastructure deficiencies, for example, have traditionally been a 
significant export obstacle that critically impairs the export capability 
of companies. Port facilities that operate poorly, deficiencies in the pro­
vision of energy, inadequate telecommunication networks, and customs 
officials who delay shipments are some o f the examples that persist in 
the region. The aggregate impact of these difficulties, the costo  p a ís , 
has up to now been partially offset with export subsidies.
The following recommendations are within the realm of the author­
ities  responsib le for trade p olicy . The recom m endations seek  to 
decrease the antiexport bias; but it must be pointed out that some of the 
measures suggested here may seem too rudimentary for Latin American 
countries that have updated their trade policy. They may also appear to 
reiterate Rhee’s seminal work in this field (Rhee 1985).
Nevertheless, there are many nations in the region that have yet to 
complete their reforms in this matter. There are countries that still have 
tariffs that are high and that vary widely for different items, significant 
nontariff barriers, costly export subsidies, and drawback systems that in 
fact are inoperative. At the same time, there are other countries that are 
very advanced in this area and that have policies that are highly effec­
tive for promoting exports, while being fully compatible with the rules 
that are to be enforced by the WTO fo llow ing the Uruguay Round 
Agreements.
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One of the steps that should be carried out by a government beginning 
to overhaul the country’s export promotion system is to make a detailed 
list o f all the formalities that are required from exporters. This would 
enable the authorities to establish which formalities make sense at the 
present time and to discard all the others.
This recommendation may seem too simple for a person not closely 
associated with export activities. It certainly is too basic for those coun­
tries that have already made considerable efforts to upgrade export 
assistance. Nevertheless, there are many nations that still demand that 
exporters conform to too many regulations. These regulations discour­
age exporters, particularly those attempting to export for the first time. 
Moreover, many of these formalities were originally set up to deal with 
short-term contingencies during the import substitution period and have 
remained in place since then.
An example of this sort of obstacle to exporting is the requirement 
for export permits from such m inistries as agriculture, health, or 
defense. In some cases, these formalities were initially established to 
restrict export of basic goods that were heavily subsidized with the goal 
of enhancing the welfare o f consumers in the domestic market. So, it 
made perfect sense to control these goods’ export. In most cases, these 
subsidies had already been phased out, but these regulations are still 
often required because of inertia and resistance by civil servants, who 
try to preserve as much discretionary power as they can.
Some Caribbean countries, for instance, require a specific sanitary 
permit and an authorization by their ministries of defense for every sin­
gle export shipment. Exporting can require up to ten different steps—  
again for each shipment— while each o f these steps involves going to 
offices in different locations and submitting copies of the forms already 
presented in another office. More recently, the bureaucracy associated 
with establishing the origin of a product to enable it to benefit from a 
PTA has become a stumbling block for exporters in those countries 
where the certificates are issued by a limited number of offices located 
exclusively in the capital.
If a government wishes to facilitate exporting, it should examine 
carefully all the export-related red tape and retain only the regulations 
that are justified under present circumstances. At the same time, care 
should be taken to ensure that the regulations retained are simple and 
expeditious. These streamlining decisions have no financial cost what­
soever; they simply require the political will to overcome the resistance
Streamlining Formalities
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of the bureaucracies in charge of the regulations. Costa Rica, for exam­
ple, has carried out important reforms in this area and has been able to 
decrease the number of export formalities thanks to the efforts o f the 
country’s TPO, the Promotora de Comercio Exterior de Costa Rica 
(Monge 1998).
Another measure is to bring together in one place all the agencies 
that deal with export formalities by setting up a one-stop facility. This 
does not imply clumping together all the different organizations that are 
involved, such as ministries of commerce or finance or the agency in 
charge o f managing customs. It simply means bringing together small 
offices of these agencies in one building to ensure that all the formali­
ties can be carried out at the same time. That way, the exporter will not 
have to face a complicated and lengthy routine to complete the official 
paperwork. At the same time, gathering into one place the different 
agencies in charge of export formalities contributes to improving com­
munication among the different government organizations and can also 
lead to further cutting export red tape.
The general guidelines that should be taken into account when 
streamlining export formalities are as follows:
• Export formalities should be sim plified  as much as possible.
• Required inform ation should be easy to obtain and t r a n s ­
parent.
• Export formalities should be completed prom ptly , and a maxi­
mum delay (e.g., two weeks) for dealing with the formalities 
must be established from the beginning.
• A u to m a tic  approval should be preferred to discretionary  
approval whenever possible, particularly for export firms that 
have established a reputation o f com plying with the require­
ments.
• All the steps should be carried out in a one-stop facility .
• And once all the formalities have been streamlined, the funda­
mental instruments should remain stable so as to minimize infor­
mation costs.
In strum en ts to A llo w  Access to C om petitive Inpu ts
An export company must have access to inputs at competitive prices 
and quality irrespective of whether they are imported or manufactured 
domestically. If this condition is not met, the company will be at a dis­
advantage with respect to its competitors in other countries.
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D ra w b a cks . A drawback system that allows exporters to receive a 
rebate on duties paid on inputs imported for manufacturing exports is a 
requisite for enabling export companies to have access to competitive 
inputs. Contrary to what is often stated, this instrument is not an export 
promotion instrument that favors exporters above firms manufacturing 
for the domestic market. It is strictly a modality to prevent exporters 
from having to pay taxes twice, in both the importing and the exporting 
countries. Therefore, it is fully compatible with the Uruguay Round 
Agreements on export subsidies. Moreover, it is a way of decreasing the 
antiexport bias.
W hile som e countries in Latin America have, in theory, a duty 
drawback mechanism, companies use them rarely because the draw­
backs tend to require complex procedures and because it is more practi­
cal to apply for export subsidies. Nevertheless, this instrument should 
become more important in the coming years as nonagricultural export 
subsidies are phased out to comply with WTO rules.
This mechanism must operate simply and promptly, with a mini­
mum of red tape. The requirements to be met in order to benefit from 
this policy instrument must be transparent and permanently established. 
At the same time, the government should be firmly committed to avoid­
ing trying to solve short-term public-sector budget problems (as has 
often been the case in the past) by diverting the resources originally 
allocated for the drawback. Care must be taken to ensure that this 
instrument is indisputably a rebate on tariffs and not an export subsidy. 
This is indispensable in guaranteeing compatibility with the Uruguay 
Round Agreements on export subsidies for nonagricultural products. It 
must be pointed out that these agreements have widened the range of 
imported inputs that can qualify for duty drawback by allowing the 
inclusion of the imported inputs that are consumed in the production of 
the export product, such as fuel.
To go further, once the drawback system is working efficiently, 
governments must set up mechanisms that allow duty rebates for indi­
rect exporters. This would allow domestic companies that supply inputs 
to export companies to get a rebate for the duties paid when importing 
goods. This kind of instrument, which has already been put in practice 
by M exico, is essential for strengthening the backward linkages of 
exporting and for increasing the effect of export growth on the rest of 
the economy.1
D uty exem ptions. While it is true that an efficient duty drawback sys­
tem is essential— since it allows companies that export occasionally to
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avoid double taxation— firms that export on a regular basis need to be 
exempted from paying duties for inputs used to manufacture exports.2 
This instrument is essential for increasing the number of companies that 
export regularly.
A duty exemption scheme allows export firms to decrease the funds 
needed for working capital in comparison with those funds needed  
when using the drawback. Therefore, it is particularly important for 
small and medium-sized businesses. The advantages of an instrument 
that allows duty exemption instead o f refund o f duties, as in a draw­
back, are particularly relevant in countries that have high inflation rates 
or during periods o f uncertainty over the exchange rate. In fact, effec­
tive duty exemption systems have strongly contributed to export growth 
in Mexico and in Asia (Rhee 1985).
Access to this program should be as automatic as possible while 
efforts are made to minimize discretionary decisions and uncertainty. 
The companies that have established a good exporting record should be 
able to fulfill the requirements swiftly. When the different duty exemp­
tion mechanisms presently in operation in Latin America are compared, 
the benefits of the system used by Mexico— which requires less paper­
work than in other countries— are clear in that a larger proportion of 
firms make use of it. The most efficient method for managing this kind 
of instrument is to streamline regulations and procedures as much as 
possible when the applications are turned in and to set very high penal­
ties for infractions discovered through random verification checks.
Duty exemption is compatible with the WTO rules, since it is aimed 
at avoiding double taxation and is not an export subsidy. Nevertheless, 
setting this system up requires that a government have a strong adminis­
trative competence: this prevents companies from using this exemption 
to avoid duties on inputs for manufacturing goods for the domestic mar­
ket.
Export Prom otion P olicies
Many TPOs in Latin America have at some time or another provided 
assistance in increasing nontraditional exports. Nevertheless, they have 
not always been very effective in supporting export companies partly 
because of inadequate funding, administrative inefficiencies, and lack 
of a clear vision of what the chief mandate was.
Consequently, several countries in the region are overhauling their 
TPOs to make them more effec tiv e  for increasing nontraditional
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exports. The need to ensure com patibility with the Uruguay Round 
Agreements has also played a role in the renewal of export promotion 
agencies. The most appropriate institutional structure for specific TPOs 
will ultimately depend on a country’s priorities and can be decided with 
the technical cooperation of the international multilateral organizations 
that work in this field, such as the International Trade Centre UNC­
TAD/WTO.
It is important to point out that export promotion activities need not 
be restricted to the public sector. On the contrary, many of them could 
be the responsibility of private-sector institutions. As a matter of fact, 
there is a trend toward growing participation by the private sector in 
export promotion activities as firms or entrepreneurial associations 
carry out tasks that were formerly the exclusive responsibility of public- 
sector agencies. This course should be strongly encouraged, since it will 
enable export assistance to be more effective if there is proper supervi­
sion. Moreover, it promotes the establishment of close links between 
TPOs and the private sector, which are essential for the success of an 
export promotion strategy. At the same time, a process o f competitive 
bidding for some of the funds allocated to export promotion may allow 
a more efficient use of the public funds earmarked for this purpose.
In addition to the growing provision of export services by private 
firms, there has been a change in the procedures of TPOs themselves, 
since they are following practices closer to those o f the private sector. 
Some export agencies, for example, have started charging for their ser­
vices and require cost sharing from the private firms, one of the motiva­
tions for this being inadequate funding and the need for access to better 
financing. Nevertheless, it also indicates what service firms are willing 
to pay for and allows a more efficient use of public funds. Moreover, it 
has the benefit o f exposing TPOs to com petition from private firms 
(Esser et al. 1995). Besides, it has led— in some cases— to activities 
being taken over by private firms as evidence is provided that there is 
demand for a specific service. The organization of trade fairs is one of 
the areas where this trend has become important.
At the same time, there is an expanding participation by the private 
sector in design o f export promotion strategies and in management of 
TPOs. For instance, a board that has a majority of private-sector repre­
sentatives manages Costa Rica’s agency, PROCOMER (Alonso 1998). 
Similarly, the government of Chile has drafted a law, yet to be approved 
by Congress, which will increase the participation of the private sector 
in the management of ProChile, the country’s TPO. In any event, the 
export assistance activities described below could be carried out both
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by public-sector TPOs, by competent private firms, or entrepreneurial 
associations.
Inform ation
The first step an entrepreneur must take when trying to begin exporting 
is the gathering of information, which includes knowledge of the for­
m alities required to export and the available export assistance pro­
grams. Next, guidance is needed concerning potential export markets, 
and tariff and nontariff barriers in those countries. Guidelines are need­
ed with respect to such product characteristics in the specific markets as 
prices, quality requirements, and distribution networks. Moreover, 
exporters need to find out what the established practices are in a given 
market to pay for export shipments. This information needs to be peri­
odically updated so that it reflects the changes that result, for example, 
from recent PTAs.
Obtaining this kind of information can be very costly in terms of 
time and financial resources for a company that is beginning to export. 
If entrepreneurs have difficulties in obtaining the information needed to 
export, they may be d iscouraged even before their first attempt. 
Moreover, the scarcity of information about export markets is regres­
sive because it has a stronger impact on small and medium-sized firms. 
(Large companies w ill find it much easier to obtain the knowledge  
needed to export.)
An indication of the importance of information on export markets is 
that the countries in Latin America that supply effective assistance in 
this field are also those that are most successful in increasing the num­
ber of export companies. Mexico, for example, has given a high priority 
to providing information on export markets through the foreign trade 
bank, BANCOM EXT, and through the Secretaría de C om ercio y 
Fomento Industrial, the ministry in charge of trade. At the same time, 
Chile provides information for export firms through ProChile and 
through the Asociación de Exportadores de Manufacturas, the entrepre­
neurial association that organizes companies exporting manufactured 
goods. Colombian firms have access to information through Proexport, 
the institution in charge of export promotion.
In contrast, the majority o f the nations in the region provide very 
poor information services to export firms. This is true for the TPOs and 
also for the entrepreneurial associations that attempt to assist in this 
field. In such countries, individual firms have to make considerable 
efforts to gather the information they need to begin exporting.
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Gathering the information needed to export can be very costly for 
individual com panies. Supplying information on export markets is 
clearly a case of provision of a public good because the use of informa­
tion by one firm does not prevent its use by another company. 
Moreover, pioneer export firms promptly provide a signal to other com­
panies about which export markets can lead to greater chances of suc­
cess. This implies that the provision o f the information needed to sell 
abroad yields important positive externalities, and that the lack of infor­
mation in this matter may result in a suboptimal investment in export­
ing. Therefore, assistance in this domain is critical irrespective o f the 
agency that provides this support; it can be a governmental TPO or a 
private-sector institution (e.g., a company that specializes in dissemi­
nating information or an entrepreneurial association). Whatever the pre­
ferred institutional arrangement is, if the goal is to increase exports, the 
provision of the information needed to export is a requisite for increas­
ing the number of export firms.
A ssistance fo r  Trade Fair Participation and M arketing  Abroad
Participating in trade fairs is highly beneficial for entrepreneurs break­
ing into export markets. Participation provides advantages that go 
beyond getting immediate contracts for the company. Trade fairs pro­
vide a unique opportunity to learn the products being demanded, the 
best practices used by the industry, the range of inputs available, and 
the access to consultant networks and many other benefits available 
even for companies that did not have a display at the fair.
Trade promotion agencies have often provided companies with  
assistance to attend fairs. N onetheless, this support can be fruitless 
when the specific trade fair is not adequate for the entrepreneurs receiv­
ing assistance. For instance, there are many trade fairs for the clothing 
industry. Some of these fairs deal exclusively with large shipments for 
department stores in the United States, and so they are often of no use 
for a great number o f Latin American firms that can only manufacture 
small lots. It is important that both entrepreneurs and TPO officials con­
sult with industry experts about the usefulness of going to any fair. This 
ensures that an entrepreneur benefits from going to an event and does 
not end up discouraged, and guarantees a useful allocation of the public 
funds assigned for this purpose.
Som e countries have tried to m axim ize the contacts betw een  
domestic and foreign firms by organizing trade fairs at home and bring­
ing buyers from abroad to a large-scale presentation o f an industry’s
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output. Colombia, for example, has done this: Proexport has financed 
the organization of trade fairs for the footwear industry in Bogotá and 
the travel expenses o f foreign buyers. The outcome of these events has 
been very positive because many entrepreneurs have gotten their first 
export contract in these circumstances.
Another option is to organize trips for groups o f executives in the 
same industry to trade fairs abroad. This allows enhancing the benefits 
of trade fair participation by stimulating communication among the 
entrepreneurs. Chile and Colombia have done this for several years with 
very good results. Moreover, these trips can be combined with techno­
logical excursions, that is with visits to plants that have scales and tech­
n o log ies that may be usefu l as benchmarks for the entrepreneurs 
(Ramos 1997).
Companies that attempt to break into export markets have to devel­
op the capability o f  marketing abroad. A ssistance by a TPO can be 
essential in this area. Yet, the importance of marketing abroad can vary 
widely from one industry to another. Marketing abroad and looking for 
new clients is less important for firms that manufacture commodities 
than for companies that manufacture differentiated goods. Companies 
exporting commodities usually have a stable and relatively small group 
of clients. By contrast, firms exporting, for example, specific food prod­
ucts need to be in permanent contact with the market to keep up with 
the rapidly changing tastes.
These differences between industries are relevant for marketing 
abroad. The support needed by these different kinds of companies is not 
the same, and civil servants working in TPOs need to be aware of this. 
The export promotion activities have to be c losely  in tune with the 
needs of the specific industries receiving assistance.
Export F inancing and Insurance
Export financing is an important component o f an export promotion 
strategy. Export companies should be able to provide their clients with 
financing terms that are similar to the ones offered by their competitors 
from other countries. If the companies are unable to do so, they have 
less chance of obtaining export orders. In fact, firms from some Latin 
American nations often fail to obtain export contracts due to their 
inability to provide clients with financing. This is particularly true for 
some industries that offer equipment in which long-term financing is a 
standard practice.
The Uruguay Round Agreements accept export credit and export
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insurance programs that are below market rates as long as they cover all 
the costs (Laird 1999). Given that interest rates in the region are often 
quite high by international standards, providing export credit at unsub­
sidized rates that are lower than the ones prevailing in the domestic 
market is still highly beneficial for export firms, since the costs are 
closer to those faced by comparable companies elsewhere.
There are some Latin American governments that provide export 
firms with either direct export financing, for example, Colombia and 
M exico, or with credit facilities for foreign clients, as is the case for 
Chile. Brazil has given high priority to providing export credit and 
guarantees (see Chapter 4 and Pedro da Motta Veiga, 1998). By con­
trast, there are other nations in the region that fail to provide export 
companies with financing facilities. Some other countries do have, pre­
sumably, an agency in charge o f export financing. H ow ever, the 
resources allocated for this purpose are insignificant and go mainly to a 
few large firms. Therefore the impact o f the export financing on export 
growth is negligible.
A lack of export financing is particularly harmful in those countries 
in which long-term loans are unavailable even for domestic transac­
tions, due to market failures in the capital market. It is obvious that if 
companies have difficulties when applying for long-term loans for busi­
ness in the country itself, they will face greater difficulties when trying 
to obtain financing for clients abroad.
Sm aller and m edium -sized firms often have lim ited  access to 
financing because o f their inability to provide adequate collateral. 
Providing smaller firms with loans that are not used directly by the 
companies, but which are deposited in the commercial bank providing 
the loan, can avoid this obstacle. Setting up this instrument decreases 
the barriers faced by smaller firms when they attempt to obtain export 
financing.
Governments should assign a high priority to establishing instru­
ments that allow exporters access to financing. It is important to point 
out that this does not imply that financing should be provided at subsi­
dized rates. Doing so would be incom patible with WTO rules, and 
would be a misallocation of government funds. What exporters need is 
access to export credit for working capital and for foreign clients at 
rates that are competitive internationally. Exporters’ main problem with 
credit is that it is hard to get: this is particularly true for small and medi­
um -sized firms. Large firms have a much wider range o f financing  
options, at home and abroad.
Export credit can be supplied through various arrangements. One
156 Conclusions
option is for the government to provide financing through a government 
export bank such as BANCOLDEX in Colombia or BANCOMEXT in 
Mexico. Another possibility is to channel resources through commercial 
banks that bid for export funds and to open lines of credit for purchasers 
abroad, as is done in C hile. Irrespective o f what is the preferred  
arrangement, which may vary from one country to the next, the key 
issue that should not be obviated is the importance o f allowing export 
companies access to export credit if increasing nontraditional exports 
has a high priority in the government’s agenda.
At the same time, efforts should be carried out to set up instruments 
that allow companies to have access to insurance for nonpayment by 
importers. An export firm needs insurance against the risk of not being 
paid for its shipments by an importing company, that is, the insurance 
against commercial risk. This is one o f the areas in which improving 
collaboration in the region would be very useful, since it could allow a 
substantial cut in the information costs needed for insuring against com­
mercial risk.
Export companies also need to be protected from the political risk 
of an importing country’s preventing payment being made, for example, 
when a nation decides to postpone paying all its commitments in for­
eign currencies. Insurance against this risk is still lacking in most coun­
tries. Some governments have considered establishing programs to 
cover this risk, but the progress is slow owing, partly, to the moral haz­
ard risks resulting from insuring mainly exports to countries known to 
be in macroeconomic turmoil.
Specific Export Prom otion Programs
If a government wishes to go further in promoting exports, it should 
contemplate carrying out the programs presented here. Nonetheless, it 
must be stressed that no single plan of action, even if  it is very effec­
tive, is able to offset failure in applying the schemes discussed above. 
The instruments recommended here should be taken into account only 
after the issues mentioned above have been satisfactorily addressed.
A first proposal deals with seeking to simplify even further the for­
mal regulations that apply to exporters. The first example is ALTEX, 
the scheme set up by the government of Mexico. This instrument allows 
companies with good reputations as exporters— regularly exporting a 
significant share o f their output or large volum es o f goods— to deal 
with highly streamlined export formalities.
Another option is to organize a program that provides small and
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medium-sized firms with assistance for carrying out the steps required 
for exporting, particularly when the firms have just started to sell 
abroad. This program is highly recommended for those countries that 
have to replace nonagricultural export subsidies by drawback and duty 
exemption to ensure compliance with the Uruguay Round Agreements. 
It is highly probable that smaller firms will face the greatest difficulties 
when they try to put together all the information needed to benefit from 
these instruments.
Together with all this, TPOs should follow  up on a new kind of 
assistance, which is to help companies to be regularly in touch with 
their export markets. There are various ways o f providing support in 
this matter. Colombian firms, for example, can rely on the offices that 
Proexport has in different countries, while Mexican companies benefit 
from assistance provided by BANCOMEXT’s trade representatives. 
Another alternative is supplying financing and technical assistance, as 
ProChile is doing, so that groups of firms belonging to the same indus­
try set up offices abroad. The ultimate goal is to encourage companies 
to have a permanent presence abroad, thus facilitating the transition 
from exporting intermittently to doing so continually. Having close  
links with the importing companies is particularly critical for firms 
exporting differentiated manufactured goods, since it enables them to 
keep up with the changes in demand.
At the same time, governments that have assigned a very high pri­
ority to increasing nontraditional exports can establish programs to fur­
ther encourage exporting, under the terms o f the de m in im is  clause of 
the Uruguay Round Agreements on subsidies and countervailing meas­
ures. This provision indicates that any countervailing duty investigation 
of a developing country (member o f WTO) w ill be ended once it is 
determined that a subsidy level is not above 2% of unit value. The same 
will happen if the volume of the subsidized imports from a developing 
country is below a threshold of 4% of the imports o f a product in the 
importing nation and, concurrently, the imports from all developing  
countries do not represent more than 9% of the imports (GATT 1994; 
Tussie 1997). Hence, it is still possible to encourage “pioneer” exports 
by firms exporting new products or to new markets.
Nonetheless, if the choice is made to establish such programs, it is 
critical that the following guidelines be taken into account:
• Programs should be aimed at firms that are exporting new goods  
or to new  m arkets . This is the type o f company that should be 
the main target o f export promotion projects, with the goal of
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encouraging companies to significantly boost their export activi­
ty. This could be extended to providing funds for assisting firms 
in setting up offices abroad to enable them to export continually, 
since this can also be thought o f as a shift in a firm ’s export 
activity.
• Financial assistance should be m oderate. This is to attract com­
panies that are truly willing to share the financial cost of the pro­
gram— because of the high chances of success— while discour­
aging those firms that want only to be subsidized.
• Assistance provided by a program to specific companies should 
be tem porary, with a termination date set at the beginning for a 
maximum period of two to three years. This is essential so that 
the assistance is genuinely  a startup support and does not 
becom e a subsidy that has to be permanently maintained to 
ensure the continuation of export activity or even a firm’s sur­
vival.
• Performance by a program should be periodically submitted to 
external evaluations. The program should be modified if there is 
a need to do so and terminated if  it is yielding poor results. The 
assessment should determine whether the program encourages 
export growth and diversification and whether this trend w ill 
prevail after the program’s assistance is completed.
• Projects should be designed and  m anaged jo in tly  by pub lic- and  
priva te-sector institutions, such as exporter trade associations or 
private com panies that have been awarded funds through an 
open bidding process. Export projects must have strong links 
with the private sector if they are to be successful.
• Programs must be fu l ly  com patib le w ith  WTO rules. If this con­
dition is not met, an exporting country may have to face com­
plaints channeled through the multilateral trade organization. 
Moreover, the country may be subject to retaliation— counter­
vailing measures, for example— from its trading partners.
If it is not possible to make sure that programs aimed at triggering pio­
neer exports conform to these guidelines, it is better to not set them up 
and thereby avoid an inefficient allocation of government funds.
Policies fo r  U pgrading P roductiv ity  o f  D om estic Firms
Governments should contemplate setting up or enhancing policies that 
foster productivity increases and upgrade export supply since such poli-
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cies have, in the long run, the highest potential for contributing to an 
improvement in a country’s ability to increase exports on a sustainable 
basis.
The importance of giving higher priority to productivity-upgrading 
programs is, to some extent, a consequence of the new WTO rules that 
entail eliminating nonagricultural export subsidies, while at the same 
time allowing some subsidies that are nonactionable. This includes sub­
sidies that are not specific and those used for industrial research and 
precompetitive development, for assistance to disadvantaged regions, 
and for adaptation to new environmental regulations (GATT 1994).
One o f the outcom es o f the Uruguay Round Agreements is that 
policies that seek to promote widespread productivity increases will 
acquire a greater importance in the formulation of export promotion 
strategies (Agosin, Gitli, and Vargas 1996; Tussie and Lengyel 1998).
Export developm ent programs recently set up by C hile and 
C olom bia dem onstrate the grow ing im portance o f productivity  
enhancement policies in government priorities. For instance, a chief 
guideline of the new export strategy designed by the government of 
Chile is to focus on adapting export products to the demand on interna­
tional markets (Casanueva 1998). In Colombia, the Pastrana administra­
tion has taken steps in the same direction. This trend will most probably 
prevail in the coming years as more countries attempt to increase their 
export growth rates and adapt export promotion instruments to the 
Uruguay Round Agreements.
The new programs reflect the growing awareness of governments 
of the importance o f increased productivity and adaptation o f export 
supply to demand in international markets. They also show a compati­
bility with a new policy environment.3
With all this in mind, trade promotion organizations are broadening 
what they offer by including comprehensive trade development services 
designed to upgrade the productivity o f domestic firms. The services 
include providing information on input sourcing and on assistance for 
adapting products, as well as support for improving product design and 
quality control (Bélisle 1998).
For instance, the government of Peru has stressed the importance of 
programs that allow firms to progressively adapt their products to the 
demand in international markets, instead o f simply trying to export 
whatever goods are available. Prompex, the Peruvian TPO, has a pro­
gram that provides assistance for quality certification and allows firms 
to benefit from services provided by international experts (Castillo 
1998).
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Programs that supply such services have positive results in the short 
run because they allow  com panies to boost their productivity. 
Moreover, the programs also have an extended positive effect in their 
signaling the need for given services and encouraging the provision of 
these services by private firms. All this provides an opportunity for a 
TPO to progressively allow the private sector to supply services and 
redirect its resources to newer programs needed by export firms. Such 
service provision schemes for export companies should be closely coor­
dinated with any other programs a country may set up to upgrade pro­
ductivity.
Another export boosting option is the promotion o f companies that 
produce goods in high demand in export markets and o f potentially 
profitable domestic manufacture. Fundación Chile, for example, set up 
firms to export salmon and berries in the 1980s. The companies, which 
successfully  exported products that did not previously exist on the 
domestic market, were then sold to private entrepreneurs as a deliberate 
inducement to attract private investment.
C onclusions
Latin American and Caribbean countries, with the exception of Mexico, 
need to design new export promotion policies if  they want to increase 
the growth rate of exports and move toward exporting goods with high­
er value added. The increasing challenges faced by export firms, the 
new policy environment, and the multilateral trade rules following the 
Uruguay Round Agreements demand that governments of the region 
design new export strategies that provide assistance for firms attempt­
ing to break into export markets.
This chapter has set forth recommendations with the potential of 
contributing to the design of the future export strategies. Nevertheless, 
the point should be made that whatever the export strategy ultimately 
chosen to assign high priority to increasing exports, there must be 
efforts to ensure that an export plan goes beyond a piecemeal collection 
o f export promotion measures. An effective export promotion strategy 
that leads to export growth and diversification needs to be coherent and 
clearly signal that it fosters widespread increases in productivity. This 
implies that the other high-priority policies in a government’s agenda 
are compatible with the goal of increasing exports and that the policies 
contribute to this goal.
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Programs in an export promotion strategy should be assessed regu­
larly to determine whether they are having an impact on individual 
firms. The questions that should be asked are whether managers know 
about these instruments and make use of them; whether the instruments 
are effective in assisting com panies trying to start exporting; and 
whether the instruments encourage firms with experience in selling  
abroad to export continually. The use of the schem es by small and 
medium-sized companies should be an important yardstick for analyz­
ing the schem es’ adequacy. In addition, the proportion of exports that 
use these instruments should be determined. Information on the real 
cost of the instruments should be available— but this condition is in fact 
rarely met in most countries in the region. Information on the resources 
allocated to specific instruments is often difficult to obtain.
Any evaluation should go beyond the benefits for specific firms and 
establish whether these instruments/schemes are effective for increasing 
export growth, particularly that o f nontraditional exports, and for 
encouraging a greater diversification of exports as well as exports of 
goods with greater value added. Effectiveness defined by these criteria 
should be the guideline for deciding whether an export promotion policy 
is successful. Latin American countries do have a tradition of setting up 
instruments that entrepreneurs come to believe should be permanent and 
that have no visible impact on export growth after the first few years.
The choices discussed here demonstrate that it is possible to design 
a strategy for encouraging companies to export new goods. A close col­
laboration between the public and private sectors regarding these issues 
would allow Latin American and Caribbean countries a higher rate of 
growth of exports with higher value added.
All in all, it is important that high-ranking civil servants working in 
TPOs be willing to go beyond their responsibilities o f administrating 
export promotion programs and strive to ensure that a government has a 
coherent and comprehensive export strategy.
Last, it must be emphasized again that if  a government wants to 
increase exports, the first tasks it must carry out are decreasing any 
antiexport bias and establishing a free-trade regime for export firms. 
Even the most effective export promotion program would be unable to 
compensate for the antiexport bias that results from high tariffs, non­
tariff barriers, significant export obstacles, rules that hinder competition 
in the domestic market, and an exchange rate that systematically appre­




1. S ee  L a r ry  W illm o re  (1 9 9 6 )  fo r  a  d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  a l lo w in g  
d ire c t  a n d  in d ire c t e x p o r te rs  a c c e ss  to  th e  in c e n tiv e s  g ra n te d  to  e x p o r t  p ro c e ss o rs .
2. F o r  in s ta n c e , o n ly  0 .6 %  o f  M e x ic o ’s e x p o r ts  in  1995  u s e d  th e  d ra w b a c k . In  
th e  m e a n tim e , 2 9 .3 %  o f  e x p o r ts  u s e d  th e  P ro g ra m a  d e  I m p o r ta c ió n  T e m p o ra l p a r a  
P ro d u c i r  A r t íc u lo s  d e  E x p o r ta c ió n  (P IT E X ) , a  d u ty  e x e m p tio n  m e c h a n is m  (K a te  
a n d  N ie ls  1996).
3. S ee  W ilso n  P e re s  (1 9 9 7 )  a n d  Jo s e p h  R a m o s  (1 9 9 7 )  fo r  a  d e ta i le d  p r e s e n ta ­
tio n  o f  p o lic ie s  se e k in g  to  in c re a se  p ro d u c tiv ity  in  L a tin  A m e r ic a n  c o u n tr ie s .
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B ra z ilia n  e x p o rts , 9 2 -9 4  
C h ile , 4 9 -7 2 ;  d e c is io n  to  ex p o rt, 6 2 -6 4 , 
66; ex p o rt lea rn in g  p ro c e sse s , 62, 
64—6 6 , 127; e x p o rt p ro m o tio n  in s tru ­
m en ts , 5 5 -6 2 , 66 ; e x p o rt p ro m o tio n  
reco m m en d a tio n s , 6 8 -7 0 ; m a c ro e c o ­
n o m ic  en v iro n m en t, 4 9 -5 3 , 6 8 -6 9 ; 
tra d e  po licy , 54—55; trad e  w ith  
M e x ico , 2 5 -2 7 , 2 6 t, 4 2 , 4 3 , 4 6 , 
4 7 n l6 ;  trad in g  p a rtn e rs , 52 , 55 ,
6 7 -6 8  
C h ilean  p eso , 5 3 , 5 4  
C h in a , 9 8 -9 9 , 112n23 
C o a l, 117, 121
CO FA P. See C o m p a n h ia  F a b r ic a d o ra  de  
P eças 
C o ffee , 117, 118 
C o lla te ra l ss is tan ce , 30 , 59  
C o lo m b ia , 1 1 5 -1 3 9 ; d e c is io n  to  export, 
1 2 3 -1 2 5 ; e x p o rt p ro m o tio n  in s tru ­
m en ts , 118, 1 1 9 -1 2 2 , 1 2 7 -1 2 9 ; 
lea rn in g  b y  ex p o rtin g , 1 2 5 -1 2 7 ;
Index 173
m acro e c o n o m ic  en v iro n m en t, 
1 1 5 -1 1 7 ; o b sta c le s  a n d  a d v an tag es  to  
ex p o rtin g , 1 2 9 -1 3 3 ; p re fe ren tia l 
trad e  a g reem en ts  (PT A ), 4 1 , 4 2 , 55 ,
1 1 8 -1 1 9 , 126, 133; tra d e  p o lic y  re c ­
o m m en d a tio n s , 1 3 3 -1 3 9 ; tra d e  w ith  
M e x ico , 2 5 -2 7 , 2 6 t, 119 
C o lo m b ia n  peso , 117, 120, 130, 138 
C o m m itm e n t le tte rs , 102 
C o m m o d ities: e x p o r t tax  ex em p tio n s  for, 
87; n a tu ra l re so u rc e -in te n siv e , 4 9 , 
5 2 -5 3 , 68 , 7 0 -7 2 , 73 
C o m m o d itie s  in d u str ie s , 35 , 4 0 , 44 ; as 
p e rc e n ta g e  o f  ex p o rts , 8 0 t 
C o m m u n ica tio n s  in fra s tru c tu re , 88 
C o m p ag n ie  F ra n ç a ise  d ’A ssu ra n c e  p o u r  
le  C o m m erce  E x té rieu r , 87 
C o m p a n h ia  F a b ric a d o ra  d e  P eças 
(C O F A P ), 9 5 -9 7 , 1 1 2 n n 2 4 -2 7  
C o m p an ies . See f irm s 
C o m p ara tiv e  a d v an tag e , 2 3 , 6 9 -7 0 , 103; 
e x c h a n g e  ra te  fo r  im p o rte d  in p u ts , 
105; in  n a tu ra l re so u rce -in ten siv e  
c o m m o d itie s , 6 9 -7 0 , 103; re p u ta tio n  
o f  com p an y , 125, 130 
C o m p e titio n : in  d o m es tic  m a rk e ts , 6 3 , 
66 , 8 2 -8 3 , 103, 1 2 6 -1 2 7 ; e ffec ts  on  
lea rn in g , 3 8 -3 9 , 4 4 , 64—6 5 , 127; in  
m an u fac tu rin g  in p u ts , 2 7 -2 9 , 83. See 
also im p o rt co m p e titio in  
C o m p e titiv en ess : o f  B ra z ilia n  eco n o m y , 
88 , 89 , 91 , 103; o f  B ra z ilia n  ex p o rts , 
80 , 8 8 -8 9 ; fo re ig n  e x ch an g e  p o licy  
an d , 7 3 -7 4 , 83; so u rces  o f  in  B raz il, 
98 , 1 0 0 -1 0 1 , 1 0 2 -1 0 3 , 1 0 4 -1 0 7 , 110 
C o m u n id a d  A n d in a  (fo rm erly  G ru p o  
A n d in o ), 59 , 1 1 8 -1 1 9 , 1 2 5 -1 2 6 , 133, 
139n8
C o n c en tra tio n : in  n u m b e r  o f  ex p o rt 
firm s, 69; in  n u m b e r  o f  fo re ig n  m a r­
k e ts , 6 8 -6 9 ;  v a rie ty  o f  p ro d u c ts  
ex p o rted , 9 2 -9 3  
C o n se jo  S u p e rio r  d e  C o m erc io  E x te rio r  
1998, 122 
Constancias de exportación, 29 
C o n stitu tio n , o f  B raz il, 101, 105 
C o n su ltin g  se rv ices , 5 9 , 7 2 n 2 , 126 
C o n su m e r d em an d , d o m es tic , 7 8 , 8 0 -8 1 , 
8 1 t
C o n su m e r d u rab les: e x p o rt f in an c in g  fo r 
fo re ig n  b u y e rs , 59 ; o u tp u t in  B raz il,
7 8 ,9 1
C o n su m e r n o n d u rab le  g o o d s , 91 
C o n su m e r p ro d u c ts  in d u str ie s , 35 , 4 0 , 
4 4 , 118 
C o n su m p tio n , 91
C o n tac ts , b u sin e ss : fo r  ex p o rtin g , 32 
C o n trac ts : e x p o rt n o te s , 86; F O B  sh ip ­
m en ts , 100; h o n o rin g  o f, 75 , 77 ; as 
sa les  m e th o d , 104; ta x  fo r  b re a c h  of, 
86
C opper, 5 1 -5 2 , 5 3 , 5 5 , 6 8 -6 9  
C O R F O . See C o rp o ra c ió n  d e  F o m en to  
d e  la  P ro d u c c ió n  
C o rp o ra c ió n  de  F o m e n to  d e  la  
P ro d u c c ió n  (C O R F O ), 5 8 -6 0  
C o rp o rac ió n  A n d in a  d e  F o m en to , 59  
C o rru p tio n , 98 , l l l n l l  
C o s ta  R ica : tra d e  w ith  M e x ic o , 2 5 -2 7 , 
2 6 t
C o s to  p a ís , 67
C o s t reco v ery , o f  p io n e e r in g  ex p o rte rs , 
3 4 - 3 5 ,4 4 ,1 4 4  
C red it: to  p u rch asin g  f irm s, 39, 101. See 
e x p o rt fin an c in g  
C re d it co n tro ls , 7 8 , 91 
Cruzado P la n , 80 
C u b o s E x p o rtac ió n , 5 9 -6 0  
C u rren cy : A rg en tin e  p e so , 81, 117; 
A s ia n , 117; B ra z ilia n  real, 7 8 , 81, 
105, 106, 108; C h ile a n  p e so , 22 t, 24 , 
2 5 , 53 , 54; C o lo m b ian  p eso , 117, 
120, 130, 138; d e u tsc h  m ark , 98 ,
105; d ev a lu a tio n s , 2 2 t, 24 , 25 , 78,
8 1 , 105, 106, 108. See also ex ch an g e  
ra tes
C u s to m e r d em an d , d o m es tic , 6 3 -6 4  
C u s to m e r d em an d , fo re ig n , 62 , 6 4 -6 5 , 
9 0 , 9 8 , 102, 127 
C u s to m ers : re fe rra l by, 6 3 -6 4 ; su p p o rt 
se rv ices  to , 65 , 97 , 98 , 100, 104; 
u p g ra d in g  sk ills  fro m , 9 8 , 126 
C u s to m s p ro ced u res , 6 7 , 120, 129, 132, 
1 3 7 -1 3 8
D aru , 102
D ea le rs , 104
D e b t c r is is , 8 9 -9 0
D e c re e  4 4 4 , 119, 139n4
D efic it, g o v e rn m e n t o p e ra tin g , 7 9 , 109
D e m a n d -p u ll p ro cess , 6 3 -6 4
D e p a rtm e n t o f  F o re ig n  T rad e , 113n40
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D ep o s its , as c o n d itio n  to  im p o rt, 54  
D eu tsch e  m a rk  v s  real, 98 , 105 
D ev a lu a tio n . See cu rre n cy ; d ev a lu a tio n s  
D ev e lo p m en t s tra teg ie s , 1 -2 , 2 3 -2 4 , 54 , 
133
D irec to rie s , ex p o rt, 39 , 60  
D ire c t sa les , 100, 124 
D is tr ib u tio n  n e tw o rk s , 34—37, 4 4 , 126 
D o lla r  v s. real, 7 8 , 9 8 , 100, 1 0 4 -1 0 5  
D o m estic  m ark e ts: c o m p e titiv en ess  of, 
3 6 -3 7 , 63 , 6 5 -6 6 , 83 , 106, 127; c o n ­
d itio n s  as e x p o rt m o tiv a tio n , 32 , 43 , 
68 , 123; u p g ra d in g  th ro u g h  e x p o rt 
ac tiv ity , 6 6 , 123, 126 
D raw b ack s , 28 , 149; in  B raz il, 9 9 , 103; 
in  C h ile , 5 6 , 5 7 -5 8 ,  71 ; in  C o lo m b ia , 
135; in  M e x ico , 4 0  
D ru g  traffic , illeg a l: e x p o r t d iv e rs if ic a ­
tio n  p ro g ram s, 119; sh ip m e n t in sp e c ­
tio n s, 1 3 1 -1 3 2 ; an d  v io len ce , 
130 -1 3 1  
D u m p in g , 103
D u ties , ex em p tio n  fro m , 1 4 9 -1 5 0 ,
162n2
E c o n o m ic  in d ica to rs: B raz il, 7 5 -7 7 , 76t; 
C h ile , 4 9 -5 1 , 50 t; C o lo m b ia , 
1 1 5 -1 1 7 , 116t; M e x ico , 2 1 -2 3 , 2 2 t 
E co n o m ie s  o f  sc a le , 1 2 -1 3 , 6 3 -6 4 , 
1 2 3 -1 2 4 , 1 4 4 -1 4 5 ; in p u t p ro c u re ­
m e n t and , 7 2n4 ; M e x ico , 32 , 43 , 
4 7 n l3  
E cu ad o r, 55 , 118, 133 
E d u ca tio n , 122
E le c tric ity  d is tr ib u tio n  en te rp rise s ,
8 8 -8 9
E le c tric ity  fo r  m a n u fa c tu rin g , 87 , 103 
E le c tro n ic  eq u ip m e n t an d  co m p o n en ts , 
104
E le c tro n ic  m ach in ery , 23  
E l P aso , 35
E m e rg en cy  S o c ia l F u n d , 77 
E m p lo y m en t, 55 , 8 2 -8 3 , 90  
E m p resas  A ltam en te  E x p o rtad o ras  
(A L T E X ), 2 9 , 4 0 , 4 3 , 46 ; as a  m o d el, 
71 , 136, 156 
E n e rg y  supp ly , 103, 130 
E n g in e e rin g  se rv ices , 5 9 , 8 3 -8 4 , 87 
E n trep ren eu ria l g ro u p s , 60 , 120,
125
E q u ip m en t: e x p o r t f in an c in g , 8 3 -8 4 ,
128; im p o rta tio n  o f  tech n o lo g y , 75;
ta r iff  an d  tax  red u c tio n s  o n , 6 6 , 121, 
122; u p g rad in g  of, 6 3 , 9 0 -9 1  
E sco b ar, P ab lo , 131 
E sp ír ito  S an to , 89 
“ E th n ic  fo o d s m a rk e ts ,”  35 
E u ro p e , 1 0 4 ,1 1 9  
E X C E L S A  an d  L ig h t, 88 
E x c h a n g e  ra tes , 1 8 -1 9 ; B raz il, 7 3 -7 8 , 
7 9 -8 3 , 95 , 9 8 -1 0 1 , 1 0 3 -1 0 6 ,
113n35; C h ile , 50 t, 5 3 , 54 , 65 , 67, 
6 9 -7 1 ; C o lo m b ia , 116t, 117, 130,
138; M e x ico , 30 
E x p o rt c red it, 8 6 -8 7 , 1 1 9 -1 2 0  
E x p o rt C red it C o m m itte e , 84—85 
E x p o rt d iv e rs if ica tio n , in  B raz il, 9 2 -9 3 , 
96; in  C h ile , 5 3 , 5 7 , 6 0 -6 1 , 6 9 -7 1 ; in  
C o lo m b ia , 1 1 7 -1 1 8 , 121; fo r  d ru g  
p ro d u c in g  co u n trie s , 119 
E x p o rt f in an c in g , 16, 154—156; in  
B raz il, 8 3 -8 6 , 8 7 -8 8 , 9 8 , 101, 103, 
105, 1 0 7 -1 1 0 , 113n37; in  C h ile , 
5 8 -6 0 , 71; in  C o lo m b ia , 1 1 9 -1 2 0 , 
1 2 8 -1 2 9 ; in  M e x ic o , 2 9 -3 1 , 39 , 45; 
re v ie w  fees, 109 
E x p o rt fo rm a litie s , 2 9 , 61 , 66 , 68 , 70, 
125, 1 4 7 -1 4 8  
E x p o rt- im p o rt b an k . See b a n k in g  
E x p o rtin g : as fo re ig n  e x ch an g e  sou rce , 
74 ; as m o to r  fo r  eco n o m y , 72 ; o b s ta ­
c le s , 1 7 -1 8 , 4 0 -4 1 ,  4 6 , 6 6 -6 7 , 99, 
101, 103 
E x p o rt n o tes , 86 
E x p o rt o p p o rtu n ity  rep o rts , 30 
E x p o rt p e rfo rm an ce : B raz il, 7 6 t, 7 9 -8 1 ,
9 1 -9 4 ; C h ile , 50 t, 5 1 -5 4 , 5 I t , 6 8 -6 9 ; 
C o lo m b ia , 1 1 5 -1 1 7 , 116t; M e x ico , 
22 t, 23 , 2 6 t 
E x p o rt p ro m o tio n  in s tru m en ts : B raz il, 
8 3 -8 7 , 105; C h ile , 5 5 -6 2 , 6 4 , 66,
6 8 -7 1 ; C o lo m b ia , 1 1 9 -1 2 2 ; M e x ico ,
2 7 -3 1 , 3 9 ^ 1 0 , 4 5 ^ 6  
E x p o rt p ro m o tio n  p o lic ie s , 1 6 -1 7 , 
1 4 3 -1 4 5 ; B ra z il, 8 3 -8 9 ;  C h ile ,
5 5 -6 2 , 66 , 6 9 -7 2 ;  C o lo m b ia ,
1 1 9 -1 2 2 , 1 2 7 -1 2 9 ; M e x ico , 2 1 ^1 7 ; 
reco m m en d a tio n s , 1 5 0 -1 6 0  
E x p o rt sp ec ia liza tio n , 1 -2 ; in  C h ile , 49 , 
5 1 -5 3 , 68 , 7 1 -7 2 ; M e x ico , 23 
E x p o rt su p p o rt ag en c ie s . See tra d e  p ro ­
m o tio n  o rg an iza tio n s  (T P O s)
“ E x p o rt v o u c h e rs ,”  29 
E x p o rt w areh o u se s , 5 6 -5 7
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FA T-C am bial. See F u n d o  de  A m p aro  ao 
T rab a lh ad o r-C am b ia l 
F D A . See F o o d  a n d  D ru g  
A d m in is tra tio n  
F e rre ira  G u iza re s , 112n30 
F e rro s ta a l, 104 
F ie s ta , 35
F IN A M E X . See F u n d o  de
F in an c iam en to  d e  E x p o rtaçõ es  
F in an ce  lib era liz a tio n : in  B raz il, 7 3 -7 4 , 
7 5 , 77
F in a n c ia l tra n sa c tio n  tax  (IO F ), 86,
87
F in an c iam en to  às E m p re sa s  (F IN E M ),
84
F IN E M . See F in a n c ia m e n to  às 
E m p resas  
F irm s: d e c is io n  to  ex p o rt, 24 , 6 2 -6 7 ,
9 7 , 1 0 3 -1 0 4 , 1 2 3 -1 2 5 ; e x p o rt 
b e h a v io r , 3 1 -4 3 ,  4 4 - 4 5 ,  6 2 -6 8 ,  
9 4 -1 0 5 , 1 2 2 -1 3 3 ; n u m b e r  o f  
e x p o rte rs , 2 4 , 5 2 , 6 0 , 69 ; o rg a n iz a ­
t io n  fo r  e x p o rt, 6 5 ; u p g ra d in g  a s s is ­
ta n c e  fo r, 7 2 n 2 ; u se  o f  e x p o r t p ro ­
m o tio n  p o lic ie s , 66  
F irm  size, 69 , 101, 122; an d  e x p o rt d e c i­
s io n , 3 2 , 57 , 60 ; e x p o rt su p p ly  c a p a ­
b ility , 62; an d  f in an c in g , 30, 4 0 , 120, 
128; a n d  re d  tap e  o b sta c le s , 4 0 , 56 , 
6 1 ,7 1
F isc a l S tab iliza tio n  F u n d , 77 
F ish  m ea l, 51 
F ish  p ro d u c ts , 51 , 69  
F lo w ers , 117, 121
F o n d o  d e  G a ra n tía  p a ra  E x p o rta c io n e s  
N o -T rad ic io n a le s , 59  
F o n d o  d e  P ro d u c tiv id a d  y 
C o o m p e titiv id ad , 122 
F o n d o  N ac io n a l d e  D esa rro llo  
T ecn o ló g ico  y  P ro d u c tiv o  
(F O N T E C ), 7 2 n 2  
F o o d  an d  D ru g  A d m in is tra tio n  (F D A ), 
37 , 125, 127 
F o o d  p ro cess in g  ind u stry , 3 5 -3 7 , 4 2 -4 3 , 
120, 125, 127, 130; B raz ilian 
e x p o rts , 9 2 t, 9 4 t; d e c is io n  to  ex p o rt, 
63 ; u se  o f  ex p o rt su b sid ies , 57; v io ­
len ce  im p ac tin g  o n  trad e , 131 
F o o tw e a r  industry , 33 , 62 , 64 , 65 , 118, 
1 2 5 -1 2 7  
F o rd  M o to r  C o m p an y , 38 
F o re ig n  cu rre n c y  ex p o su re , 85 , 9 8 , 100,
1 0 4 -1 0 5
F o re ig n  e x ch an g e  po licy , 7 3 -7 4 , 7 8 , 86, 
106
F o re ig n  m ark e ts: c o n c e n tra tio n  in  n u m ­
b e r  o f, 6 8 -6 9 ;  c o n tin u e d  p re se n c e  in ,
3 2 -3 3 , 38 , 4 3 , 6 0 , 7 0 , 104; c o s t to  
en te r, 32 , 3 3 -3 4 , 124; cu s to m e r 
d em an d , 62 , 6 4 - 6 5 ,9 0 ,  9 8 ,1 0 2 ,1 2 7 ;  
f lu c tu a tio n s  in , 69 ; in fo rm a tio n  su p ­
p lie rs , 30 , 39, 125; tec h n ic a l a s s is ­
tan ce  fo r  en try , 62  
F o re ig n  o ffices , fo r  e x p o rte rs , 60 , 61 ,
97 , 125, 129 
F o re ig n  su p p lie r  c red it, 101 
F ra n co , Itam ar, 82 
F re e  trad e  zo n es , 135, 169n4 
F u n d a c ió n  C h ile , 160 
F u n d o  d e  A m p a ro  ao  T rab a lh ad o r- 
C a m b ia l (FA T -C am bial), 84 
F u n d o  d e  F in an c iam en to  d e  E x p o rtaçõ es  
(F IN A M E X ), 84 , 105
G -3 . See G ro u p  o f  T h ree  
G a rm e n t industry , 4 0 , 123, 124—125,
128
G A TT. See G en e ra l A g re e m e n t on  
T ariffs  a n d  T rad e  
G D P : in  B raz il, 7 5 , 7 6 t, 7 8 -7 9 , 81 t; in  
C h ile , 4 9 -5 1 ,  5 0 t, 5 I t ,  55; in  
C o lo m b ia , 1 1 5 -1 1 7 ; M e x ico , 2 1 -2 3 , 
2 2 t
G en era l A g re e m e n t o n  T ariffs an d  T rad e  
(G A T T ), 25 
G e n e ra l G u id e lin es  o n  In d u str ia l P o licy  
an d  F o re ig n  T rad e  (P IC E ), 8 1 -8 2  
G en e ra liz e d  S y stem  o f  P re fe ren ces , 119 
G en era l M o to rs , 97 
G erm an  A g en cy  fo r  T ech n ica l 
A ssis tan c e , 62 
G o ld , 51
G o v ern m en t: b u re a u c ra c ra tic  o b sta c le s  
to  trad e , 103, 1 0 8 -1 1 0 , 1 1 3 n 4 0 ,132; 
co llab o ra tio n  w ith  tra d e  a sso c ia tio n s , 
61 , 71 ; deb t, 7 9 , 109; ro le  in  ec o n o ­
m y, 54 , 77 ; ro le  in  in fo rm a tio n  p ro v i­
sio n , 3 5 -3 6 ,  3 9 -4 0 ,  4 4  
G re a t B rita in , 52
G ro u p  o f  T h ree  (G 3 ), 2 5 , 4 2 , 119,
133
G ru p o  A n d in o . See C o m u n id a d  A n d in a  
H a rd  cu rre n cy , 32 , 4 3 , 117
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H eck sch er, E li, 5 - 6  
H obday , M ic h ae l, 11 
H y p erin fla tio n , 90
IC M S . See m e rc h a n d ise  a n d  se rv ices 
sa les  tax  
Id ea l, 43 
Ig lesias , R ., 80 
Im ag e , as e x p o rt o b sta c le , 99  
Im p o rt co m p e titio n , 6 3 , 66 , 83, 103,
1 0 6 ,1 2 3 -1 2 4 , 127 
Im p o rt licen ses, 24—25, 118 
Im p o rt p erfo rm an ce : C h ile , 5 0 t, 54; 
C o lo m b ia , 1 1 5 -1 1 7 , 116t; M e x ico , 
2 2 t, 23, 2 6 t 
Im p o rt p ro h ib itio n s , 54  
Im p o rts , See also m a n u fa c tu rin g  in p u ts , 
im p o rted
Im p o rt su b stitu tio n , 2 3 -2 4 , 51 , 5 4 , 104, 
117, 133 
In co m e , p e r  cap ita , 7 5 , 91 
In d ex in g . See cu rren cy , e x c h a n g e  ra tes;
p ric e  co n tro ls  
In d ia , 9 8 -9 9
In d ire c t ex p o rte rs : d e c is io n  to  ex p o rt,
6 3 -6 4 , 65; in cen tiv es  for, 29 , 46 ; 
lea rn in g  p ro c e sse s , 38 , 44  
In d o n esia , 103
In d u str ia l m ach inery . See m a c h in e ry  an d  
e q u ip m en t in d u stry  
In d u str ia l po licy , B raz il, 8 1 -8 3 , 9 0 -9 1  
In d u str ia l P ro d u c ts  T ax  (IP I), 8 8 -8 9 , 
112n21
In d u stry  in fo rm a tio n  v a ria tio n , 3 5 -3 6 , 
39, 4 4 , 126 
In fla tio n , 53 , 54; in  B ra z il, 7 5 , 7 7 -7 8 , 
8 2 ,9 0
In fo rm a tio n  g a th e rin g , 36 , 4 3 , 64—6 6 , 
1 2 5 -1 2 6
In fo rm a tio n  p ro v id e rs : A S E X M A , 
6 1 -6 2 , 64 ; B A N C O M E X T , 30 , 39, 
45 ; P ro C h ile , 6 0 , 64; P ro e x p o rt, 122; 
req u irem en ts  for, 36 , 4 4 , 1 5 2 -1 5 3 ; 
S E C O F I, 39; trad e rs , 62 , 64 , 65 
In fra stru c tu re : en h an ce m e n ts , 24 , 4 3 , 71 , 
8 8 -8 9 , 101; in ad e q u a c ie s  in  e x p o rt­
in g  co u n tries , 4 6 , 6 7 , 99, 103, 130; 
in ad eq u ac ie s  in  im p o rtin g  co u n tries , 
4 1 , 46 . See also tra n sp o rta tio n  in fra ­
stru c tu re
In su ran ce , 156; fo r  co m m e rc ia l risk s,
87; ex p o rt, 5 9 -6 0 , 7 1 , 82; e x p o rt 
c red it, 8 6 -8 7 , 1 0 8 -1 0 9  
In te re s t ra te s , 3 0 , 4 0 , 7 8 -7 9 , 1 0 6 -1 0 7 , 
128; eq u a liz a tio n  o f, 84—85 
In te rn a tio n a l re se rv e s , 79  
In v estm en t, 53; in  B ra z il, 7 5 , 9 0 -9 1 , 
9 6 -9 7 , 99 , 104, 106; in  cap ita l eq u ip ­
m en t, 75 , 9 0 -9 1 ,  97 ; in  C h ile , 5 3 , 54, 
71 ; in  h u m a n  c ap ita l, 24 ; in  in fra ­
stru c tu re , 2 4 , 4 3 , 71 ; a n d  N A F T A ,
25; in  p lan ts , 4 3 , 9 7 , 104, 112n25; in  
p ro d u c tio n  cap ac ity , 81 , 106, 109 
IO F. See f in a n c ia l tra n sa c tio n  tax  
IS O  1400, 98 
IS O  9 0 0 0 , 98 , 100
Ja p an , 37 
JC P en n ey , 126 
Jeitinho brasileiro, 107 
Jo in t v en tu res, 97
K a tz , Jo rg e , 8 
K ees in g , D o n a ld , 62 
K o rea , S o u th , 52 , 112n23 , 117 
K ru eg er, A n n e , 9 
K ru g m an , P au l, 6 - 7 ,  8 
K u b itsc h ek , Ju sc e lin o , 96
L a b o r  fo rce : c o s t o f, 88 , 98 , 101, 103, 
105, 107, 1 1 2 n l9 ; e d u c a tio n  o f, 98 , 
105, 107, 110, 122; in v e s tm e n t in ,
24; p ro d u c tiv ity , 7 5 -7 6 ;  sk ills  o f, 73 , 
9 8 , 105, 107, 110, 131 
L a ll, S an jay a , 62  
L a th es , 103
L a tin  A m erica , 23 , 61; e x p o rt p e rfo rm ­
an ce , 1 4 1 -1 4 2 ; n o n ta r iff  b a rrie rs , 37, 
4 1 , 4 6 ; s ize  o f  eco n o m y , 7 5 , 115; ta r ­
if f  lev e ls , 4 2  
L e a rn in g  fro m  ex p o rtin g , 1 3 -1 6 ; in  
B raz il, 98 , 100, 104; in  C h ile , 62 ,
64—6 6 , 145; in  C o lo m b ia , 1 2 6 -1 2 7 ; 
in  M e x ico , 3 6 -3 9 , 4 3 —44 
L e a rn in g  to  ex p o rt, 3 2 -3 6 , 6 2 , 6 4 -6 5 , 
102, 105, 1 2 5 -1 2 6  
L e a th e r  p ro d u c ts  ind u stry , 125, 129 
L eg a l sy s tem , as e x p o rt o b sta c le , 99,
102
L o an  secu ritiza tio n , 86  
L o b b ie s , 132
L o ca tio n : ad v a n ta g e s  o f  M e x ico , 24;
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p ro x im ity  to  m ark e ts , 131 
L o g is tic s , tran sp o rt, 3 5 -3 6 , 4 0 , 64 , 97 , 
100, 126 
L u m b e r, 51
M a c h in e ry  an d  e q u ip m e n t industry , 
1 0 3 -1 0 5 ; e ffe c ts  o f  tra d e  lib e ra liz a ­
tio n , 94; e x p o rt fin an c in g , 8 3 -8 4 ; 
in v es tm en t in , 9 0 -9 1  
M a g az in es , 60  
M a lay sia , 117
M a n a g e m e n t co m m itm en t, 34 
M a n a g e m e n t p rac tice s , 6 4 , 65 , 9 0 , 106 
M a n u fa c tu re d  g o o d s; in -b o n d  p ro cess in g  
of, 23 , 2 7 -2 8 ; m a rk e t fo r  C o lo m b ian ,
1 1 8 -1 1 9 ; sh a re  o f  ex p o rts , 2 3 -2 4 , 52, 
80 t, 9 2 -9 4 , 9 2 t, 94 t; sh a re  o f  G D P, 
2 1 ,7 6 ,  115 
M a n u fa c tu rin g  E x p o rts  P ro m o tio n  
P ro g ram , 84 
M a n u fac tu rin g  fo r  d o m e s tic  m ark e t, 58 
M a n u fac tu rin g  fo r  ex p o rt, 24 , 3 1 -4 3 ; 
e x p o rt d ec is io n  fac to rs , 3 2 -3 3 ; 
in v es tm en ts  in , 9 6 -9 7 , 106; p ro d u c ­
tio n  cap ac ity , 81 , 96 ; as sha re  o f  p ro ­
d u c tio n  capac ity , 96 , 99 , 103. See 
also f irm s, e x p o r t b e h a v io r  
M a n u fac tu rin g  in p u ts; c o s t o f, 4 2 , 83 , 
132; in v e s tm e n t fin an c in g  fo r, 5 9 , 99 , 
101; p ric e  n e g o tia tio n , 63; p ro c u re ­
m e n t an d  e c o n o m ies  o f  sca le , 72n 4 ; 
ta x  e x em p tio n s , 87 , 119, 121; u p d a t­
ed , in fo rm a tio n  o n , 65 
M a n u fac tu rin g  in p u ts , d o m es tic , 29 , 58 , 
85; a cce ss  m e th o d s , 1 4 8 -1 5 0  
M a n u fac tu rin g  in p u ts , im p o rted : access 
m e th o d s , 1 4 8 -1 5 0 ; in  B raz il, 91 , 95 , 
99 , 102, 104, 105; in  C h ile , 56,
5 7 -5 8 , 68 ; in  C o lo m b ia , 119, 127, 
129, 1 3 2 -1 3 3 ; in  M e x ico , 2 7 -2 9 , 45 , 
4 6
M a n u fac tu rin g  p lan ts ; e x p o rt f in an c in g , 
84; lo c a tio n  ch o ice , 21 . See also p ro ­
d u c tio n  p ro cesses  
M a n u fa c tu r in g  sec to r: o u tp u t lev e ls , 24, 
8 I t;  p e rfo rm an ce , 9 0 -9 1  
Maquiladora industry , 23 , 2 7 -2 8 , 29; 
d o m e s tic  m a rk e t sa les , 31; e x c lu s io n  
f ro m  study , 31 
M a ran h a o , 89
M a rk e tin g  ab road : fin an c in g  for, 59 , 60,
1 1 9 -1 2 0 , 1 5 3 -1 5 4 ; m e th o d s, 9 7 , 99, 
102, 104, 113n29, 1 2 4 -1 2 5  
M a rk e tin g  stra teg y  d es ig n : tec h n ic a l 
a ss is ta n ce  in , 62  
M a rk e t re se a rc h , 32 , 3 3 -3 6 , 4 0  
M a rk e t se g m en ta tio n , 124 
M a rk e t sha re : g a in  th ro u g h  ex p o rtin g , 
65; re c o v e ry  o f  d o m e s tic  m ark e ts , 37 
M e a t m e a l, 51 
M e d e llin , 123, 1 3 0 -1 3 1  
M e rch a n d ise  an d  se rv ices  sa le s  tax  
(IC M S ), 87, 103 
M e rco su r, 5 5 , 9 9 , l l l n l O ,  119; an d  
B ra z ilia n  m o to r  v e h ic le  ind u stry , 95; 
in fra s tru c tu re  o b sta c le s  in , 67 ; red  
tap e  fo r  im p o rtin g , 108 
M e rg ers an d  acq u is itio n s , 95 
M e ta l L ev e , 9 6 -9 7 , 1 1 2 n n 2 4 -2 8  
M e ta llu rg ica l in d u stry , 9 1 , 9 2 t, 93 , 9 4 t 
M e ta l m an u fac tu rin g  an d  m ach in ery ,
9 2 -9 4
M e ta lw o rk in g  industry , 73 
M e x ic a n  f in an c ia l c r is is , 78 
M e x ican  p e so , 22 t, 24 , 25 , 133 
M e x ican s  in  th e  U n ite d  S ta tes: as c o n ­
su m e rs , 3 4 -3 5  
M e x ico , 21 —46; d e c is io n  to  ex p o rt,
3 2 -3 3 ; d o m es tic  m a rk e ts , 24 ; e x p o rt 
p ro m o tio n  in s tru m en ts , 2 7 -3 1 , 
3 9 -4 0 , 4 6 ; lea rn in g  b y  ex p o rtin g ,
3 3 -3 9 , 4 3 -4 4 , 127; m a c ro eco n o m ic  
en v iro n m en t, 2 1 -2 4 ; o b sta c le s  to  
ex p o rt, 4 0 -4 1 ;  tra d e  po licy , 2 4 -2 7 , 
4 5 ^ 1 6 ; trad in g  p a rtn e rs , 2 4 -2 7 , 26 t, 
4 3 ,4 6 ,  119
M IC T . See M in is try  o f  Industry , 
C o m m erce , a n d  T ou rism  
M in in g  industry , 2 3 , 5 6 , 92  
M in is te rio  d e  C o m erc io  E x te rio r , 120, 
137, 138 
M in is try  o f  F in a n c e  (M ex ico ), 27 
M in is try  o f  F o re ig n  A ffa irs  (C h ile ),
61
M in is try  o f  Industry , C o m m erce , an d  
T o u rism  (M IC T ), 8 4 -8 5 , 113n40  
M in is try  o f  th e  E c o n o m y  (C h ile ), 70  
M in is try  o f  T rad e  an d  In d u stry  
(M ex ico ), 27 
M o d u la r  in v es tm en t, 97 
M o to r  V ehicle  A g reem en t, 8 8 , 112n20 
M o to r  v e h ic le  assem b ly  industry , 9 5 , 96
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M o to r  v e h ic le  p a rts . See au to m o b ile  
p a rts  in d u stry  
M o to r  v eh ic le s , 2 3 -2 4 ,  95 
M u c u ri, 101
M u ltila te ra l tra d e  ru le s , 3, 31 , 70 , 
1 4 2 -1 4 3 . See also U ru g u ay  R o u n d  
A g reem en ts
N A F T A . See N o rth  A m e ric a n  F re e  T rade  
A g reem en t 
N ard in i, 104
N a tio n a l B a n k  fo r  E c o n o m ic  an d  S o c ia l 
D ev e lo p m en t (B N D E S ), 8 3 -8 4 , 105, 
107, 109, 113n42  
N a tio n a l D e v e lo p m e n t P ro g ram , 89 
N e tw o rk in g . See b u s in e ss  co n tac ts ; d is ­
tr ib u tio n  n e tw o rk s  
N icarag u a : trad e  w ith  M e x ico , 2 5 , 2 6 t 
N issan , 38
N o n ta r iff  trad e  b a rrie rs , 30, 36; c e r tifi­
ca te s  o f  o rig in , 41 ; in  C h ile , 37 , 41 , 
4 2 , 43 , 46 ; in  C o lo m b ia , 4 2 , 118; in  
L a tin  A m erica , 37 , 4 1 , 4 2 , 4 3 , 4 6 , 68; 
q u a lity  ce rtifica tio n , 41 
N o n trad itio n a l ex p o rts , 53; f in a n c in g  for, 
59 , 120; g ro w th  o f, 6 9 -7 0 , 7 2 , 117; 
p ro m o tio n  o f, 60 ; re fu n d  o n  im p o rted  
in p u ts  for, 5 3 , 5 7 -5 8 ;  tax  ex em p tio n s  
o n  in p u ts  fo r, 121 
N o rth  A m erican  F re e  T rad e  A g reem en t 
(N A F T A ), 21 , 2 4 , 2 5 , 27; e ffe c ts  on  
trad e , 4 2 , 4 6 , 4 7 n l7 ;  p la n t lo ca tio n  
ch o ice , 4 2 , 43 ; an d  ta r if f  red u c tio n ,
31
N o v a  A m erica , 112n30
O cam p o , Jo sé  A n to n io , 9
O h lin , B e rtil, 5 - 6
O il, c rude , 23 , 117
O p en n ess  o f  eco n o m y , 23; B raz il,
7 3 -7 4 , 7 5 -7 7 , 7 6 t, 103; C h ile , 51,
5 4 , 6 5 -6 6 ;  C o lo m b ia , 117; M ex ico , 
2 1 ,2 3
O u tso u rc in g  o f  su p p o rt se rv ices , g lo b a l, 
9 5 , 96 , 102 
O v a lle  M o o re , 43
P ac if ic  R im , 55 
P ack ag in g  fea tu re s , 35 , 37, 63 
P ac k a g in g  p ro d u c ts , 65 
P a p e r  industry , 5 7 , 94
P ap e rw o rk , 56 , 71 
P a rá , 89
P arag u ay , 52 , 119 
P a s tra n a  ad m in is tra tio n , 122, 138 
P e n s io n  fu n d s, 51 
P eru , 55 , 118 
P eso . See under cu rre n cy  
P e tro ch em ica l ind u stry , 35 , 4 7 n l3 ,  56, 
117
P IC E . See G en e ra l G u id e lin es  o n  
In d u str ia l P o lic y  an d  F o re ig n  T rad e  
P io n ee rin g  ex p o rte rs , 34—35, 4 4 , 144 
P irahy , 102
P IT E X . See P ro g ra m a  d e  Im p o rtac ió n  
T em p o ra l p a ra  P ro d u c ir  A rtícu lo s  de  
E x p o rtac ió n  
“P la n  d e  D e sa rro llo  d e  la  
C o m p e titiv id a d  d e  C h ile  
1 9 9 8 -2 0 0 3 ,”  70  
P lan o  d e  M etas, 96
P la n t lo ca tio n  ch o ice , 131; in v es tm en ts  
in  p lan ts  ab ro ad , 9 7 , 104, 112n25; 
an d  N o rth  A m e ric a n  F re e  T rad e  
A g reem en t, 24 , 2 7 -2 8 , 4 2 , 43 ; an d  
p re fe re n tia l tra d e  ag reem en ts , 4 6  
P la n  V alle jo  (a lso  c a lle d  S IE X ), 119, 
1 2 1 -1 2 2 , 128, 1 3 4 -1 3 6 , 138 
P o lan d , 9 8 -9 9  
P o lic y  co n flic ts , 54 , 110 
P o p u la tio n , 75
P o rts , 4 1 , 46 ; in f ra s tru c tu re  o b sta c le s , 
6 7 , 82 , 8 8 -8 9 , 9 8 -9 9 ,  101, 103, 105, 
108, 130; p riv a tiz a tio n  o f, 87 , 89 
P o rtu g a l, 97
P o stsh ip m e n t f in an c in g , 84, 85, 120 
P re fe re n tia l tra d e  ag reem en ts  (PT A ): o f  
B raz il, 52 , 81 , 9 8 -9 9 , 119; o f  C h ile , 
55 , 6 7 -6 8 ; o f  C o lo m b ia , 4 1 , 4 2 , 55 , 
1 1 8 -1 1 9 , 126, 133; o f  M ex ico , 
2 5 -2 7 , 26 t, 31 , 4 1 ^ 4 3 , 4 6 , 4 7 n l7 ;  
n o n ta r iff  tra d e  b a rrie rs , 41 ; p la n t 
lo c a tio n  d ec is io n s , 46 . See also 
A P E C ; G ro u p  o f  T h re e  (G 3); 
M e rco su r; N A F T A  
P re fe rre d -su p p lie r  ce rtifica te , 128 
P re sh ip m e n t f in a n c in g , 84 , 85 , 87 , 120 
P ric e  co n tro ls , 7 3 , 7 5 , 7 7 -7 8 , 82 
P ric e  s tab ility , 5 1 , 53 , 5 5 , 83 , 101, 
117 -1 1 8
P ric in g  o f  ex p o rts , 96, 100, 104, 124 
P rim ary  g o o d s ex p o rts , 2 3 , 5 1 , 6 8 , 9 2
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P rin tin g  industry , 57 , 64—6 5 , 124, 129, 
130, 1 3 2 ,1 3 5  
P riv a tiza tio n , 5 4 , 8 8 -8 9 , 108 
P ro c ess in g  lev e l o f  ex p o rts , 7 9 -8 0  
P ro C h ile , 6 0 -6 1 , 64 , 66 , 69 , 7 0 -7 1 , 119 
P ro d u c tio n  cap ac ity : in v e s tm e n t fo r  
ex p o rt, 81, 106; u tiliza tio n , 32 , 90, 
102, 1 0 3 -1 0 4 , 123 
P ro d u c tio n  fin an c in g , 85, 8 6 -8 8 , 103,
110
P ro d u c tio n  p ro cesses : se p e ra te  p ro d u c t 
l in es, 127; s tru c tu ra l c h an g es , 9 0 , 94; 
u p g ra d in g  of, 3 7 -3 8 , 4 3 , 4 4 , 62,
6 4 -6 5 , 83 , 98 , 102, 103, 105; 
u p g rad in g  th ro u g h  c lien ts , 126; v e r ti­
c a l s tru c tu re , 99  
P ro d u c tio n  tech n o lo g y , 94 , 97 
P ro d u c tiv ity : b en e fits  f ro m  ex p o rtin g ,
3 8 , 4 2 , 4 4 , 106; e n h a n c e m e n t m e a s­
u res , 7 0 -7 1 , 7 2 n 7 , 122, 1 5 8 -1 6 0 ; 
g a in s an d  fo re ig n  ex ch an g e  po licy , 
106, 113n36; g a in s  f ro m  o u tso u rc in g , 
9 6 ; o f  labo r, 75 
P ro d u c t m ix , 124
P ro d u c t quality , 3 6 -3 7 , 38; d o m estic  
s ta n d a rd s , 6 3 -6 4 ;  as so u rce  o f  c o m ­
p e titio n , 102; u p g ra d in g  o f, 6 3 , 65 , 
83 , 98 , 100, 126 
P ro d u c ts : d iffe re n tia tio n  o f, 98 ,
1 0 0 -1 0 1 , 104—105; s tan d ard s , 3 6 -3 7 , 
4 4 , 6 4 -6 5 , 124, 126 
P ro d u c t tren d s, 35 , 126 
P R O E X . See P ro g ra m a  de
F in a n c ia m ie n to  d e  E x p o rtaçõ es  
P ro e x p o , 1 1 9 -1 2 0  
P ro e x p o rt, 120, 122, 125, 129, 136 
P R O F O . See P ro y e c to s  d e  F o m en to  
P ro g ra m a  d e  F in a n c ia m ie n to  de 
E x p o rta ç õ e s  (P R O E X ), 84—85 
P ro g ra m a  d e  Im p o rta c ió n  T em p o ra l p a ra  
P ro d u c ir  A rtícu lo s  d e  E x p o rtac ió n  
(P IT E X ), 2 8 -2 9 , 4 0 , 4 5 -4 6  
P ro g ra m a  d e  In te g ra ç ã o  S ocia l an d  
C o n trib u ç â o  p a ra  o  F in a n c ia m e n to  da  
S eg u rid ad e  S o c ia l, 8 8 -8 9  
P ro m p e x , 159
P ro te c tio n ism , 2 4 , 8 2 -8 3 , 118, 137. See 
also o p en n ess  o f  eco n o m y ; tra d e  lib ­
e ra liz a tio n  
P ro y e c to s  d e  F o m en to  (P R O F O ), 72n 2  
P T A s. See p re fe ren tia l tra d e  a g ree ­
m en ts
P u lp  a n d  p a p e r  ind u stry , 5 1 , 52 , 57 , 91, 
9 3 , 9 4 , 1 0 1 -1 0 3  
P u rc h a se  fin an c in g  fo r  ex p o rts , 59
Q S  9 0 0 0 , 98
Q u a lity  assu ran ce , 3 6 -3 7 , 6 2 , 64—6 5 , 98, 
102, 126 
Q u a lity  ce rtifica tio n s , 4 1 , 102
R a ilro ad s , 4 1 , 4 6 , 89 , 108 
R a w  m a te ria ls , 9 6 ,1 0 2 ;  e x p o r t ta x  
ex em p tio n s , 2 8 -2 9 ; im p o rted , 83, 99 , 
102, 121 
Real, 7 3 , 7 7 -7 8 , 80 , 86 , 98 
Real P lan , 7 7 -7 8 , 79 , 82, 105 
R e cess io n , 32 , 55; in  B raz il, 75 , 90 , 103, 
105
R e cru itm en t, o f  fo re ig n  rep re sen ta tiv es , 
33
R e d e  F e rro v iá r ia  F ed e ra l S o c ied ad e  
A n ô n im a , 88 
R e d  tap e , ex p o rt, 132, 1 4 7 -1 4 8 ; in  
B raz il, 98 , 99 , 102, 105, 107, 110; in  
M e x ic o , 4 0 -4 1 , 45 
R e d  tap e , im p o rt, 4 1 , 4 2 , 4 6  
R e eb o k , 128 
R e fu n d s , 5 7 -5 8
R e g io n a l in teg ra tio n , 81 , 1 1 8 -1 1 9 , 122, 
1 2 5 -1 2 6 , 133 
R e g u la tio n : o f  e x p o rt f in a n c in g , 84—85;
o f  te leco m m u n ica tio n s , 89 
R e g u la to ry  sy s tem , as e x p o rt o b sta c le , 
99
R e in te g ro  S im p lif icad o , 56 , 5 7 -5 8 , 66,
6 9 -7 0
R e sea rch  m e th o d s , 4 - 5 ,  31 , 4 7 n n  5, 11, 
93 , 94 , 123, 139 
R ica rd o , D av id , 5 
R ío  d e  Ja n e iro , 89, 94  
R io  G ran d e  d o  N o rte , 89 
R isk  in su ran ce , 8 6 -8 7 , 87 , 109 
R o a d s , 99 , 108, 130 
R o d rik , D an i, 7 
R u le s  o f  o rig in , 30
S A B O , 9 6 -9 8 , 1 1 2 n n 2 4 -2 6  
S a le  r ig h ts  c o n trac ts , 86 
S a le s  ex p an s io n , 97  
S an  A n to n io , 67 
S an ita ry  re q u ire m e n ts , 37 , 42
1 8 0 Index
S an tiag o , 67 
S an to s, 1 0 1 ,1 0 5  
S áo  P au lo , 89 , 94 , 101, 105 
S a te llite  ex p lo ra tio n , 89  
S av in g s, 51
S E C O F I. See M in is try  o f  T rad e  an d  
In d u stry  (M ex ico )
“ S eco n d  f lo o r”  f in a n c ia l in s titu tio n s , 30, 
120
S ecre ta ría  d e  H a c ie n d a  (F in a n ce  
M in is try -C o lo m b ia ) , 120 
S ecu ritiza tio n : o f  e x p o rts , 83 , 86 , 103;
o f  loans , 86 
S ecurity , 131
S em im an u fa c tu red  g o o d s , 8 0 t, 87 , 103 
S erv ices: e n g in ee rin g , f in an c in g  o f, 59, 
8 3 -8 4 , 87; g lo b a l o u tso u rc in g , 95,
96 ; to  su p p o rt cu s to m e rs , 65 , 9 7 , 98 , 
100, 104; tra d e  in , 25 
S h ip m en t sch ed u le s , 4 1 , 4 6 , 130 
S h o ck  ab so rb e rs , 9 5 -9 7  
S IC O M E X , 110, 113n41 
S IE X . See P la n  V allejo  
S im p lif ied  D ra w b a c k  S ch em e  fo r  
N o n trad itio n a l E x p o rts . See 
R e in teg ro  S im p lif icad o  
S im p lif ied  tra d e  p ro c e d u re s , 29  
S istem as E sp ec ia le s  d e  Im p o rtac ió n - 
E x p o rta c ió n  (S IE X ). See P la n  V allejo  
S itin g  o f  p lan ts . See p la n t lo ca tio n  
ch o ice
S m u g g lin g , 130, 133, 138 
S o c ia l se cu rity  co n tr ib u tio n s , 88 
S o c ied ad e  d e  C réd ito  à  E x p o rtação , 87  
S o u th  A m erica , 68
S tab iliza tio n  o f  eco n o m y , 7 3 -7 5 , 7 7 , 80, 
8 2 -8 3 , 91 
S tag n a tio n , 7 5 , 9 0
S tan d ard s, in te rn a tio n a l, 3 7 -3 9 , 4 4 , 98 , 
1 2 5 -1 2 7  
S to rag e , 5 6 -5 7  
S tra te g ic  a llian ces , 6 0  
“ S tro n g  real” po licy , 73 , 80 , 103, 106 
S u b sid ia ries , fo re ig n , 9 7 , 104 
S ubsid ies : fo r  e x p o rt in su ran ce , 5 9 -6 0 ; 
fo r  ex p o rts , 5 6 -5 8 , 6 1 , 6 9 -7 0 , 
1 2 1 -1 2 2 , 1 2 8 -1 2 9 ; fo r  u p g ra d e  co n ­
su ltan ts , 7 2 n 2 . See also U ru g u ay  
R o u n d  A g reem en ts  
S u l A m érica , 87 
S u p p lie r  c red its , 103
S u p p lie rs  to  e x p o rte rs , 3 8 , 4 4 , 6 3 , 65 , 
126
S upp ly , re lia b ility  o f, 102 
S u p p ly -p u sh  p ro c e ss , 6 3 -6 4
T aiw an: trad e  w ith  C h ile , 52 
T ariffs , 30 , 36; in  B raz il, 82, 95 , l l l n l O ;  
in  C h ile , 54—55; in  C o lo m b ia , 118; 
co s t reco v e ry  fro m , 2 8 , 56 , 5 7 -5 8 , 
120; d e lay ed  p a y m e n ts , 58; e x e m p ­
tio n  fro m , 2 8 -2 9 , 135, 150; in  
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About the Book
Although Latin American and Caribbean countries have assigned a high 
priority to increasing exports in recent years— substantially transform­
ing their economies in the process— export performance in most cases 
remains deficient. This book investigates why this is so, identifying the 
p o lic ie s  that determ ine su ccesses and failures in B razil, C hile, 
Colombia, and Mexico.
Each country case study focuses systematically on the macroeco­
nomic environment, its trade and export promotion policies, and the 
influence of those policies on firms ’ export behavior. The authors also 
consider the learning experiences of firms that successfully change their 
practices in order to compete in global markets. A concluding chapter 
offers policy recommendations for enhancing export performance with­
in the bounds of the Uruguay Round Agreements.
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